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John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke’s use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
An examination of whether or not the nature of consciousness and human identify can be explained using scientific methodology and neurobiological technology. Until recently, the vast complexity of the brain has kept researchers from tackling the thorny topic of consciousness. But now, new imaging techniques are revealing many of the brain's mysteries to neuroscientists, while researchers in the field of artificial intelligence believe they soon might replicate consciousness with silicon and circuitry. Meanwhile, philosophers take issue with this scientific methodology, questioning whether a reductionist approach can really solve the holistic relationship between mind and brain. These approaches are debated in Consciousness and Human Identity by leading figures from such diverse fields as psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, theology, and artificial intelligence. Each contributor brings the insights of their field of study to the debate. Contributors include John Searle, Margaret Boden, Steven Rose, and Olaf Sporns. John Cornwell, the editor, is the former features editor of the Observer, a frequent contributor to the Sunday Times, and currently runs The Science and Human Dimension Project at Jesus College. The project's aims is to stimulate debate between science and the arts and humanities.
Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.
Udo Thiel presents a critical evaluation of the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity in early modern philosophy. He explores over a century of European philosophical debate from Descartes to Hume, and argues that our interest in human subjectivity remains strongly influenced by the conceptual framework of early modern thought.
The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life.
Consciousness is hard to bring to the laboratory as it confronts us with a classic dilemma: can a mind observe itself? However, who, then, is observing the observer? Without experiential awareness, culture, the arts, science, and philosophy would not make sense. Would it make sense if refrigerators were to produce a “refrigerator culture” without the experience of freezing food? Virtually all human culture is destined to provide conscious experiences. This volume provides a rich array of views on human nature and the way it shows up in the strange land of human identity.
Essay from the year 2017 in the subject Philosophy - Practical (Ethics, Aesthetics, Culture, Nature, Right, ...), grade: 3.34, Indiana University (College of Arts and Sciences - Philosophy Department), course: PHIL-P300 Philosophical Writing Methods, language: English, abstract: The Philosophy of Personal Identity which bears a rich tradition dating back to some of the seminal psychological theory of identity forwarded by John Locke. In this essay, I propose a new variation of an imperfect psychological criterion of personal identity that attempts to precisely answer the question, "What is necessary and sufficient for a person to be the same person over time?" Though various experts in this field such as Derek Parfit have forwarded skepticism and outright rejection of conventional theories of personal identity, this paper appeals to metaphysical notions of immanent causality in an effort to respond to Parfit and formulate a framework of identity that explains and satisfies what are often closely held intuitions on personhood.
Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness runs through and helps to solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology and in his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. Central to her account is that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states wherein consciousness is a constituent. Such an interpretation answers charges of inconsistency in Locke's model of the mind and lends coherence to a puzzling aspect of Locke's theory of knowledge: how we know individual things (particular ideas, ourselves, and external objects) when knowledge is defined as the perception of an agreement, or relation, of ideas. In each case, consciousness helps to forge the relation, resulting in a structurally integrated account of our knowledge of particulars fully consistent with the general definition. This model also explains how we achieve the unity of consciousness with past and future selves necessary for Locke's accounts of moral responsibility and moral motivation. And with help from other of his metaphysical commitments, consciousness so interpreted allows Locke's theory of personal identity to resist well-known accusations of circularity, failure of transitivity, and insufficiency for his theological and moral concerns. Although virtually every Locke scholar writes on at least some of these topics, the model of consciousness set forth here provides for an analysis all of these issues as bound together by a common thread.
Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.
Abstract: "Two of the many problems regarding consciousness are how it is possible for us to have conscious experiences, or qualia, and how it is possible for each of us to have a unique self. Some people claim that we will soon be able to answer both these questions in scientific terms. I argue that we can already outline (in computational, but not neuroscientific, terms) how it is possible for us to construct a self, and that (for a tiny handful of cases) we can already give neuroscientific explanations of why we have this conscious experience rather than that one. We can expect more explanations of this kind. But explaining why we have any conscious experiences at all is quite another matter. There is no prospect of a scientific account of this while the philosophical problems remain unsolved."