Download Free Deep Maneuver Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Deep Maneuver and write the review.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
An essential part of the Air War College curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Part 1 of this manuscript presents an attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U.S. Army's official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. Part 2 contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysis of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which we have presented them.
"Part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series, Deep Operations compares and contrasts US and Soviet theoretical approaches to deep operations. It provides readings that outline the theoretical approach to conducting deep operations in order to prevail and win. The US Army may be well served to look at how operations were done in the past in order to gain insight into not only what an adversary is doing, but why they are doing operations in a certain way"--
The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions. The first question is: Is it feasible to use airborne forces to penetrate enemy airspace and to conduct a vertical envelopment to effect deep operational maneuver? If it is feasible, what are the employment options available for the use of such an airborne force in the conduct of a modern military campaign? To examine these questions, the paper begins with some definitions to provide a common frame of reference. The use of airborne forces in World War II is next examined to determine if the use of airborne forces to effect deep operational maneuver is historically feasible. Next, the contemporary threat is discussed as it is relevant to the employment of airborne forces in a modern context. Next, the feasibility of the use of airborne forces with some limitations to conduct deep operational maneuver is established in the context of the maneuver, firepower, and protection aspects of the combat power model. Next, the theory of deep operations and the use of airborne forces to conduct these kinds of deep maneuvers is examined in the theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, Tukhachevskiy, Triandafillov, and Simpkin. Next, six employment options for the use of airborne forces to conduct deep operations in a modern context are deduced. They are: (1) an airborne force can be used to create a second front within a theater of operations; (2) an airborne force can be used to operationally contain an enemy force targeted for destruction within a theater of operations; (3) an airborne force can be used to seize a “bridgehead”...; (4) an airborne force can conduct coups de main against high value targets within a theater of operations; (5) an airborne force can conduct light operations in a theater of operations to disrupt and disorganize the enemy’s rear facilities and networks and have a cumulative operational impact; and (6) an airborne force can conduct expeditionary operations to achieve political, strategic, and operational aims
From the authors' abstract: "This analytical study looks at the importance of Deep Space Operations and recommends an approach for senior policy leaders. Section 1 presents a capability requirements definition with candidate solutions and technology strategies. Section 2 recommends an acquisition and organizational approach. Section 3 provides an extended strategic rationale for deep space operations as a national priority." And from the Introduction: [this essay] "presents capability requirements, potential solutions, and strategic rationale for achieving movement and maneuver advantage in deep space. In this context, deep space is anything beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Driving the research are two primary assumptions underpinning the need for investment in deep space propulsion. The first assumption is that growing international activity, commerce, and industry in space extends the global commons, thus creating a military-economic imperative for the United States Department of Defense (DoD) to expand its protection of U.S. interests by defending space lines of communication. Although there are wide-ranging reasons to expand the space-faring capabilities of the human species, from the capitalistic to the existential, the fact of its occurrence offers the U.S. immense strategic opportunity. Section 1, operating on this assumption, recommends capability-based requirements for deep space operations given a projected future operating environment.The second driving assumption underpinning this study is that improved movement and maneuver capabilities in deep space offer a wide array of benefits for the current National Security Enterprise, and for this reason alone demands attention in the form of disciplined investment. Furthermore, because the core functional capability required for deep space operations is in-space propulsion, the requirement necessitates a materiel solution.
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
The Art of Maneuver shows how true maneuver-warfare theory has been applied in campaigns throughout history. With a genius for apt analogy the author shows how our obsession with fighting and winning set-piece battles causes us to overlook an enemy’s true vulnerabilities. But as low-intensity conflicts promise to become the dominant warfare of the future, the importance of maneuver in attacking an enemy’s critical vulnerability will render attrition approaches to warfighting ever more obsolete. Praise for The Art of Maneuver “Robert Leonhard is one of a number of prominent young military writers, like Daniel Bolger, John Antal, Bruce Gudmundsson, and Harold Raugh, whose work appears regularly in military journals. The Art of Maneuver is his first book, and military readers will appreciate his grasp of military history, forceful analysis, and adventurous writing style. . . .This is an important book which deserves the attention of military professionals. . . . Leonhard deserves credit for a hard-nosed attempt to evaluate U.S. strengths and weaknesses as a basis for further improvements in service doctrine, training, and force development. . . . In the celebratory aftermath of a ‘good war,’ such honest self-appraisal is both healthy and encouraging.”—Parameters “This commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations. . . . This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author’s knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. . . . An important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!”—Marine Corps Gazette “Leonhard . . . has combined military expertise and historical analysis for an entertaining and fresh look at maneuver warfare. . . . In one volume, the author offers trenchant, exciting, and masterful perspective on victory in modern warfare.”—National Defense “Robert Leonhard makes an outstanding contribution to our understanding of maneuver warfare in this book. . . . Our leaders, junior and senior alike, should find this book well worth reading and contemplating.”—ARMOR Magazine “An important contribution to the on-going reassessment of U.S. Army doctrine . . . A must for anyone seriously interested in the future of Army doctrine—and the Army. . . . Further, it is an excellent starting point for young officers to begin their lifelong study of the art of war.”—ARMY Magazine
Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders' actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.