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This paper, the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC's responsibility to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council's (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI).
In the aftermath of September 11 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) embarked on a program to reform its intelligence and national security programs. Many experts agree the FBI has made progress in some areas (dissemination of raw intelligence), but some believe that the FBI has shown little progress in other areas (establishing an integrated and proactive intelligence program) while the FBI's budget increased by 68 per cent from 2001-2005. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has recommended, and the White House has approved, the establishment of a National Security Service within the FBI. This Service would integrate the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Division with the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Whether this organisational change will yield substantive results is an open question. This book analyses the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field.
These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states. Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.
In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.
Posner discusses the utter futilty of this reform act in a searing critique of the 9/11 Commission, its recommendations, Congress's role in making law, and the law's inability to do what it is intended to do.
The documents contained within this updated edition incorporate all amendments since the release of Winter 2012 version through February 26, 2016 and verified against the United States Code maintained by the United States Library of Congress and Westlaw private company. The documents cited in this volume range from principles of professional ethics and transparency for the Intelligence Community, several Acts including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that includes information sharing, privacy, and civil liberties, and security clearances, plus Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Classified Information Procedures Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, numerous executive orders, presidential policy directives, and more. American citizens, law enforcement, especially U.S. Federal agency personnel that engage with intelligence surveillance, classified information, and national security efforts may be interested in this updated edition. Additionally, attorneys, civil servants involved within information technology departments, and records management may also be interested in this resource. Students pursuing courses in the areas of Ethics in Criminal Justice, Computer Forensics, Criminal Law in Criminal Justice, Homeland Security and Terrorism, Information Storage and Retrieval, Computer Security, or Military Science may be interested in this reference for research. Lastly, public, special, and academic libraries may want this legal reference available for their patrons. Related products: Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book, Winter 2012 - Limited quantities while supplies last - can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00278-3 Intelligence and Espionage resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/intelligence-espionage Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice topical books can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/law-enforcement-criminal-justice Mail & Communications Security collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/mail-communications-security
After the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission argued that the United States needed a powerful leader, a spymaster, to forge the scattered intelligence bureaucracies into a singular enterprise to vanquish AmericaÆs new enemiesùstateless international terrorists. In the midst of the 2004 presidential election, Congress and the president remade the postûWorld War II national security infrastructure in less than five months, creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red illuminates the complicated history of the bureaucratic efforts to reform AmericaÆs national security after the intelligence failures of 9/11 and IraqÆs missing weapons of mass destruction, explaining how the NSC and Congress shaped the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. Michael Allen asserts that the process of creating the DNI position and the NCTC is a case study in power politics and institutional reform. By bringing to light the legislative transactions and political wrangling during the reform of the intelligence community, Allen helps us understand why the effectiveness of these institutional changes is still in question.
How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.