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We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
This report examines the interplay between banking competition and financial stability, taking into account the experiences in the recent global crisis and the policy response to it. The report has been prepared by members of the Directorate of ...
We analyze how bank profitability impacts financial stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first develop a theoretical model of the relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role of non-interest income and retail-oriented business models. We then conduct panel regression analysis to examine the empirical determinants of bank risks and profitability, and how the level and the source of bank profitability affect risks for 431 publicly traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to 2017. Results reveal that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and its idiosyncratic risk, and an over-reliance on non-interest income, wholesale funding and leverage is associated with higher risks. Low competition is associated with low idiosyncratic risk but a high contribution to systemic risk. Lastly, the problem loans ratio and the cost-to-income ratio are found to be key factors that influence bank profitability. The paper’s findings suggest that policy makers should strive to better understand the source of bank profitability, especially where there is an over-reliance on market-based non-interest income, leverage, and wholesale funding.
A thoughtful and thought generating overview of what ails the banking sector and a reminder that the purpose of banks is to help create economic growth.
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
This note analyzes the implications of changes in commercial real estate (CRE) prices for the stability of the US banking sector. Using detailed bank-level and CRE price data for US metropolitan statistical areas, the analysis shows that, following a decline in CRE prices, banks with greater exposures to CRE loans perform worse than their counterparts, experiencing higher non-performing CRE loans, lower revenues, and lower capital. These effects are particularly pronounced if the drop in CRE prices turns out to be persistent because of possible structural shifts in CRE demand—for example, because of an increased trend toward e-commerce and teleworking—even after the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is over. The impact of a decline in CRE prices is especially true for small and community banks, which tend to have the highest CRE loan exposures. While the US banking sector has remained resilient during the pandemic crisis due to strong capital buffers and massive policy support, these findings suggest that continued vigilance is warranted with regard to potential downside risks to CRE prices amidst ongoing structural shifts in the sector.
We use data for more than 2,600 European banks to test whether increased competition causes banks to hold higher capital ratios. Employing panel data techniques, and distinguishing between the competitive conduct of small and large banks, we show that banks tend to hold higher capital ratios when operating in a more competitive environment. This result holds when controlling for the degree of concentration in banking systems, inter-industry competition, characteristics of the wider financial system, and the regulatory and institutional environment.
This book addresses both theoretical developments in and practical applications of econometric techniques to finance-related problems. It includes selected edited outcomes of the International Econometric Conference of Vietnam (ECONVN2018), held at Banking University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam on January 15-16, 2018. Econometrics is a branch of economics that uses mathematical (especially statistical) methods to analyze economic systems, to forecast economic and financial dynamics, and to develop strategies for achieving desirable economic performance. An extremely important part of economics is finances: a financial crisis can bring the whole economy to a standstill and, vice versa, a smart financial policy can dramatically boost economic development. It is therefore crucial to be able to apply mathematical techniques of econometrics to financial problems. Such applications are a growing field, with many interesting results – and an even larger number of challenges and open problems.
This note outlines the basic economics of the shadow banking system, highlights (systemic) risks related to it, and suggests implications for measurement and regulatory approaches.