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A loss of solvency increases central bank vulnerability, reducing the credibility of commitments to defend a nominal regime, including an exchange rate peg. This paper develops a methodology to assess central bank solvency and exposure to risk. The measure, based on Value-at-Risk, is frequently used to evaluate commercial risk. The paper emphasizes that the ability to sustain nominal commitments cannot be gauged by focusing only on selected accounts (such as reserves), but requires a comprehensive solvency and vulnerability analysis of the monetary authorities’ complete portfolio (including off-balance-sheet operations). The suggested measure has powerful reporting value and its disclosure could improve monitoring of sovereign solvency risk.
The 1990s currency debacles revitalized the search for early warning and forward-looking indicators of financial vulnerabilities. This paper contributes to this task by proposing an approach to assess central bank solvency and to examine the factors putting it at risk, and by refining the concepts relevant for solvency analysis of central bank portfolios. It postulates that a loss of solvency increases central bank financial vulnerability and leads to credibility losses regarding its ability to defend a nominal regime, including exchange rate pegs. The methodology proposed for appraising central banks' financial vulnerability is based on Value-at-Risk (VaR), a concept developed to assess commercial risk. While central banks cannot commercially fail, they behave equivalently if they forsake their commitment to an announced nominal regime. Since a default in central bank commitments would arise from the increased vulnerability caused by solvency losses, solvency measures, such as VaR, are good forward-looking indicators of possible credibility crises. The paper analyzes risks derived both from traditional central bank operations and from off-balance sheet positions, including foreign exchange forwards and financial sector guarantees. Methodological and policy implications are derived. Main factors putting central bank solvency at risk are the volatilities of the exchange rate, of expected exchange rate changes, of international interest rates, of country risk coefficients, and of the magnitudes of the corresponding positions exposed. Therefore, central banks with positions implying high VaR face difficulties in defending rigorous nominal commitments and should not attempt to peg their currencies. Alternatively, if fixing the rate is deemed essential, the central bank should diminish its portfolio's risk exposure and vulnerability in order to reduce the likelihood of credibility crises. Available data and technology permits the tracking of central-bank VaR measures along the lines suggested here. We claim that this indicator, if disclosed to institutions and investors can reduce the likelihood of contagion and improve the monitoring of sovereign risk.
In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.
The authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies. Theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely, the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions.
This paper examines contractionary currency crashes in developing countries. It explores the causes of India’s productivity surge around 1980, more than a decade before serious economic reforms were initiated. The paper finds evidence that the trigger may have been an attitudinal shift by the government in the early 1980s that, unlike the reforms of the 1990s, was pro-business rather than pro-market in character, favoring the interests of existing businesses rather than new entrants or consumers. A relatively small shift elicited a large productivity response, because India was far away from its income possibility frontier.
This book investigates to what extent the quality of eligible collateral is able to explain inflation. Addressing this question, hypotheses derived from the Theory of Property Economics by Heinsohn & Steiger are tested. Data are collected using a questionnaire, answered by central banks. An index of the quality of eligible collateral is constructed. Regression analyses are performed based on a sample of 62 countries for the period 1990 to 2003. A negative, robust and statistically significant correlation between inflation and the quality of eligible collateral is found. Central bank independence cannot contribute to the explanation of inflation. The result supports the theory of Heinsohn & Steiger: Securitisation of central bank lending is crucial for price stability.
Most trade is invoiced in very few currencies. Despite this, the Mundell-Fleming benchmark and its variants focus on pricing in the producer’s currency or in local currency. We model instead a ‘dominant currency paradigm’ for small open economies characterized by three features: pricing in a dominant currency; pricing complementarities, and imported input use in production. Under this paradigm: (a) the terms-of-trade is stable; (b) dominant currency exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices is high regardless of destination or origin of goods; (c) exchange rate pass-through of non-dominant currencies is small; (d) expenditure switching occurs mostly via imports, driven by the dollar exchange rate while exports respond weakly, if at all; (e) strengthening of the dominant currency relative to non-dominant ones can negatively impact global trade; (f) optimal monetary policy targets deviations from the law of one price arising from dominant currency fluctuations, in addition to the inflation and output gap. Using data from Colombia we document strong support for the dominant currency paradigm.