Download Free Bydepartment Military Intelligence Division Tactical And Technical Trends Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Bydepartment Military Intelligence Division Tactical And Technical Trends and write the review.

Sections include information on air, antiaircraft, antitank, armored, artillery, chemical warfare, engineers, infantry, medical, ordnance, etc."TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL TRENDSNo. 3112 August 1943Prepared forARMY GROUND, AIR, AND SERVICE FORCESbyMILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICEWAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.CONTENTS
Complete account of airborne operations in the Pacific theater. Firsthand descriptions from American and Japanese paratroopers. Detailed maps illustrate battles.
In 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) coordinated the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. As of mid-2005, 145 states had signed the agreement. The ICBL's efforts were in large part a response to the careless use of landmines in the previous fifty years. The history of mine use in warfare, however, goes back much further than the World Wars of the 20th century and includes both land and sea use. This first comprehensive study traces the technical, tactical, and ethical developments of mine warfare, from ancient times to the present. Beginning with mine warfare's roots in ancient Assyria and China, Youngblood takes the reader through the centuries of debate about how these hidden weapons should be used. A look at 19th-century developments explores the intertwined development of land and sea mines and the inventors behind them, including Robert Fulton, Samuel Colt, and Immanuel Nobel, father of Alfred Nobel. Subsequent chapters examine the use of mines in the American Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War, both World Wars, and the battlefields of the Cold War, and chart key battles and technical innovations, such as the development of air-delivered munitions. Finally, the author addresses the ethical concerns raised by the careless mining, namely the impact on civilians and the difficulties of de-mining, and the treaties that regulate landmine use.
In an increasingly urbanized world, urban terrain has become a greater factor in military operations. Simultaneously, advances in military technology have given military forces sharply increased capabilities. The conflict comes from how urban terrain can negate or degrade many of those increased capabilities. What happens when advanced weapons are used in a close-range urban fight with an abundance of cover? Storming the City explores these issues by analyzing the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-twentieth century (Aachen 1944, Manila 1945, Seoul 1950, and Hue 1968). Alec Wahlman assesses each battle using a similar framework of capability categories, and separate chapters address urban warfare in American military thought. In the four battles, across a wide range of conditions, American forces were ultimately successful in capturing each city because of two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The preparations US forces made for warfare writ large proved generally applicable to urban warfare. Battlefield adaptation, a strong suit of American forces, filled in where those overall preparations for combat needed fine tuning. From World War Two to Vietnam, however, there was a gradual reduction in tactical performance in the four battles.
Closing with the Enemy picks up where D-Day leaves off. From Normandy through the "breakout" in France to the German army's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge, Doubler deals with the deadly business of war-closing with the enemy, fighting and winning battles, taking and holding territory. His study provides a provocative reassessment of how American GIs accomplished these dangerous and costly tasks. Doubler portrays a far more capable and successful American fighting force than previous historians-notably Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld, and S.L.A. Marshall-have depicted. True, the GIs weren't fully prepared or organized for a war in Europe and have often been viewed as inferior to their German opponent. But, Doubler argues, they more than compensated for this by their ability to learn quickly from mistakes, to adapt in the face of unforseen obstacles, and to innovate new tactics on the battlefield. This adaptability, Doubler contends, was far more crucial to the American effort than we've been led to believe. Fueled by a fiercely democratic and entrepreneurial spirit, GI innovations emerged from every level within the ranks-from the novel employment of conventional weapons and small units to the rapid retraining of troops on the battlefield. Their most dramatic success, however, was with combined arms warfare-the coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power, and engineers-in which they perfected the use of air support for ground operations and tank-infantry teams for breaking through enemy strongholds. Doubler argues that, without such ingenuity and imaginative leadership, it would have been impossible to defeat an enemy as well trained and heavily fortified as the German army the GIs confronted in the tortuous hedgerow country of northern France, the narrow cobblestoned streets of Aachen and Brest, the dark recesses of the Huertgen Forest, and the frigid snow-covered hills of the Ardennes. Marking the 50th anniversary of the American victory in the Battle of the Bulge, Doubler offers a timely reminder that "the tremendous effects of firepower and technology will still not relieve ground troops of the burden of closing with the enemy." As even Desert Storm suggests, that will likely prove true for future high-tech battlefields, where an army's adaptability will continue to be prized.
If the machine gun changed the course of ground combat in the First World War, it was the tank that shaped ground combat in World War II. The tank was introduced in World War I in an effort to end the stalemate of the machine gun versus barbed-wire trenches, and by World War II, the tank’s mobility and firepower became a rolling, thundering difference-maker on the battlefield. In this detailed, deeply researched, and heavily illustrated book, tank expert Richard Anderson tells the story of how the United States developed its armored force, turning it into a war-winning weapon in World War II that powered American ground forces and supplied armies around the world, including the British and Soviets. For decades, American tanks of World War II have been undervalued in comparisons with German and Soviet tanks—and it’s true that the best of American armor tended to underperform the best of German and Soviet armor during the war. That’s because the U.S. had a different goal: not only to create battleworthy tanks like the Sherman, and to develop other tanks, but also to supply American allies with serviceable, combat-ready tanks. The United States did all this, but until now the complete story of American tanks in World War II has yet to be told. Anderson’s book is deeper and more thorough a chronicle of American tanks in World War II than has ever been done. This book is colorful, vivid, and thought-provokingly insightful on how the U.S. produced a tank force capable of conducting its own battlefield efforts and sustaining key allies around the world. This will be the go-to volume on American tanks for years to come.
Rudolf Witzig entered the history books as the heroic captor of Belgiumês supposedly impregnable fortress Eben Emael in May 1940 _ the first time that glider-borne troops were used in the war. To many people, he is also known as the commander of the battle group that fired the first shots of the Tunisian campaign. Remarkably, next to nothing has been written about him as an individual. This biography, completed with the full support of Witzigês widow and son, is a comprehensive history of the man and also provides important new detail on the German parachute arm that he served. In the course of his service, he was awarded the coveted Knightês Cross of the Iron Cross. He could not be awarded the decoration because he had not yet earned the Ironês Crosses 2nd and 1st class _ to resolve the problem he was awarded all three on the spot. Witzig was involved in Operation Mercury, the invasion of Crete, but was injured during the fighting. After his recovery, he was sent to Tunisia where he was credited with several successful defensive actions. He ended the war in captivity, surrendering to the Allies on 8 May 1945, the day after his name was placed on the Honour Roll of the Luftwaffe. Rudolf Witzig was born on 14th August 1916 in Westphalia. His military career started in 1935 when he was accepted as an officerês candidate. He went on to win the Knightês Cross, which was awarded by Hitler personally. Witzig died on 3rd October 2001 at the age of 85. Gilberto Vilhermosa is a serving member of the US military in Yemen. This is his second book.
This study attempts to show the misapplication of tactical airpower by the Luftwaffe in support of German ground forces during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. The analysis is based on an investigation of historical references and provides lessons learned which might be applied in future conflicts. The study shows that the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts at Kursk on Close Air Support and neglected Battlefield Air Interdiction. This was primarily because Close Air Support had proven itself so successful in German experience prior to Kursk. However, the failure of the Luftwaffe to interdict Russian reinforcements at Kursk proved to be critical and contributed to the German defeat. Air planners must realize that a correct balance between Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction is essential to the efficient use of airpower during any tactical application in support of ground forces. Neither Close Air Support nor Battlefield Air Interdiction should gain primacy in doctrine, rather, a mix of the two should be applied on a situational basis.