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Explores current debates around religious extremism as a means to understand and re-think the connections between terrorism, insurgency and state failure. Using case studies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, she develops a better understanding of the underlying causes and conditions necessary for terrorism and insurgency to occur.
Since 20 December 2001 - the date which marked the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Government - hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers from around 50 different states have physically been and served in Afghanistan. Roughly 20 rotation periods have been experienced; billions of US dollars have been spent; and almost 3,500 coalition soldiers and 7,400 Afghani security personnel have fallen for Afghanistan. In this badly-managed success story, the true determiner of both tactical outcomes on the ground and strategic results was always the tribal and rural parts of Muslim-populated Afghanistan. Although there has emerged a vast literature on counterinsurgency theories and tactics, we still lack reliable information about the motivations and aspirations of the residents of Tribalised Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs) that make up most of Afghanistan. The aim of this book is to describe some on-the-ground problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in TRMEs - specifically in rural Afghanistan - and then to propose how these efforts might be improved. Along the way, it will be necessary to challenge many current assumptions about the conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Most generally, the book will show how counterinsurgency succeeds or fails at the local level (at the level of tactical decisions by small-unit leaders) and that these decisions cannot be successful without understanding the culture and perspective of those who live in TRMEs. Although engaging issues of culture, the author is not an anthropologist or an academic of any kind. He is a Muslim who spent his childhood in a TRME - a remote village in Turkey - and he offers his observations on the basis of 15 years' worth of field experience as a Turkish Special Forces officer serving in rural Iraq, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Cultures in these areas are not the same, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest some overall characteristics of TRMEs and some general problems of COIN efforts in these environments. In summary, this book not only challenges some of the fundamentals of traditional counterinsurgency wisdom and emphasizes the importance of the tactical level - a rarely-studied field from the COIN perspective - but also blends the firsthand field experiences of the author with deep analyses. In this sense, it is not solely an autobiography, but something much more.
What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counter terrorism campaigns? This title addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated.
This study has been undertaken as the first ever joint research publication between defence institutions in Denmark and Pakistan. Given the development in international security politics in the last few years, it is fair to argue that both Denmark and Pakistan are at a point where future security challenges require a development of policies and strategies. Though the roles of Denmark and Pakistan respectively are different in nature, a lot of commonalities in conceptual thoughts and actions were found between the two countries at all levels. The book at hand gathers a number of lessons identified from Afghanistan and Pakistan with the objective of promoting sustainable regional peace building and developing military and civilian cooperation strategies for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counter terrorism campaigns? This title addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century analyzes the most significant dimensions of combating terrorism, including considerations of strategic and tactical issues (hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence); the need to thwart sources and facilitators (weak governments, ill-conceived foreign policy, and trafficking in drugs, guns, and humans); and the incorporation of lessons learned thus far from combating terrorism around the globe. Since the dawn of the new millennium, combating terrorism has become a primary focus of security professionals throughout the world. The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States, while many countries—from Algeria and Spain to Sri Lanka and Indonesia—have redoubled their efforts to combat their own indigenous terrorism threats. In the Unites States, the counterterrorism goals identified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) can only be achieved through significant multinational cooperation. These goals are to advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideologies of terrorism; to prevent attacks by terrorist networks; to deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; to deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and to lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism efforts, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do this better? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated. Volume 1: Strategic and Tactical Considerations examines issues of hard power, soft power, and intelligence/counterintelligence. Volume 2: Sources and Facilitators covers state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, networks and trade and trafficking, and societal issues. Volume 3: Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency includes case studies of counterterrorism operations (e.g., the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the capture of key terrorist suspects like Ramzi Youssef and Khalid Sheikh Mohamad); and case studies of long-term efforts to combat terrorism (e.g., the Basques in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Israel's struggle against Palestinian terror organizations, Peru and Sendero Luminoso, and Japan and Aum Shinrikyo).
Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, a small number of U.S. Army Special Forces (USSF) invaded the Al Qaeda safe haven of Afghanistan. USSF A-teams, operating with almost total independence, conducted highly successful Unconventional Warfare "through, with, and by" the indigenous Afghan militias of the Northern Alliance. The USSF and their indigenous Afghan armies rapidly deposed the Taliban regime and denied the Al Qaeda terrorists their training and support areas within Afghanistan. The momentum of the initial success achieved by USSF during 2001-2002, however, has been dramatically overshadowed by the inability of follow-on U.S. forces to establish long-term stability in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Since 2002, the conventional U.S./Coalition forces, which replaced Army USSF as the main U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) forces, have thus far failed to defeat the re-emerging Taliban/Al Qaeda threat. In fact, 2005 has been the most violent year-to-date for U.S./Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan with 239 U.S. casualties, and President Hamid Karzai's central Afghan government exhibiting little control outside its major cities. This trend continues in 2006. In this thesis we question the current U.S./Coalition campaign plan, which places emphasis on conventional military forces, not USSF, as the main effort COIN force in Operation Enduring Freedom. We propose an alternative Unconventional COIN model which focuses on population control instead of "clear and sweep operations", Afghan constabulary-style forces instead of conventional Afghan National Army troops, the importance of "grassroots" intelligence collection at the village level, and the employment of USSF advisors instead of conventional U.S. infantry troops.
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.
Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.