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This article presents evidence that the preferred awards of arbitrators in final-offer arbitration (FOA) compromise between the perspectives of the bargainers. Using Major League Baseball FOA offers between 1986-2002, this study finds strong evidence that final offers (which are strategically formulated around the preferred award) are a weighted average of the player`s salary in the previous season and the average free agent salary. The findings are particularly interesting because FOA was created to eliminate arbitrator compromise. (JEL J520, L830).
Amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA) has been developed as an attractive alternative mechanism to final-offer arbitration (FOA). Under AFOA, more reasonable offers win, but the outcome is determined by the loser's offer and the arbitrator's value. In AFOA, disputants making extreme offers are penalized, thereby encouraging compromise. This article compares the theoretical and behavioral properties of AFOA and FOA. Controlled laboratory experiments indicate that AFOA significantly outperforms FOA, generating substantially greater prearbitration settlement. Consistent with theoretical predictions, offers converge under AFOA; however, FOA offers neither converge nor are consistent with theoretical predictions. This work suggests practitioners should consider adopting AFOA over FOA.
Excerpt from Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important? Of central importance in the process of collective bargaining is the mechanism for settling disputes that arise when the parties fail to reach agreement. It determines not only the terms of agreement in all cases but also the probability of reaching agreement without resort to the dispute settlement mechanism. While the strike is the dominant mode for settling disputes that arise in the course of negotiating labor contracts, arbitration procedures have become particularly important in areas, such as the public sector, where strikes are not allowed. These procedures are characterized by a third party making a binding decision. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Pamphlet on final offer compulsory arbitration procedures in the public sector of the USA - includes statistical tables on some dispute settlement experiences, etc. References.
This book is a comprehensive analysis of the behavior of arbitrators in conventional and final-offer arbitration. Through empirical research, the book identifies the key factors that influence the behavior of arbitrators and the outcomes of their decisions. The book also examines the implications of these findings for the theory and practice of labor relations and dispute resolution. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Excerpt from The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration I. Farber and Katz (1979) and Farber (1980) develop models of the negotiation process under the threat of arbitration that highlight the role of the expected arbitration award. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.