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One of the challenges facing the writer is keeping up with developments in the information age. While Command, Control, and the Common Defense provides a historical perspective on a contemporary problem, it was written in the late l980s; since then, the end of the Cold War and the American experience in the Gulf War have provided some fundamentally new perspectives of their own. Re-written history has its own pitfalls; a better solution was to leave the original content intact and to add as an epilogue a chapter which originally appeared in a 1995 anthology on the Gulf War. Both works have, of course, been edited for consistency. Finally, there is reason to ponder in the light of more contemporary developments one of the major points in that original work: that the tight integration demanded by emerging command and control technologies often runs afoul of existing command structures and theories of warfare. As I completed the revisions to this edition while serving on special assignment with the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, there were daily reminders of the truth of that statement.
Rapid progress in information and communications technologies is dramatically enhancing the strategic role of information, positioning effective exploitation of these technology advances as a critical success factor in military affairs. These technology advances are drivers and enablers for the "nervous system" of the militaryâ€"its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systemsâ€"to more effectively use the "muscle" side of the military. Authored by a committee of experts drawn equally from the military and commercial sectors, Realizing the Potential of C4I identifies three major areas as fundamental challenges to the full Department of Defense (DOD) exploitation of C4I technologyâ€"information systems security, interoperability, and various aspects of DOD process and culture. The book details principles by which to assess DOD efforts in these areas over the long term and provides specific, more immediately actionable recommendations. Although DOD is the focus of this book, the principles and issues presented are also relevant to interoperability, architecture, and security challenges faced by government as a whole and by large, complex public and private enterprises across the economy.
Perhaps the best single way to summarize it is to view the book as a bureaucratic or organizational history. What the author does is to take three distinct historical themes-organization, technology, and ideology and examine how each contributed to the development of WWMCCS and its ability (and frequent inability) to satisfy the demands of national leadership. Whereas earlier works were primarily descriptive, cataloguing the command and control assets then in place or under development, The book offers more analysis by focusing on the issue of how and why WWMCCS developed the way it did. While at first glance less provocative, this approach is potentially more useful for defense decision makers dealing with complex human and technological systems in the post-cold-war era. It also makes for a better story and, I trust, a more interesting read. By necessity, this work is selective. The elements of WWMCCS are so numerous, and the parameters of the system potentially so expansive, that a full treatment is impossible within the compass of a single volume. Indeed, a full treatment of even a single WWMCCS asset or subsystem-the Defense Satellite Communications System, Extremely Low Frequency Communications, the National Military Command System, to name but a few-could itself constitute a substantial work. In its broadest conceptualization, WWMCCS is the world, and my approach has been to deal with the head of the octopus rather than its myriad tentacles.
The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.
1. A Dangerous New World, 1607-1689. 2. The Colonial Wars, 1689-1763. 3. The American Revolution, 1763-1783. 4. Preserving the New Republic's Independence, 1783-1815. 5. The Armed Forces and National Expansion, 1815-1860. 6. The Civil War, 1861-1862. 7. The Civil War, 1863-1865. 8. From Postwar Demobilization Toward Great Power Status, 1865-1898. 9. The Birth of an American Empire, 1898-1902. 10. Building the Military Forces of a World Power, 1899-1917. 11. The United States Fights in the "War to End All Wars", 1917-1918. 12. Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939. 13. The United States and World War II. From the Edge of Defeat to the Edge of Victory, 1939-1943. 14. The United States of World War II: The Road to Victory, 1943-1945. 15. Cold War and Hot War: The United States Enters the Ages of Nuclear Deterrence and Collective Security, 1945-1953. 16. Waging Cold War: American Defense Policy for Extended Deterrence and Containment, 1953-1965. 17. In Dubious Battle: The War for Vietnam and the Erosion of American Mmilitary Power, 1961-1975. 18. The Common Defense and the End of the Cold War, 1976-1993. Appendixes: A. Participation and Losses, Major Wars, 1775-1991. B. The Armed Forces and National Expansion. C. The Armed Forces of the Cold War.
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.