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We stress some efficiency aspects of monopolistic competition justifying it on account of its tendency to innovate and the questionable excess capacity paradigm. Some further efficiency aspects revealed are product variety and transaction cost savings. We view the monopolistically competitive firm as an essential source of technological innovation, product variety and cost economies. While perfect competition is universally considered a benchmark and a social optimum, we consider it a strongly unrealistic theoretical setup where the monopolistically, rather than the perfectly, competitive firm turns out to be the true type of competition and social optimum in the real world of positive transaction costs. The monopolistically competitive firm not only offers product variety and innovation but is the optimal institutional arrangement under positive transaction costs.
Economic analysis of law is an interesting and challenging attempt to employ the concepts and reasoning methods of modern economic theory so as to gain a deeper understanding of legal problems. According to Richard A. Posner it is the role of the law to encourage market competition and, where the market fails because transaction costs are too high, to simulate the result of competitive markets. This would maximize economic efficiency and social wealth. In this work, the lawyer and economist Klaus Mathis critically appraises Posner’s normative justification of the efficiency paradigm from the perspective of the philosophy of law. Posner acknowledges the influences of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, whom he views as the founders of normative economics. He subscribes to Smith’s faith in the market as an ideal allocation model, and to Bentham’s ethical consequentialism. Finally, aligning himself with John Rawls’s contract theory, he seeks to legitimize his concept of wealth maximization with a consensus theory approach. In his interdisciplinary study, the author points out the possibilities as well as the limits of economic analysis of law. It provides a method of analysing the law which, while very helpful, is also rather specific. The efficiency arguments therefore need to be incorporated into a process for resolving value conflicts. In a democracy this must take place within the political decision-making process. In this clearly written work, Klaus Mathis succeeds in making even non-economists more aware of the economic aspects of the law.
This volume examines the complexities involved when international co-ordination and harmonization of competition law and policy are considered.
COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS systematically explores the hypothesis that, similar to merchandisers, governments are internally competitive and also in their relations with each other, as well as in their relations with other institutions in society.
This timely book presents practical applications of modern economic theories to trade, transaction costs and institutions within both business and governmental realms. Frank A.G. den Butter explains the importance and means of keeping transaction costs as low as possible. He illustrates how this transaction management can contribute to making firms and nations more competitive by exploiting gains from the division of labour and international fragmentation of production, and uses relevant case studies to illustrate how value is created by reducing transaction costs. Policy recommendations for strengthening the competitive position of trading nations and reducing implementation costs of government policy are presented, and management methods for creating value in organizing production on a global scale are prescribed. A wide-ranging audience encompassing economists in academia, government and business; managers in industry and government; and students of economics, business and globalization will find this book to be a crucial reference tool.
Despite abundant literature on transaction costs, there is little to no in-depth analysis regarding what the transaction is or how it works. Drawing on both Old and New Institutional Economics and on a variety of interdisciplinary sources, this monograph traces the history of the meaning of transaction in institutional economics, mapping its topicality and use over time. This manuscript treats the idea of ‘transaction’ as a construct with legal, competitive and political dimensions, and connects different approaches within institutional economics. The book covers the contributions of key thinkers from different schools, including (in alphabetical order) Ronald H. Coase, John R. Commons, Robert Lee Hale, Oliver Hart, Mancur Olson, Thorstein Veblen and Olver E. Williamson. This book will be of interest to advanced students and researchers of institutional economics, law and economics, and economics, and the history of economic thought.
Transcending Transaction examines recent attempts to show how, in theory and history, market transaction can emerge from the unregulated interaction of competitive traders. Alan Shipman examines the legal, informational, organisational, social and financial foundations of market trade, focusing on the possible routes by which it could arise without the influence of pre-market social conventions or political structures.
This report addresses the overarching question regarding the role of institutions in enhancing market development following market reforms. It uses the New Institutional Economics framework to empirically analyze the role of a specific market institution, that of brokers acting as intermediaries to match traders in the Ethiopian grain market in reducing the transaction costs of search faced by traders. Brokers play a key role in facilitating exchange in a weak marketing environment where limited public market information, the lack of grain standardization, oral contracts, and weak legal enforcement of contracts increase the risk of contract failure. Relying on primary data, it analyzes traders' microeconomic behavior, social capital, the nature and extent of their transaction costs, and the norms and rules governing the relationship between brokers and traders.The study uses an innovative approach to quantify the costs of search and demonstrates that the brokerage institution is economically efficient both for individual traders and for global economic welfare.