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Respected Bible scholar Ron Rhodes, author of The Coming Oil Storm, addresses another timely issue with integrity in this exploration of how over-dependence on technology puts the nation at risk for cyberattacks and sets the stage for the end times. With up-to-date information, Rhodes prepares readers for the possibility of technology-based warfare and helps them view it in a biblical context as he addresses the following hot topics: what Christians need to know about cybercontrol and the Antichrist what technology and security experts have to say about the risks the validity of the threat of cyberterrorism what a cyberattack against the U.S. would look like the possible role of cyberattacks in end-time wars Both captivating and helpful, this compelling resource provides the truth behind the technology and its likely role in God’s plan for the future.
In seconds, computers can perform tasks that once took days, or wreak havoc beyond anything imaginable. In Cyber Meltdown the "wrong hands" are hard at work and Buzz Decker and his team face a menace that threatens the entire country.
The threat of cyberwar can feel very Hollywood: nuclear codes hacked, power plants melting down, cities burning. In reality, state-sponsored hacking is covert, insidious, and constant. It is also much harder to prevent. Ben Buchanan reveals the cyberwar that's already here, reshaping the global contest for geopolitical advantage.
At its current rate, technological development has outpaced corresponding changes in international law. Proposals to remedy this deficiency have been made, in part, by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by the Russian Federation), but the United States and select allies have rejected these proposals, arguing that existing international law already provides a suitable comprehensive framework necessary to tackle cyber-warfare. Cyber-Attacks and the Exploitable Imperfections of International Law does not contest (and, in fact, supports) the idea that contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello, in general, can accommodate cyber-warfare. However, this analysis argues that existing international law contains significant imperfections that can be exploited; gaps, not yet filled, that fail to address future risks posed by cyber-attacks.
The inside story of how America's enemies launched a cyber war against us-and how we've learned to fight back With each passing year, the internet-linked attacks on America's interests have grown in both frequency and severity. Overmatched by our military, countries like North Korea, China, Iran, and Russia have found us vulnerable in cyberspace. The "Code War" is upon us. In this dramatic book, former Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin takes readers to the front lines of a global but little-understood fight as the Justice Department and the FBI chases down hackers, online terrorist recruiters, and spies. Today, as our entire economy goes digital, from banking to manufacturing to transportation, the potential targets for our enemies multiply. This firsthand account is both a remarkable untold story and a warning of dangers yet to come.
Matt wonders what it would be like to be Meltdown Man, the cyber creature from an Internet game.
Cybersecurity is a complex and contested issue in international politics. By focusing on the 'great powers'--the US, the EU, Russia and China--studies in the field often fail to capture the specific politics of cybersecurity in the Middle East, especially in Egypt and the GCC states. For these countries, cybersecurity policies and practices are entangled with those of long-standing allies in the US and Europe, and are built on reciprocal flows of data, capital, technology and expertise. At the same time, these states have authoritarian systems of governance more reminiscent of Russia or China, including approaches to digital technologies centred on sovereignty and surveillance. This book is a pioneering examination of the politics of cybersecurity in the Middle East. Drawing on new interviews and original fieldwork, James Shires shows how the label of cybersecurity is repurposed by states, companies and other organisations to encompass a variety of concepts, including state conflict, targeted spyware, domestic information controls, and foreign interference through leaks and disinformation. These shifting meanings shape key technological systems as well as the social relations underpinning digital development. But however the term is interpreted, it is clear that cybersecurity is an integral aspect of the region's contemporary politics.
Terrorist acts, most notably 9/11 and the Bali bombings, transformed our attitudes to the secretive world of intelligence, surveillance and security. In this book a prominent group of writers including Michael Mori, Ben Saul, Anne Aly and Peter Leahy lay bare the facts about spying and security in post-9/11 Australia. Their compelling book cuts through panic and fear-mongering to ask hard questions: Is ASIO unaccountable? Is the money we spend on security worth it? Is cyber-terrorism an urgent threat? Are our spies up to the job, and how do we know anyway as we only hear about their failures? Is WikiLeaks good for human rights? Are we trading our privacy for a false sense of security? Spooked untangles the half-truths, conspiracy theories and controversies about the ‘war on terror’, and is a welcome antidote to misinformation and alarm.
THE NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER * Winner of the Financial Times & McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award * Bronze Medal, Arthur Ross Book Award (Council on Foreign Relations) "Written in the hot, propulsive prose of a spy thriller" (The New York Times), the untold story of the cyberweapons market-the most secretive, government-backed market on earth-and a terrifying first look at a new kind of global warfare. Zero-day: a software bug that allows a hacker to break into your devices and move around undetected. One of the most coveted tools in a spy's arsenal, a zero-day has the power to silently spy on your iPhone, dismantle the safety controls at a chemical plant, alter an election, and shut down the electric grid (just ask Ukraine). For decades, under cover of classification levels and nondisclosure agreements, the United States government became the world's dominant hoarder of zero-days. U.S. government agents paid top dollar-first thousands, and later millions of dollars-to hackers willing to sell their lock-picking code and their silence. Then the United States lost control of its hoard and the market. Now those zero-days are in the hands of hostile nations and mercenaries who do not care if your vote goes missing, your clean water is contaminated, or our nuclear plants melt down. Filled with spies, hackers, arms dealers, and a few unsung heroes, written like a thriller and a reference, This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends is an astonishing feat of journalism. Based on years of reporting and hundreds of interviews, Nicole Perlroth lifts the curtain on a market in shadow, revealing the urgent threat faced by us all if we cannot bring the global cyberarms race to heel.
This book examines the role of cyber-doom rhetoric in the U.S. cybersecurity debate. For more than two decades, fear of "cyber-doom" scenarios—i.e. cyberattacks against critical infrastructure resulting in catastrophic physical, social, and economic impacts—has been a persistent feature of the U.S. cybersecurity debate. This is despite the fact that no cyberattack has come close to realizing such impacts. This book argues that such scenarios are part of a broader rhetoric of cyber-doom within the U.S. cybersecurity debate, and takes a multidisciplinary approach that draws on research in history, sociology, communication, psychology, and political science. It identifies a number of variations of cyber-doom rhetoric, then places them into a larger historical context, assesses how realistic the fears expressed in such rhetoric are, and finally draws out the policy implications of relying on these fears to structure our response to cybersecurity challenges. The United States faces very real cybersecurity challenges that are, nonetheless, much less dramatic than what is implied in the rhetoric. This book argues that relying on cyber-doom rhetoric to frame our thinking about such threats is counterproductive, and encourages us to develop ways of thinking and speaking about cybersecurity beyond cyber-doom. This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, foreign policy, public administration, national security, and international relations in general.