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Examines 4 case studies: Flight Trails d/b/a Air Resorts, Provincetown-Boston Airlines, Inc., Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., and South Pacific Island Airways.
In response to a congressional request, GAO examined the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA): (1) ability to maintain airline safety standards in a deregulated environment; and (2) actions to correct weaknesses in its inspection program. GAO found that FAA: (1) did not develop a system for monitoring deregulation's impact; (2) decreased its inspection force by 250 between 1981 and 1983, although it did not have staffing standards to provide a framework for determining how many inspectors it needed; (3) failed to collect inspection data and often did not identify major safety problems or ensure their correction through appropriate followup; (4) lacked guidelines concerning the needed frequency and scope of inspections; and (5) gave priority to certifying new airlines while existing airlines were experiencing safety compliance problems due to rapid growth and personnel turnover. GAO also found that FAA has begun to address these problems by: (1) increasing its inspector work force; (2) establishing minimum inspection standards; (3) improving its internal control and management information systems; and (4) instituting a National Inspection Plan (NIP), using specially assembled teams to inspect targeted airlines.
The deregulation of the commercial airline industry has stimulated the formation of a number of new airlines. This report addresses (1) the safety performance of new airlines (less than 5 years old) compared with that of established airlines (more than 5 years old) in terms of accidents, incidents, and FAA-initiated enforcement actions; and (2) the frequency with which FAA inspects new airlines compared with its inspections of established airlines. Assesses the status of FAA's efforts to correct problems that limit the effectiveness of its safety inspection program. Discusses publishing airline-specific safety data for use by the traveling public. Charts and tables.
The FAA uses the Air Transport. Oversight System (ATOS) to oversee 7 legacyÓ airlines & 9 other airlines. This report refers to airlines that are not in ATOS as non-legacy airlines. Two other processes are used to oversee 99 non-legacy passenger airlines (NLPA), which represent a fast-growing segment of the commercial aviation passenger industry & carried 200 million passengers. in 2004. These establish a set of inspection activities for NLPA, & use principles of system safety to identify additional risk-based inspections for those airlines. This report assesses the processes used by FAA to ensure the safety of NLPA. Reviewed the strengths of FAA's inspection oversight for NLPA & the issues that hinder its effectiveness. Charts & tables.
U.S. airlines and air cargo companies operate more than 6,700 aircraft. Nearly half of the work of maintaining, repairing and renovating this fleet is done by about 2,800 independent repair stations rather than the air carriers themselves. Examines the FAA's oversight of the aviation repair station industry. This report addresses these questions: (1) What is the nature and scope of the oversight of repair stations conducted by FAA personnel? (2) How well does FAA follow up on inspections to ensure that identified deficiencies in repair station operations are corrected? (3) What steps has FAA taken to improve the oversight of repair stations? Charts and tables.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the safety performance of new airlines having 5 or fewer years of operating experience, focusing on: (1) the frequency with which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspects new airlines compared with its inspections of established airlines; and (2) FAA efforts to correct long-standing problems that limit the effectiveness of its safety inspection program. GAO found that: (1) although data regarding airline accidents and FAA incident and enforcement actions require cautious interpretation, it appeared that, for the review period of 1990 through 1994, new airlines had higher rates of accidents, incidents, and FAA enforcement actions than established airlines during their early years of operations; (2) FAA officials theorized that new airlines may experience more incidents because their fleets expand faster than their ability to absorb growth, train staff, and maintain fleets; (3) FAA national inspection guidelines that were in effect during the review period did not target new airlines for increased surveillance; (4) no clear pattern in the inspection rates distinguished airlines with relatively high rates of incidents and enforcement actions from those that had few or no problems; (5) FAA aviation safety inspection program shortcomings include insufficient inspector training, inadequate aviation safety databases, and the need to improve the oversight of aging aircraft; (6) FAA actions to better target its inspection resources to areas with the greatest safety risks remain incomplete; and (7) initiatives to accelerate the hiring of safety inspectors, strengthen FAA data collection and tracking systems, review FAA inspection operations, and conduct a safety review have the potential to significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the FAA safety inspection program.