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Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.
Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.
Game theory is a branch of modern applied mathematics that aims to analyse various problems of conflict between parties that have opposed similar or simply different interests.Games are grouped into several classes according to some important features. In Game Theory (2nd Edition), Petrosyan and Zenkevich consider zero-sum two-person games, strategic N-person games in normal form, cooperative games, games in extensive form with complete and incomplete information, differential pursuit games and differential cooperative, and non-cooperative N-person games. The 2nd edition updates heavily from the 1st edition published in 1996.
Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.
Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.
This book differs from traditional numerical analysis texts in that it focuses on the motivation and ideas behind the algorithms presented rather than on detailed analyses of them. It presents a broad overview of methods and software for solving mathematical problems arising in computational modeling and data analysis, including proper problem formulation, selection of effective solution algorithms, and interpretation of results. In the 20 years since its original publication, the modern, fundamental perspective of this book has aged well, and it continues to be used in the classroom. This Classics edition has been updated to include pointers to Python software and the Chebfun package, expansions on barycentric formulation for Lagrange polynomial interpretation and stochastic methods, and the availability of about 100 interactive educational modules that dynamically illustrate the concepts and algorithms in the book. Scientific Computing: An Introductory Survey, Second Edition is intended as both a textbook and a reference for computationally oriented disciplines that need to solve mathematical problems.
This classic book provides a rigorous treatment of the Riesz?Fredholm theory of compact operators in dual systems, followed by a derivation of the jump relations and mapping properties of scalar and vector potentials in spaces of continuous and H?lder continuous functions. These results are then used to study scattering problems for the Helmholtz and Maxwell equations. Readers will benefit from a full discussion of the mapping properties of scalar and vector potentials in spaces of continuous and H?lder continuous functions, an in-depth treatment of the use of boundary integral equations to solve scattering problems for acoustic and electromagnetic waves, and an introduction to inverse scattering theory with an emphasis on the ill-posedness and nonlinearity of the inverse scattering problem.
In order to emphasize the relationships and cohesion between analytical and numerical techniques, Ordinary Differential Equations in Theory and Practice presents a comprehensive and integrated treatment of both aspects in combination with the modeling of relevant problem classes. This text is uniquely geared to provide enough insight into qualitative aspects of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to offer a thorough account of quantitative methods for approximating solutions numerically, and to acquaint the reader with mathematical modeling, where such ODEs often play a significant role. Although originally published in 1995, the text remains timely and useful to a wide audience. It provides a thorough introduction to ODEs, since it treats not only standard aspects such as existence, uniqueness, stability, one-step methods, multistep methods, and singular perturbations, but also chaotic systems, differential-algebraic systems, and boundary value problems. The authors aim to show the use of ODEs in real life problems, so there is an extended chapter in which illustrative examples from various fields are presented. A chapter on classical mechanics makes the book self-contained. Audience: the book is intended for use as a textbook for both undergraduate and graduate courses, and it can also serve as a reference for students and researchers alike.