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Based on his Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) for German firms, Andreas Schillhofer documents a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital.
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This paper investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for German firms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance practices to firm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR firms and shorted low-CGR firms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period. We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR firms.
Mathias Külpmann presents a framework to evaluate whether the stock market is in line with underlying fundamentals. The new and revised edition offers an up to date introduction to the controversy between rational asset pricing and behavioural finance. Empirical evidence of stock market overreaction are investigated within the paradigms of rational asset pricing and behavioural finance. Although this monograph will not promise the reader to become a millionaire, it offers a road to obtain a deeper understanding of the forces which drive stock returns. It should be of interest to anyone interested in what drives performance in the stock market.
Extant literature finds that long-term abnormal stock returns are generated by a strategy based on corporate governance index values (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick2003). The result is inconsistent with efficient markets and suggests that information about governance is not accurately reflected in market data. Control firm portfolios are used to mitigate model misspecification in measuring long-term abnormal returns. Using a number of different matching criteria and governance indices, no long-term abnormal returns are found to trading strategies based on corporate governance. The effect of a change in governance on firm value is mixed, but some support is found for poor governance destroying firm value. These results have a number of implications for practitioners, researchers, and policy makers.
I develop a dynamic model of corporate investment with taxes, costly equity and debt financing, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, and a parameterized time-varying pricing kernel. The framework allows me to explore both the cross section of returns and firms' financing choices. In the model, managers seek private benefits proportional to the sizes of the firms, leading to empire-building behaviors. Corporate governance is modeled explicitly as a mechanism for shareholders to discipline managers. The predictions of the model are consistent with the recent empirical findings: (1) firms with stronger governance outperform firms with weaker governance in booms and underperform these firms in recessions; (2) firms with weaker governance enjoy lower costs of debt financing and rely less on equity financing than firms with stronger governance do. I also empirically test the predictions of the model on expected stock returns.
Incorporates estimation risk in portfolio choice and also covers a risk measure for retail investment products, understanding and exploiting momentum in stock returns. This book includes: Introduction - Corporate restructuring; mergers and acquisitions in Europe; and the performance of acquisitive companies in the US.
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.
Transforming Governance: New Values, New Systems in the New Business Environment, edited by Maria Aluchna and Güler Aras addresses the current state, as well as the development of corporate governance and its perceived tasks and functions, in response to the changing market and regulatory environment. Divided into three parts, the book firstly addresses the variety of theoretical approaches. The inefficiencies, scandals and crises as well as the significant shortcomings and current criticism of shareholder value provide a new setting and theoretical assumptions for the purpose and role of corporate governance in the economy and society. The second section of the book goes on to discuss the forces which lead to the changing corporate governance paradigm, as companies are expected to incorporate not only shareholders but also stakeholders expectations and report and improve upon social and environmental performance. The focus of this section is to present the impact of stakeholders, the requirement for corporate social responsibility and sustainability, as well as the increasing importance of women in management and their participation at corporate board level. Section Three contains corporate governance case studies within various organizational and institutional settings; including the case of family companies, social enterprises/benefit corporations, sustainable companies and emerging markets. The book's contributors comprise both researchers and business experts addressing both theoretical and practical dimensions.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward