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Effects-based operations (EBO) are defined for thismonograph as operations conceived and planned in a systems framework thatconsiders the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.
The unpredictable counterinsurgency environment challenges centralized, quantitative campaign assessment. A comprehensive examination of the centralized, quantitative approach to assessment, as described in the literature and doctrine and applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps and proposes an alternative process: contextual assessment.
Airpower in the War against ISIS chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT). Benjamin S. Lambeth contends that the war's costly and excessive duration resulted from CENTCOM's inaccurate assessment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), determining it was simply a resurrected Iraqi insurgency rather than recognizing it as the emerging proto-state that it actually was. This erroneous decision, Lambeth argues, saw the application of an inappropriate counterinsurgency strategy and use of rules of engagement that imposed needless restrictions on the most effective use of the precision air assets at CENTCOM's disposal. The author, through expert analysis of recent history, forcefully argues that CENTCOM erred badly by not using its ample air assets at the outset not merely for supporting Iraq's initially noncombat-ready ground troops but also in an independent and uncompromising strategic interdiction campaign against ISIS's most vital center-of-gravity targets in Syria from the effort's first moments onward.
This edited volume addresses the challenges and opportunities facing NATO post-2014, applying an original approach to strategy that will produce fresh insights into this hot topic within the international security community.
This is the first comprehensive account of the progression of the Second Lebanese War, from the border abduction of an Israeli soldier on the morning of July 12, 2006, through the hasty decision for an aggressive response; the fateful discussions in the Cabinet and the senior Israeli command; to the heavy fighting in south Lebanon and the raging diplomatic battles in Paris, Washington and New York. The book answers the following questions: has Israel learned the right lessons from this failed military confrontation? What can Western countries learn from the IDF's failure against a fundamentalist Islamic terror organization? And what role did Iran and Syria play in this affair? 34 Days delivers the first blow-by-blow account of the Lebanon war and new insights for the future of the region and its effects on the West.
The participants in the Dartmouth Conference-so named because the first meeting took place at Dartmouth College in 1960-didn't just open up a new level of East-West understanding, they also pioneered a new kind of dialogue between adversaries. They were not government officials, yet their aim was somehow to narrow the divide between the Soviet and American governments-and indeed their peoples. Over the course of more than 40 years, as relationships warmed and trust developed, their dialogue deepened and widened. The ideas and information exchanged between them filtered into public discourse and were channeled into policymaking circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The impact of the Dartmouth Conference can never be measured precisely, but it was substantial. As James Voorhees demonstrates, the concept of the multilevel peace process, and especially the idea of sustained dialogue between influential but unofficial members of seemingly implacable groups, evolved as the Dartmouth process evolved. Unfettered by the constraints on official diplomats, the participants could speak with a rare degree of candor and freedom on a wide range of subjects, sustaining their conversation from one meeting to the next and building a foundation of shared knowledge. As Harold Saunders and Vitaly Zhurkin explain in a concluding chapter, the lessons learned and techniques developed at Dartmouth are being applied today in numerous settings. Drawing on extensive research and interviews, this highly readable account of the evolution of a unique peacemaking venture adds a new perspective on both the Cold War and the conduct of multilevel peace processes.
Information operations involve the use of military information and how it is gathered, manipulated, and fused. It includes such critical functions as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and precision navigation. Separating myth from reality, this authoritative resource provides military professionals with a current and comprehensive understanding of information warfare operations planning, including offensive, defensive, and influence operations. The book identifies the features of information operations that differ from traditional military operations and reveals why this discipline is more important now than ever before. Professionals discover new planning tools that have been brought together under a single platform to become the next Information Operations Planning Tool for the U.S. Department of Defence. Additionally, the book defines and identifies new threats and opportunities, and explains why the U.S. is not yet winning the war for the minds.