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Verification in an Age of Insecurity takes the reader into some of the most urgent arms control issues facing the world community, including the nuclear activities of rogue states and threats from sophisticated non-state actors. In the book, national security expert Philip D. O'Neill, Jr. identifies and addresses issues from the resuscitated disarmament agenda, from the comprehensive test ban to fissile material and biological weapons. O'Neill examines the need for shifts in verification standards and policy suitable for our volatile era and beyond it. He surveys recent history to show how established verification procedures fail to produce the certainty necessary to meet today's threats. Verification in an Age of Insecurity goes beyond a discussion of rogue states like North Korea to offer suggestions on how best to bring compliance policy up to date with modern threats.
This Report assesses U.S. compliance with and adherence to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments in 2016, including Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), as well as the adherence in 2016 of other nations to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments, including CSBMs and the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the United States is a participating State. The issues addressed in this Report primarily reflect activities from January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, unless otherwise noted.
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control; (3) The Components of a Verification Regime: The Objectives of a Verification Regime; Assessing Verifiability; Monitoring and Verification in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control; Monitoring and Verification in New START (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty); National Technical Means of Verification; Providing Telemetry Generated During Missile Flight Tests: Telemetry Exchange in START; Telemetry Exchange in New START; Mobile ICBMs: Limits on Mobile ICBMs in START; Mobile ICBMs in New START; On-Site Inspections: On-Site Inspections in START; On-Site Inspections in New START; (4) Assessing the Verification Regime in New START. Illustrations.
Originally published in 1985, the level of anxiety and suspicion between the USA and the USSR had rarely been higher. Many advocates of arms control believed that effective verification would reduce tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses the two main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the present capabilities of various verification techniques and what is their potential? The devices and methods currently employed by the two major nuclear powers and by international organizations to monitor the compliance of states with arms control or disarmament treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US and Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and bureaucratic politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard of adequacy be based? In short, how much is enough? Although the study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming more mobile and it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a danger that the ability to hide weapons will outstrip the ability to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect all violations; a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from the ability to detect militarily significant violations.
Heinz Gaertner argues in this Occasional Paper, one area of arms control in which the NNA and smaller European states can make a significant contribution is verification. This study explores the possibilities for the smaller nations of Europe to make positive contributions to the verification of reductions in conventional forces and arms, a chemica