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Financial crises are recurring phenomena that result in the financial distress of systemically important banks, making it imperative to understand how to best respond to such crises and their consequences. Two policy responses became prominent for dealing with these distressed institutions since the last Global Financial Crisis: bailouts and bail-ins. The main questions surrounding these responses touch everyone: Are bailouts or bail-ins good for the financial system and the real economy? Is it essential to save distressed financial institutions by putting taxpayer money at risk in bailouts, or is it better to use private money in bail-ins instead? Are there better options, such as first lines of defense that help prevent such distress in the first place? Can countercyclical prudential and monetary policies lessen the likelihood and severity of the financial crises that often bring about this distress? Through careful analysis, authors Berger and Roman review and critically assess the extant theoretical and empirical research on many resolution approaches and tools. Placing special emphasis on lessons learned from one of the biggest bailouts of all time, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), while also reviewing other programs and tools, TARP and Other Bank Bailouts and Bail-Ins around the World sheds light on how best to protect the financial system on Wall Street and the real economy on Main Street.
Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm’s length.Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions.
Includes a new foreword to the paperback edition.
The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries—developed and less developed, democratic and autocratic—respond by protecting bank creditors from all or some of the losses they otherwise would face. Failing banks are labeled "too big to fail" (or TBTF). This important new book examines the issues surrounding TBTF, explaining why it is a problem and discussing ways of dealing with it more effectively. Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, officers with the Federal Reserve, warn that not enough has been done to reduce creditors' expectations of TBTF protection. Many of the existing pledges and policies meant to convince creditors that they will bear market losses when large banks fail are not credible, resulting in significant net costs to the economy. The authors recommend that policymakers enact a series of reforms to reduce expectations of bailouts when large banks fail.
Setting forth the building blocks of banking bailout law, this book reconstructs a regulatory framework that might better serve countries during future crisis situations. It builds upon recent, carefully selected case studies from the US, the EU, the UK, Spain and Hungary to answer the questions of what went wrong with the bank bailouts in the EU, why the US performed better in terms of crisis management, and how bailouts could be regulated and conducted more successfully in the future. Employing a comparative methodology, it examines the different bailout and bank resolution techniques and tools and identifies the pros and cons of the different legal and regulatory options and their underlying principles. In the post-2008 legal-regulatory architecture financial institution specific insolvency proceedings were further developed or implemented on both sides of the Atlantic. Ten years after the most recent financial crisis, there is sufficient empirical evidence to evaluate the outcomes of the bank bailouts in the US and the EU and to examine a number of cases under the EU’s new bank resolution regime. This book will be of interest of anyone in the field of finance, banking, central banking, monetary policy and insolvency law.
During the high interest times in the 1970's and 1980's, the banks and the savings and loan associations were under heavy financial pressure. Hundreds of them failed. The Home Loan Bank Board permitted the savings and loan associations to treat goodwill as capital, thereby allowing them to remain open and to build up enormous losses that eventually cost the taxpayers billions of dollars. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation took a different approach. It closed the banks or sold them, all at no cost to the taxpayers. Bailout is the engrossing story of how the FDIC handled four of these failures. Book jacket.
The disturbing, untold story of one of the largest financial institutions in the world, Citigroup—one of the " too big to fail" banks—from its founding in 1812 to its role in the 2008 financial crisis, and the many disasters in between. During the 2008 financial crisis, Citi was presented as the victim of events beyond its control—the larger financial panic, unforeseen economic disruptions, and a perfect storm of credit expansion, private greed, and public incompetence. To save the economy and keep the bank afloat, the government provided huge infusions of cash through multiple bailouts that frustrated and angered the American public. But, as financial experts James Freeman and Vern McKinley reveal, the 2008 crisis was just one of many disasters Citi has experienced since its founding more than two hundred years ago. In Borrowed Time, they reveal Citi’s history of instability and government support. It’s not a story that either Citi or Washington wants told. From its founding in 1812 and through much of its history the bank has been tied to the federal government—a relationship that has benefited both. Many of its initial stockholders had owned stock in the Bank of the United States, and its first president, Samuel Osgood, had been a member of the Continental Congress and America’s first Postmaster General. From its earliest years, Citi took massive risks that led to crisis. But thanks to private investors, including John Jacob Astor, they survived throughout the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, Senator Carter Glass blamed Citi CEO "Sunshine Charlie" Mitchell for the 1929 stock market crash, and the bank was actually in violation of the senator’s signature achievement, the Glass-Steagall law, in the late 1990s until then U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin engineered the law’s repeal. Rubin later became the chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup, helping to oversee the bank as it ramped up its increasing mortgage risks before the 2008 crash. The scale of the financial panic of 2008 was not, as the media and experts claim, unprecedented. As Borrowed Time shows, disasters have been relatively frequent during the century of government-protected banking—especially at Citi.
Witness how the FDIC manages your money during financial crises Inside the FDIC tells the real stories behind bank failures and financial crises to provide a direct account of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and other bank regulators. Author John Bovenzi served in senior level positions within the FDIC for over twenty years, including a decade as the Deputy to the Chairman and Chief Operating Officer. This book describes what he witnessed as the person in charge of day-to-day operations, as a nearly invisible agency grew to become a major, highly independent force impacting US financial markets. Readers will learn how the FDIC and other bank regulators use the power of the federal government, spend other people's money, and approach decision-making. This book takes readers inside the FDIC to showcase: The FDIC's emergence as a major market influence How ten FDIC chairmen helped shape the US financial regulatory system Internal conflicts between the FDIC and other bank regulatory agencies Pressures and challenges presented by financial crises Since the early 1980s, over 3,400 banks have failed. These failures weren't steady, regular, and easily predictable events; periods of tranquility were followed by turmoil, booms led to busts, and peaceful complacency often turned to sudden devastation. Inside the FDIC chronicles it all, from the perspective of a first hand witness inside the agency responsible for calming the storm.
This book examines the dangers of continuing government bailouts and offers alternative strategies designed to produce growth based on the vigor of the private sector with inflation under control. The expert authors show that it is indeed possible to explain the causes of the crisis in understandable terms and clarify why resolving the bailout problem is essential to preventing future crises.
The explosive growth and increasing complexity of global financial markets are defining characteristics of the contemporary world economy. Unfortunately, financial globalization has been accompanied by a marked increase in the frequency and severity of financial crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has taken a central role in managing these crises through its loans to developing countries. Despite extensive analysis and criticism of the IMF in recent years, key questions remain unanswered. Why does the Fund treat some countries more generously than others? To what extent is IMF lending driven by political factors rather than economic concerns? In whose interests does the IMF act? In this book, Mark Copelovitch offers novel answers to these questions. Combining statistical analysis with detailed case studies, he demonstrates how the politics and policies of the IMF have evolved over the last three decades in response to fundamental changes in the composition of international capital flows.