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Excerpt from Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions Together, the above three findings indicate that the information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions is related to earnings changes in the year of and one year subsequent to the announcement of these dividend policy changes. This evidence is consistent with the dividend information hypothesis. The results are also consistent with l.intner's description that in making dividend policy decisions managers consider past, current and future earnings. Investors therefore interpret dividend initiations and omissions as changes in managements' About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
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Initiations and omissions of dividend payments are important changes in corporate financial policy. This paper investigates the market reaction to such changes in terms of prices, volume, and changes in clientele. Consistent with the prior literature we find that short run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations ( -7.0% vs. +3.4% three day return). However, we show that, when we control for the change in the magnitude of dividend yield (which is larger for omissions), the asymmetry shrinks or disappears, depending on the specification. In the 12 months after the announcement (excluding the event calendar month), there is a significant positive market-adjusted return for firms initiating dividends of +7.5% and a significant negative market-adjusted return for firms omitting dividends of -11.0%. However, the post dividend omission drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples (long in initiation stocks and short in omission stocks) earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. Although these changes in dividend policy might be expected to produce shifts in clientele, we find little evidence for such a shift. Volume increases, but only slightly and briefly, and there are no important changes in institutional ownership.
We find that informed trading in the option market prior to dividend initiation is negatively related to announcement period price reactions. This relation is more prevalent among firms with abnormal trading in call options, higher stock price runup, and higher option liquidity. We also find improvements in stock liquidity following dividend initiation. The improvement in stock liquidity is positively related to the increase in institutional investors' holdings, and negatively related to the relative size of the dividend initiation payment and preannouncement option trading. We further find positive abnormal earnings following dividend initiation. Overall, these findings indicate that dividend initiation conveys information regarding sustainable future earnings and improvements in liquidity, and informed traders are active in the option market prior to dividend initiation.
We examine the intra-industry information effects of announcements of dividend initiations. Our results indicate that the stock prices of industry competitors do not react to dividend initiations. Further, analysts do not revise their earnings forecasts for nonannouncing, rival firms. These findings are not sensitive to the manner in which we estimate abnormal returns or calculate forecast revisions. Thus, the information conveyed to the market by the decision to initiate dividends contains no industry-wide component. Dividend initiation appears to be a firm-specific event.
Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.
We hypothesize that the initiation of cash dividends indicates that a firm?s earnings and cash flows have become fundamentally less risky. We present evidence to support this hypothesis. A sample of firms initiating dividends displays a precipitous decrease in risk immediately following the dividend announcement. Although these firms? earnings do not subsequently increase, earnings volatility is significantly lower following the dividend decision. We also find that the decrease in risk is related to the excess return observed around the dividend announcement.
We find that dividend-omitting firms suffer a greater drop in short-term and long-term forecasts of future earnings than their industry average. Earnings and dividend announcements are substitute signals of short- term earnings prospects - after controlling for recent earnings announcements, dividend omissions do not provide incremental information about short-term earnings expectations. Even after controlling for contemporaneous earnings and other announcements, however, omissions provide incremental information about long-term earnings forecasts. Our findings support Miller and Modigliani's [1961] information content hypothesis that while dividend omissions are associated with short-term earnings downturns, they convey incremental information about quot;permanentquot; earnings prospects.
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