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Lethality in Combat shines a blazing light on the three most controversial aspects of military combat: the necessity of killing; the taking, or not, of prisoners; and the targeting of civilians. This book argues that when a nation-state sends its soldiers to fight, the state must accept the full implications of this, uncomfortable as they may be. Drawing on seven conflicts - the Boer War, World Wars I and II, and the wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands and Iraq - the author considers these ethical issues.
While the focus of this book is on ground combat system vulnerability, many of the principles, methodologies, and tools discussed are also applicable to the air and sea system communities.
Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders' actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
First published in 1956, this is an account of the arming of the Union forces in the Civil War, and of Lincoln’s part in it. It has never been told in any comprehensive way before, and shows Lincoln in a new and engaging light. Lincoln was determined to win the war, yet his generals seemed unable to give him a victory, so he reasoned that a more efficient weapon would have to be invented. However, his main opponent, General James W. Ripley, who sat in charge of army ordnance, believed the war would be short and didn’t want a vast supply of expensive arms left over. Standardized guns and ammunition made supplying the troops in the field easier. Lincoln was in the thick of it. He wanted mortar boats to help open the upper Mississippi as they had helped Porter take New Orleans. When he discovered a big snafu had delayed production, one J. D. Mills came to Washington with a crude machine gun that was soon christened the coffee-mill gun. Probably the biggest and longest controversy involved muzzle-loading rifles—favoured by Ripley—and breech-loading rifles—the Soldier’s choice, as he could lie down and load a breechloader at least five times as fast as a muzzle-loader. In addition to these and other standard arms, the inventors offered a wide catalogue of innovations: rockets, steam guns, liquid fire, a submarine, explosive bullets, a proposed poison gas, and so on down to the fantastic. This book is a big American story of Washington in wartime, and it will appeal to everybody who ever had any contact with the armed services. For the specialist, it offers quite a quantity of previously unpublished material. Its biggest merit is, however, that it is just plain fascinating reading, the kind of book no one should start late in the evening if he wants any sleep.
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.
Taking its title from The Face of Battle, John Keegan's canonical book on the nature of warfare, The Other Face of Battle illuminates the American experience of fighting in "irregular" and "intercultural" wars over the centuries. Sometimes known as "forgotten" wars, in part because they lackedtriumphant clarity, they are the focus of the book. David Preston, David Silbey, and Anthony Carlson focus on, respectively, the Battle of Monongahela (1755), the Battle of Manila (1898), and the Battle of Makuan, Afghanistan (2020) - conflicts in which American soldiers were forced to engage in"irregular" warfare, confronting an enemy entirely alien to them. This enemy rejected the Western conventions of warfare and defined success and failure - victory and defeat - in entirely different ways. Symmetry of any kind is lost. Here was not ennobling engagement but atrocity, unanticipatedinsurgencies, and strategic stalemate.War is always hell. These wars, however, profoundly undermined any sense of purpose or proportion. Nightmarish and existentially bewildering, they nonetheless characterize how Americans have experienced combat and what its effects have been. They are therefore worth comparing for what they hold incommon as well as what they reveal about our attitude toward war itself. The Other Face of Battle reminds us that "irregular" or "asymmetrical" warfare is now not the exception but the rule. Understanding its roots seems more crucial than ever.