Kenneth L. Privratsky
Published: 2016-08-15
Total Pages: 209
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A military logistics expert analyzes the detailed coordination employed by the British during the Falklands War in 1982. While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge: the lack of preparation time, the urgency, the huge distances involved, and the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four. After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina’s invasion, the book details the rush to re-organize and deploy forces, dispatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the task force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the set-backs, and finally the restoring of order after victory. Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties, etc. The lessons learned have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs, and this book fills an important gap. “With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.” —Michael Clapp, Commander Amphibious Task Force “A timely book that explores the logistical challenges of projecting decisive combat power across transoceanic distances.” —Marine Corps Gazette