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This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919-1941. This period represents more than twenty years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks. From the earliest origins, attack theory and doctrine evolved primarily along two paths direct and indirect support of ground and air force objectives. The direct support approach was based on fundamental beliefs by the Army that attack aviation was an auxiliary combat arm, to be used directly on the battlefield against ground forces and to further the ground campaign plan. The indirect support approach, or air interdiction, was derived from the fundamental beliefs by the Air Corps that attack aviation was best used beyond the battle line and artillery range, against targets more vulnerable and less heavily defended, to further both the Air Force mission and the ground support mission. As attack doctrine evolved, range and hardened targets became problematic for the single-engine attack plane. Thus, attack theory and doctrine in terms of the indirect support approach, was adequately developed to be useful at the start of WWII. The use of light and medium bombers in North Africa showed the effectiveness of air interdiction and the indirect approach. Attack aviation had, indeed, established itself before WWII. Attack aviation, in the form of close air support, would have to wait for the lessons of WWII.
Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars
This book looks at the history of the US Air Force through the lens of its (lack of) preparedness for major wars, which is shown to be a result of its organizational culture. The U.S. Air Force is probably the most powerful military force in history, both in its destructive firepower and in its ability to project it globally. Yet, despite its unparalleled power, the Air Force entered its first three pivotal conflicts – World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War – unprepared. But surprisingly, it was remarkably well prepared for its fourth major war: the Gulf War of 1991. Could there be an underlying trait or characteristic, which influenced the Air Force between the wars, that historically caused the US Air Force to be unprepared for war or prepared for the wrong type of war? Surprisingly, there is such a factor which was quite prominent in the Air Force’s complex identity – its organizational culture. Besides providing a historical description of the Air Force, this book demonstrates clearly how its organizational culture evolved and how it caused the US Air Force to be prepared for the wrong war. It also shows that when the organizational culture changed, the Air Force changed its focus and arrived prepared for the following war: the 1991 Gulf War. This book will be of interest to students of air power, strategic studies, US public policy, and security studies in general.
Proper doctrine for close support of American ground forces by airpower has been a tumultuous issue since the first days of combat aircraft. Air and ground leaders struggled with interservice rivalry, parochialism, employment paradigms, and technological roadblocks while seeking the optimum balance of missions given the unique speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft. Neither ground force concepts of airpower as self-defense and extended organic artillery, nor air force theories focused on command of the air and strategic attack fit the middle ground of close air support (CAS), leaving a doctrinal void prior to American combat in World War II. This thesis focuses on the critical period from September 1939 through the doctrinal and practical crucible of North Africa, which eventually produced a resoundingly successful system. Theoretical and practical changes in organization and command, airpower roles, and the tactical air control system are examined, with subarea focus on cooperation and communications technology. Upon examination, discerning leadership, able to transcend earlier compromises and failures, emerges as the essential element for CAS success during the war. While many airpower concepts proved valid, air-ground cooperation through liaison proved indispensable, a lesson repeated even today.
[Illustrated with more than 45 diagrams, photos and tables] Captain Rodman, an instructor weapon-systems officer at Dyess AFB, Texas, examines the distinctive nature of Fifth Air Force's role in the air war over the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II. Especially notable is Gen George Kenney's innovative use of light attack aircraft as well as both medium and heavy bombardment aircraft, characterized by theater-specific tactics, ordnance, and structural modifications. A War of Their Own also considers the free exchange of aircraft and missions in the Southwest Pacific a hallmark of that theater; in terms of the conflict between doctrine and tactics that underlay Fifth Air Force's relationship to the prewar Army Air Corps and the postwar Air Force. The author also notes the relevance of the Fifth's experiences to airpower.
This highly selective bibliography supplements the original bibliography developed in 1978 by Ms. Betsy C. Kysely, to support the Eighth Military History Symposium While this bibliography focuses primarily on materials published since the earlier bibliography was developed, it does include some significant materials that were published prior to 1978, but that were omitted from that edition. Emphasis in this supplement is on scholarly analysis of air power itself and scholarly depictions of its history. Like most editions of the United State Air Force Academy Directorate of Libraries' publication, Special Bibliography Series, this compilation is limited to current holdings of the Academic Library at the Academy. It includes books, reports, government documents, and journal articles. Excluded are pictorial works, newspaper articles, works of fiction, studies of the technology of aircraft and associated weaponry, and items focused on the general history of aviation. Readers wanting information on the history of aviation, certainly prior to the Wright Brothers, are encouraged to consult the U S. Air Force Academy Friends of the Library publication, The Genesis of Flight: The Aeronautical History Collection of Colonel Richard Gimbel.
Presents a regional, national, and global overview of air power; Written by a cadre of military specialists who offer global perspectives; Assesses its cultural as well as military influences
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.