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World War II threw Britain and the Soviet Union together as unlikely allies. This book examines British policy-makers' attitudes to cooperation with the USSR and shows how views of internal developments in the USSR and of Stalin himself influenced Churchill, the War Cabinet and the Foreign Office to believe that long-term collaboration was a desirable and achievable goal. In particular, it was assumed that a shared concern to prevent future German aggression would be a lasting bond. Such attitudes significantly shaped Britain's wartime policy towards the USSR, and for many individuals, including Churchill, played a more important role than their long-standing anti-Communist attitudes.
At the midpoint of the “high” cold war, when most people in North America and Europe thought catastrophic nuclear onslaught was almost inevitable, an unprecedented and unrepeated event took place in Geneva in July 1955. The heads of state from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France came together in an attempt at diplomatic dialogue, primarily over the questions of German unification, European security, and nuclear disarmament. Although the summit ended with no tangible results, its ramifications were extensive, and it provided the world with a brief repose from escalating East-West tension. In Cold War Respite twelve scholars writing from several national perspectives investigate in riveting detail how that event—examined only in passing until now—came about, why its “spirit” was so short-lived, and what its subsequent impact was on the development of the cold war. Making use of newly -declassified archives in the United States, France, Britain, and Russia, the authors provide some of the latest research and insights into early cold-war history as they track the crucial period from Stalin’s death in 1953 until the summit. They consider John Foster Dulles’s policy at Geneva and the meeting of the four foreign ministers that followed the summit. As the essayists attest, the psychological effects of the summit were of immense significance to the history of international relations and reveal the complexity and dynamism of foreign affairs during the decades following World War II. While some argue that the series of international crises beginning in 1958 and culminating in 1962 might have been averted if the Geneva conference had been pursued more eagerly, others argue that it is a credit to the summit that those events are studied today as examples of crisis management and not of nuclear war.
Although it once issued a radical challenge that shook the existing world order, the USSR was soon thrown back to seek security within its own confines. Black Earth, Red Star vividly chronicles the Soviet experience from Lenin's 1917 revolution to the disintegration of the union in December 1991. R. Craig Nation provides the first post-Cold War history of the Soviets' seventy-four-year struggle to maintain an effective national security policy in a hostile world without altogether abandoning the commitment to their original internationalist ideals. Drawing on an unprecedented body of primary and secondary sources, Nation presents a nuanced overview of Soviet history from the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution to the emergence of Stalin, the shattering victory over Hitler, Khrushchev's frustrated efforts at reform during the Cold War, the degeneration of Soviet power under Brezhnev, and the convulsive changes since 1985. Shaped by a dynamic conflict between often contradictory aims - the promotion of Communist internationalism and the defense of national self-interest - Soviet security policy was far from static, he shows. Nation reconstructs the military, political, and economic strategies behind the succession of security policies with which the Kremlin responded to the rapid changes in the international environment and in Soviet society itself. While the red star that shines above the Kremlin no longer symbolizes a commitment to world revolution, the rich black earth of the Slavic east remains of lasting importance in international affairs. This book will be essential reading for anyone concerned with the future of the former Soviet republics, including historians of the USSR and political scientists working in international relations and security studies.
To Win a Nuclear War records as fully as we are likely to find what has gone on in the minds of American leaders and nuclear strategists on this awesome subject during these fateful forty years. It is an appalling story... This book compels us to re-think and re-write the history of the Cold War and the arms race."--From the foreword by Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States. To Win a Nuclear War provides a startling glimpse into secret U.S. plans to initiate a nuclear war from 1945 to the present. Based on recently declassified Top Secret documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, this book meticulously traces how U.S. policy makers in over a dozen episodes have threatened to initiate a nuclear attack. The book also documents the surprising reasons why the war plans were never carried out and discloses the deeper, hidden meaning of the Star Wars program.
The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.