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This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book examines the concept of care and care practices in healthcare from the interdisciplinary perspectives of continental philosophy, care ethics, the social sciences, and anthropology. Areas addressed include dementia care, midwifery, diabetes care, psychiatry, and reproductive medicine. Special attention is paid to ambivalences and tensions within both the concept of care and care practices. Contributions in the first section of the book explore phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to care and reveal historical precursors to care ethics. Empirical case studies and reflections on care in institutionalised and standardised settings form the second section of the book. The concluding chapter, jointly written by many of the contributors, points at recurring challenges of understanding and practicing care that open up the field for further research and discussion. This collection will be of great value to scholars and practitioners of medicine, ethics, philosophy, social science and history.
Despite its absence in the written text of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights now regularly uses the concept of autonomy when deciding cases concerning assisted dying, sexuality and reproductive rights, self-determination, fulfilment of choices and control over body and mind. But is the concept of autonomy as expressed in the ECtHR reasoning an appropriate tool for regulating reproduction or medical practice? Caring Autonomy reveals and evaluates the type of individual the ECtHR expresses and shapes through its autonomy-based case law. It claims that from a social and ethical perspective, the current individualistic interpretation of the concept of autonomy is inadequate, and proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in the acknowledgment and appreciation of human interdependence and the importance of interpersonal trust and care.
This book begins with versions of the ethic of care and the ethic of justice. It argues that the ethic of care reveals important problems with the concept of autonomy, but that these problems are not present in all versions of autonomy.
The realities and misconceptions of long-term care and the challenges it presents for the ethics of autonomy are analyzed in this perceptive work. While defending the concept of autonomy, the author argues that the standard view of autonomy as non-interference and independence has only a limited applicability for long-term care. He explains that autonomy should be understood as a comprehensiveness that defines the overall course of a person's life rather than as a way of responding to an isolated situation. Agich distinguishes actual and ideal autonomy and argues that actual autonomy is better revealed in the everyday experiences of long-term care than in dramatic, conflict-ridden paradigm situations such as decisions to institutionalize, to initiate aggressive treatments, or to withhold or to withdraw life-sustaining treatments. Through a phenomenological analysis of long-term care, he develops an ethical framework for it by showing how autonomy is actually manifest in certain structural features of the social world of long-term care. Throughout this timely work, the rich sociological and anthropological literature on aging and long-term care is referenced and the practical ethical questions of promoting and enhancing the exercise of autonomy are addressed.
A key theoretical contribution to the sociological study of health and embodiment by illuminating the processes of social change that have transformed individual self-care and the ways in which power and desire now shape health behaviour.
Pamphlet is a succinct statement of the ethical obligations and duties of individuals who enter the nursing profession, the profession's nonnegotiable ethical standard, and an expression of nursing's own understanding of its commitment to society. Provides a framework for nurses to use in ethical analysis and decision-making.
There is a tension at the heart of family law and policy between the increasing influence of individual autonomy and the demands of caring for children. Individual autonomy envisages decisions made in one's own best interests, whereas decisions around care are often made for the good of the family, and may conflict with the caregiver's individual interests. Whereas individual autonomy valorises economic self-sufficiency, caregiving responsibilities constrain choice and conflict with paid work. This book explores this tension to consider how, given changing social trends, family law and policy should take account of caregiving responsibilities on parental separation. Crucially, it suggests that we need to rethink family law by placing care at its centre. This book draws on original empirical data to explore the experiences of parents in England and Wales, where the division of paid work and care is considered a choice, and Sweden, where parents are encouraged to work full-time, supported by wellfunded state childcare. This comparative perspective sheds light on whether the clash between the ideas of autonomy and care could be reconciled in a more gender equal society. The book argues that caregiving is hidden from, and undervalued by, law and policy in both jurisdictions, underscoring the need for the proposed new approach. The law needs to think more deeply about what it means to care, and how the care provided by parents differs. Anna Heenan outlines how family law might look different if the proposed framework, based on placing care at the heart of family law, is adopted.
This important new book develops a new concept of autonomy. The notion of autonomy has emerged as central to contemporary moral and political philosophy, particularly in the area of applied ethics. professor Dworkin examines the nature and value of autonomy and uses the concept to analyse various practical moral issues such as proxy consent in the medical context, paternalism, and entrapment by law enforcement officials.
Respecting the autonomy of disabled people is an important ethical issue for providers of long-term care. In this influential book, George Agich abandons comfortable abstractions to reveal the concrete threats to personal autonomy in this setting, where ethical conflict, dilemma and tragedy are inescapable. He argues that liberal accounts of autonomy and individual rights are insufficient, and offers an account of autonomy that matches the realities of long-term care. The book therefore offers a framework for carers to develop an ethic of long-term care within the complex environment in which many dependent and aged people find themselves. Previously published as Autonomy and Long-term Care, this revised edition, in paperback for the first time, takes account of recent work and develops the author's views of what autonomy means in the real world. It will have wide appeal among bioethicists and health care professionals.
Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether ". . . the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent". In this book, I bring recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, I develop a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different form of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. I contrast my rationalist with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outline the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity.