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This book discusses the relationship between democracy and the financial order from various legal perspectives. Each of the nine contributions adopts a unique perspective on the legal and political challenges brought to the fore by the Global Financial Crisis. This crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in Europe are only the latest in a long series of financial crises around the globe in recent decades. By their very existence, but also as a result of the political turmoil they have created, these financial crises testify to the well-known tensions between democracy and a market-based economic and financial order. However, what is missing in this debate is an analysis of the role of law for reconciling democracy with a market-based financial order. To fill this lacuna, the book focuses on the controversy surrounding the concept of law, thereby adding another variable to the debate on the relation between democracy and capitalism. Each chapter addresses the concept of law from a particular theoretical angle, be it a full-grown legal theory or an approach in political economy that has a particular view of the law.
This book discusses the relationship between democracy and the financial order from various legal perspectives. Each of the nine contributions adopts a unique perspective on the legal and political challenges brought to the fore by the Global Financial Crisis. This crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in Europe are only the latest in a long series of financial crises around the globe in recent decades. By their very existence, but also as a result of the political turmoil they have created, these financial crises testify to the well-known tensions between democracy and a market-based economic and financial order. However, what is missing in this debate is an analysis of the role of law for reconciling democracy with a market-based financial order. To fill this lacuna, the book focuses on the controversy surrounding the concept of law, thereby adding another variable to the debate on the relation between democracy and capitalism. Each chapter addresses the concept of law from a particular theoretical angle, be it a full-grown legal theory or an approach in political economy that has a particular view of the law.
Tamara Lothian shows a path to the reconstruction of the economy in the service of both growth and inclusion that would reignite economic growth by democratizing the market. Law and the Wealth of Nations offers a progressive approach to the supply side of the economy and proposes innovation in our fundamental economic arrangements.
Víctor Ferreres Comella contrasts the European 'centralised' constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralised model such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and non-constitutional questions.
This special issue assembles eight articles on the relationship between democracy and the financial order from various legal perspectives. Each article engages with the concept of law from a particular theoretical angle, be it a full-grown legal theory or an approach in political economy that has a particular view of the law. We have arranged the special issue in order to reflect certain debates. Thus, the special issue begins with a debate between two contemporary German theories of law by Jürgen Habermas (Goldmann and Steininger) and Niklas Luhmann (Viellechner). Next is a transatlantic debate between rational choice conceptions of law (Towfigh) and ideas of constitutional pluralism (Avbelj). Different traditions of mostly Anglo-Saxon liberalism are reflected in the contribution by Suttle. Eventually, three contributions engage with conceptions of law in neoliberalism and ordoliberalism and the way they have shaped our perceptions of public finance, including budgetary rules, taxes, and money (Biebricher, Saffie, Feichtner).To connect theory with life, each contribution elaborates its salient theoretical points by using an example of a particular case study or issue area that faces challenges in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Thus, while all articles address the law's capacity to accommodate both democracy and capitalism, each individually contributes to the development of law and policy in a particular issue area. Topics range from sovereign debt issues (Goldmann and Steininger, Viellechner, Suttle) to budgetary restrictions (Biebricher), banking regulation (Avbelj), money and the ECB (Towfigh and Feichtner), and taxes (Saffie).
At the end of the Cold War, international law scholars engaged in furious debate over whether principles of democratic legitimacy had entered international law. Many argued that a 'democratic entitlement' was emerging. Others were skeptical that international practice in democracy promotion was either consistent or sufficiently widespread and many found the idea of democratic entitlement dangerous. Those debates, while ongoing, have not been comprehensively revisited in almost twenty years. Together with an original introduction, this volume collects the leading scholarship of the past two decades on these and other questions. It focuses particular attention on the normative consequences of the recent 'democratic recession' in many regions of the world.
The question of which European or international institution should exercise public authority is a highly contested one. This new collection offers an innovative approach to answering this vexed question. It argues that by viewing public authority as relative, it allows for greater understanding of both its allocation and its legitimacy. Furthermore, it argues that relations between actors should reflect the comparative analysis of the legitimacy assets that each actor can bring into governance processes. Put succinctly, the volume illustrates that public authority is relative between actors and relative to specific legitimacy assets. Drawing on the expertise of leading scholars in the field, it offers a thought-provoking and rigorous analysis of the long debated question of who should do what in European and international law.
As of the latest national elections, it costs approximately $1 billion to become president, $10 million to become a Senator, and $1 million to become a Member of the House. High-priced campaigns, an elite class of donors and spenders, superPACs, and increasing corporate political power have become the new normal in American politics. In Capitalism v. Democracy, Timothy Kuhner explains how these conditions have corrupted American democracy, turning it into a system of rule that favors the wealthy and marginalizes ordinary citizens. Kuhner maintains that these conditions have corrupted capitalism as well, routing economic competition through political channels and allowing politically powerful companies to evade market forces. The Supreme Court has brought about both forms of corruption by striking down campaign finance reforms that limited the role of money in politics. Exposing the extreme economic worldview that pollutes constitutional interpretation, Kuhner shows how the Court became the architect of American plutocracy. Capitalism v. Democracy offers the key to understanding why corporations are now citizens, money is political speech, limits on corporate spending are a form of censorship, democracy is a free market, and political equality and democratic integrity are unconstitutional constraints on money in politics. Supreme Court opinions have dictated these conditions in the name of the Constitution, as though the Constitution itself required the privatization of democracy. Kuhner explores the reasons behind these opinions, reveals that they form a blueprint for free market democracy, and demonstrates that this design corrupts both politics and markets. He argues that nothing short of a constitutional amendment can set the necessary boundaries between capitalism and democracy.
One of the most troubling critiques of contemporary democracy is the inability of representative governments to regulate the deluge of money in politics. If it is impossible to conceive of democracies without elections, it is equally impractical to imagine elections without money. Costs of Democracy is an exhaustive, ground-breaking study of money in Indian politics that opens readers’ eyes to the opaque and enigmatic ways in which money flows through the political veins of the world’s largest democracy. Through original, in-depth investigation—drawing from extensive fieldwork on political campaigns, pioneering surveys, and innovative data analysis—the contributors in this volume uncover the institutional and regulatory contexts governing the torrent of money in politics; the sources of political finance; the reasons for such large spending; and how money flows, influences, and interacts with different tiers of government. The book raises uncomfortable questions about whether the flood of money risks washing away electoral democracy itself.
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.