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Chapter Three of the dissertation addresses the corporate control issue during the IPO transition. When a firm goes public, the joint ownership of the firm is dismantled asynchronously, as some initial owners (for example, the venture capitalists) are able to sell their shares soon after an IPO while the entrepreneur usually stays in the management for a longer period. This paper captures this empirical fact by introducing a model of the IPO decision that explicitly considers the interaction of different block-holders of the firm at the time of an IPO. We focus on the case of a venture capitalist and a single entrepreneur. We find that in our model the privately optimal size of the IPO depends on the pre-IPO ownership structure. We characterize the nature of this dependence in a structural model and perform an empirical analysis for the U.S. IPO market for the period 1994-2005. The data confirm that the unsynchronized dismantlement of a joint venture affects the size of an IPO in a way consistent with our model. Our empirical results suggest that the decision of what fraction of the firm to sell is distorted in the direction generally favored by the venture capitalist.
“An incisive history of the venture-capital industry.” —New Yorker “An excellent and original economic history of venture capital.” —Tyler Cowen, Marginal Revolution “A detailed, fact-filled account of America’s most celebrated moneymen.” —New Republic “Extremely interesting, readable, and informative...Tom Nicholas tells you most everything you ever wanted to know about the history of venture capital, from the financing of the whaling industry to the present multibillion-dollar venture funds.” —Arthur Rock “In principle, venture capital is where the ordinarily conservative, cynical domain of big money touches dreamy, long-shot enterprise. In practice, it has become the distinguishing big-business engine of our time...[A] first-rate history.” —New Yorker VC tells the riveting story of how the venture capital industry arose from America’s longstanding identification with entrepreneurship and risk-taking. Whether the venture is a whaling voyage setting sail from New Bedford or the latest Silicon Valley startup, VC is a state of mind as much as a way of doing business, exemplified by an appetite for seeking extreme financial rewards, a tolerance for failure and experimentation, and a faith in the promise of innovation to generate new wealth. Tom Nicholas’s authoritative history takes us on a roller coaster of entrepreneurial successes and setbacks. It describes how iconic firms like Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia invested in Genentech and Apple even as it tells the larger story of VC’s birth and evolution, revealing along the way why venture capital is such a quintessentially American institution—one that has proven difficult to recreate elsewhere.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are financial vehicles whereby firms can raise capital through public markets. These vehicles increased in importance in the 1990's when financial institutions were reluctant to lend money, especially to young or unestablished firms. Private real estate companies, hampered by these tight credit markets, formed Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), a public entity. REIT IPOs trade on the same markets and are subject to the same SEC regulations as equity stocks, but the lack luster behavior of their initial stock offerings is opposite to large initial day returns exhibited by equity stocks. In proposing that underpricing is a strategy utilized by the firm and the underwriter, this study, comparing IPOs of four industries: retail, manufacturer of communication equipment, software development, and REITs, validates the theory of asymmetric information, whereby investors are compensated for risk through underpricing.
In the second essay, it is argued that the time following an amendment in which demand is revealed has a cost. So, why do some firms take longer than others to go public following the amendment? It is hypothesized that the delay to the offer results from overestimation of demand and risk. As a result, underpricing predicted at the amendment is not indicative of the final level of underpricing. The firm and its investors bear the costs of the delay. This study highlights the distinction between partial and full information and the costs associated with SEC requirements.
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We describe and present time series evidence on the leveraged buyout / private equity industry, both firms and transactions. We discuss the existing empirical evidence on the economics of the firms and transactions. We consider similarities and differences between the recent private equity wave and the wave of the 1980s. Finally, we speculate on what the evidence implies for the future of private equity.
ABSTRACT: This dissertation includes two chapters that investigate the role venture capitalists (VCs) play in the underpricing and in the long-run performance of IPOs. The first chapter focuses on the underpricing of IPOs and attempts to determine the role that VCs play in this underpricing process. The evidence is consistent with a view that VCs agree to underpricing to ascertain benefits from both "grandstanding" and "spinning." The second chapter examines the long-run performance of IPOs and tries to determine the role that VCs play in the development of IPOs. Here, the evidence suggests that VC-backed IPOs appear to have better access to capital than non-VC-backed IPOs, but the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs is generally mixed.