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In his introduction John D. Milligan considers Reed's provocative thesis that General George B. McClellan's concept of a grand strategy would have ended the bloodshed sooner.
Despite a wealth of books on the campaigns of the American Civil War, the subject of combined or joint operations has been largely neglected. This revealing book offers ten case studies of combined Army-Navy operations by Union forces. Presented in chronological order, each essay illuminates an aspect of combined operations during a time of changing technology and doctrine. The essays cover the war along the "rebel coast," including the operations in the North Carolina Sounds in 1861, the Union thrusts up the York and James rivers during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862 and 1864, and the various Union efforts to seize rebel seaports from the Texas coast to Charleston and Wilmington in 1863-65. Concluding the volume are two essays that evaluate the impact of Union combined operations on subsequent doctrine in both the United States and England.
Despite the abundance of books on the Civil War, not one has focused exclusively on what was in fact the determining factor in the outcome of the conflict: differences in Union and Southern strategy. In The Grand Design, Donald Stoker provides for the first time a comprehensive and often surprising account of strategy as it evolved between Fort Sumter and Appomattox. Reminding us that strategy is different from tactics (battlefield deployments) and operations (campaigns conducted in pursuit of a strategy), Stoker examines how Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis identified their political goals and worked with their generals to craft the military means to achieve them--or how they often failed to do so. Stoker shows that Davis, despite a West Point education and experience as Secretary of War, ultimately failed as a strategist by losing control of the political side of the war. Lincoln, in contrast, evolved a clear strategic vision, but he failed for years to make his generals implement it. And while Robert E. Lee was unerring in his ability to determine the Union's strategic heart--its center of gravity--he proved mistaken in his assessment of how to destroy it. Historians have often argued that the North's advantages in population and industry ensured certain victory. In The Grand Design, Stoker reasserts the centrality of the overarching plan on each side, arguing convincingly that it was strategy that determined the result of America's great national conflict.
History has demonstrated that amphibious assaults are among the most complex and challenging of all joint operations. The myriad of factors that evolved independently throughout the war did not become fully integrated until the winter of 1864-65. This thesis explores the maturation of joint amphibious operations during the U.S. Civil War, specifically through the assaults on Fort Fisher. This analysis will use modern joint doctrine as the framework to compare and contrast the two assaults. It will elaborate on how seaborne assaults differ from riverine assaults. Utilizing Fort Fisher as the focus develops an understanding of the interrelationship of these various factors and the challenges posed in their synchronization to achieve success. This study concludes that the operations reflected jointness, but also marked the emergence of modern amphibious assault concepts.
Although previously undervalued for their strategic impact because they represented only a small percentage of total forces, the Union and Confederate navies were crucial to the outcome of the Civil War. In War on the Waters, James M. McPherson has crafted an enlightening, at times harrowing, and ultimately thrilling account of the war's naval campaigns and their military leaders. McPherson recounts how the Union navy's blockade of the Confederate coast, leaky as a sieve in the war's early months, became increasingly effective as it choked off vital imports and exports. Meanwhile, the Confederate navy, dwarfed by its giant adversary, demonstrated daring and military innovation. Commerce raiders sank Union ships and drove the American merchant marine from the high seas. Southern ironclads sent several Union warships to the bottom, naval mines sank many more, and the Confederates deployed the world's first submarine to sink an enemy vessel. But in the end, it was the Union navy that won some of the war's most important strategic victories--as an essential partner to the army on the ground at Fort Donelson, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Mobile Bay, and Fort Fisher, and all by itself at Port Royal, Fort Henry, New Orleans, and Memphis.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
Includes 4 figures, 13 maps and 4 tables. Renowned Military Historian Dr Christopher Gabel investigates the effects of the Railroad on the strategies employed by both the Union and Confederate Generals of the Civil War. According to an old saying, “amateurs study tactics: professionals study logistics.” Any serious student of the military profession will know that logistics constantly shape military affairs and sometimes even dictate strategy and tactics. This excellent monograph by Dr. Christopher Gabel shows that the appearance of the steam-powered railroad had enormous implications for military logistics, and thus for strategy, in the American Civil War. Not surprisingly, the side that proved superior in “railroad generalship,” or the utilization of the railroads for military purposes, was also the side that won the war.
The development of steam propulsion machinery in warships during the nineteenth century, in conjunction with iron armor and shell guns, resulted in a technological revolution in the world's navies. Warships utilizing all of these technologies were built in France and Great Britain in the 1850s, but it was during the American Civil War that large numbers of ironclads powered solely by steam proved themselves to be quite capable warships. This book focuses on Confederate ironclads with American built machinery, offering a detailed look at marine steam-engineering practices in both northern and southern industry prior to and during the Civil War. It gives a contextual naval history of the Civil War, the creation of the ironclad program, and the advent of various technologies. The author analyzes the armored warships built by the Confederate States of America that represented a style adapted to scarce industrial resources and facilities.
Since the Cold War, peace operations have become the core focus of many Western armed forces. In these operations, the division between civil and military responsibilities often rapidly blurs. Among policy makers and in military circles, a debate has erupted regarding the scope of the military in stabilizing and reconstructing war torn societies. Should soldiers, who primarily prepare for combat duties, observe a strict segregation between the "military sphere" and the "civilian sphere" or become involved in "nation building"? Should soldiers be allowed to venture into the murky arena of public security, civil administration, humanitarian relief, and political and social reconstruction? In Soldiers and Civil Power, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg draws on military records and in-depth interviews with key players to examine international operations in the 1990's in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Focusing his historical analysis on the experiences of various battalions in the field, he reveals large gaps between this tactical level of operations, political-strategic decision making and military doctrine. By comparing peace operations to examples of counterinsurgency operations in the colonial era and military governance in World War II, he exposes the controversial, but inescapable role of the Western military in supporting and even substituting civil authorities during military interventions. At a time when US forces and its allies struggle to restore order in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brocades Zaalberg’s in-depth study is an invaluable resource not only for military historians, but anyone interested in the evolving global mission of armed forces in the twenty-first century.