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A study and analysis of lack of enforcement against criminal actions in corporate America and what can be done to fix it. In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn’t happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don’t have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. “We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks,” he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, “it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings.” All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice. “Professor Coffee’s compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime.” —Robert Jackson, professor of Law, New York University, and former commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission “A great book that more than any other recent volume deftly explains why effective prosecution of corporate senior executives largely collapsed in the post-2007–2009 stock market crash period and why this creates a crisis of underenforcement. No one is Professor Coffee’s equal in tying together causes for the crisis.” —Joel Seligman, author, historian, former law school dean, and president emeritus, University of Rochester
Nearly six decades have passed since the concept of white-collar crime was introduced and systematic scholarly investigation of it began. Although it has proven to be one of the most challenging and controversial topics in sociology, the concept has taken firm root in lay and scholarly lexicons where it is widely understand and used to denote a type of crime that differs fundamentally from street crime. One way it is different is the backgrounds and characteristics of it perpetrators; the poor and disreputable fodder routinely encountered in police stations and in studies of street crime are seldom in evidence here. Most if not all white-collar offenders by contrast are distinguished by lives by privilege, much of it with origins in class inequality. This reader begins together under a unifying theoretical approach the current state of knowledge about and debate over white-collar crime. Editors' introductions preface each of the six chapters in the book, and each of the thirty-one carefully chosen selections --- both classic and contemporary -- has been significantly edited for readability and suitability for the college student. The readings address conceptual conflicts as well as empirical studies of the strucutre of opportunities, the characteristics of white-collar offenders and their decision making, and the various approaches to controlling white-collar offering. Additionally, the book includes twenty-one specially designed panels that call-out particular issues from the readings by offering case examples taken from local and regional newspapers. Together, the readings and the panels offer the student both analysis and examples of white-collar crime.
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren’t subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are. Prosecutors in the Boardroom explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution. Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna
“Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime.” —Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. “We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks,” he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, “it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings.” All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.
Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime. Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. "We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks," he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, "it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings." All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.
"Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime." --Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. "We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks," he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, "it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings." All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.
Insider trading. Savings and loan scandals. Enron. Corporate crimes were once thought of as victimless offenses, but now—with billions of dollars and an increasingly global economy at stake—this is understood to be far from the truth. The International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime explores the complex interplay of factors involved when corporate cultures normalize lawbreaking, and when organizational behavior is pushed to unethical (and sometimes inhumane) limits. Featuring original contributions from a panel of experts representing North America, Asia, Europe, and Australia, this timely volume presents multidisciplinary views on recent corporate wrongdoing affecting economic and social conditions worldwide. Criminal liability and intent Stock market and financial crime Bribery and extortion Computer and identity fraud Health care fraud Crime in the professions Industrial pollution Political corruption War crimes and genocide Contributors offer case studies, historical and sociopolitical analyses, theoretical and legal perspectives, and comparative studies, featuring examples as varied as NASA, Parmalat, the Italian government, and Watergate. Criminal justice responses to these phenomena, the role of the media in exposing or minimizing them, prevention, regulation, and self- policing strategies, and larger global issues emerging from economic crime are also featured. Richly diverse in its coverage, The International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime is stimulating reading for students, academics, and professionals in a wide range of fields, from criminology and criminal justice to business and economics, psychology to social policy to ethics. This powerful information is certain to change many of our deeply held views on criminal behavior.
Punishing Corporate Crime: Legal Penalties for Criminal and Regulatory Violations provides a practical discussion of criminal punishment trends directed at the corporate entity. Corporate punishment, for the most part, has traditionally occurred either in the form of a fine or, in the extreme, a heavy sanction that terminates the business. This timely book analyzes the historical and statutory bases of corporate punishment and reviews the latest remedies now employed by the government, including receivership and monitoring, disgorgement of profits, restitution, integrity agreements, and disbarment from regulated fields. Punishing Corporate Crime explores the new and evolving area of corporate criminal punishment that has emerged in the post- Enron era. This book offers key advice in addressing the new and evolving punishments that face corporations, as well as a consideration of preventative programs.
Indonesia’s criminal law system faces major challenges. Despite the country’s transition to democracy, both the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code are badly out of date, the former only superficially changed since colonial times and the latter remaining as it was under Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime. Law enforcement officers and judges are widely seen as corrupt or incompetent, and new laws, including new Islamic laws passed at the regional level, often contradict the Criminal Code and national statutes, including human rights laws. This book, based on extensive original research by leading scholars in the field, provides an overall assessment of the state of criminal law, law enforcement and penal policy in Indonesia, considers in depth a wide range of specific areas of criminal law, and discusses recent efforts at reform and their prospects for success.
Corporate Crime, originally published in 1980, is the first and still the only comprehensive study of corporate law violations by our largest corporations. The book laid the groundwork for analyses of important aspects of corporate behavior. It defined corporate crime and found ways of locating corporate violations from various sources. It even drew up measures of the seriousness of crimes. Much of this book still applies today to the corporate world and its illegal behavior.A new introduction, "Corporate Crime: Yesterday and Today--A Comparison," prepared for this edition by coauthor Marshall B. Clinard, discusses the development of a criminological interest in corporate crime, explains the nature of corporate crime, and analyzes a number of issues involved in its study. Among the issues tackled are whether today's corporate crime is greater, more serious, and more complex; accounting fraud and its crucial role in hiding corporate crime; the pharmaceuticals, the industry with the most corporate violations; explanations of corporate crime in terms of economic factors, corporate culture, and the role of top executives; and new laws to control corporate crime and alternative approaches.