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Description of Volume 13. China : "This volume is the first publication in a new subseries of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important foreign policy issues of the Jimmy Carter presidential administration." From U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian website.
A narrative chronicle of Israeli democracy that defines historic phases and follows thematic challenges to democracy, including: competition between religion and the rule of law; the statist society and chaotic minoritocracy; modern illiberal populism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The comprehensive portrait exposes endemic flaws of democracy in Israel, but also shows that Israel has considerable capacity – and responsibility – to fulfill the promise of democracy.
This political biography sheds new light on the vital role played by the Israeli Prime Minister in establishing peaceful relations with Egypt. Focusing on the character and personality of Menachem Begin, Gerald Steinberg and Ziv Rubinovitz offer a new look into the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s. Begin’s role as a peace negotiator has often been marginalized, but this sympathetic and critical portrait restores him to the center of the diplomatic process. Beginning with the events of 1967, Steinberg and Rubinovitz look at Begin’s statements on foreign policy, including relations with Egypt, and his role as Prime Minister and chief signer of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. While Begin did not leave personal memoirs or diaries of the peace process, Steinberg and Rubinovitz have tapped into newly released Israeli archives and information housed at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and the Begin Heritage Center. The analysis illuminates the complexities that Menachem Begin faced in navigating between ideology and political realism in the negotiations towards a peace treaty that remains a unique diplomatic achievement.
Israeli settlements are proliferating in Palestinian territory, and if they are annexed, the possibility of a future Palestinian state is virtually impossible. Could it have been otherwise? Can it still be? These are the questions Jerome M. Segal poses in The Olive Branch from Palestine. Carefully argued and highly informative, this book is centered on an original strategy that Segal devised—a strategy adopted but only partially implemented by Palestinian leadership, leaving its feasibility untested. The first step of this strategy was the issuance in November 1988 of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. That document, authored by Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish and modeled on Israel's own Declaration, called for a Palestinian state that would live in peace with Israel. In The Olive Branch from Palestine, Segal provides in the first part an analytical and historical study of the 1988 Declaration, a remarkable act of unilateral peacemaking through which the PLO accepted the legitimacy of the 1947 Partition Resolution and thereby redefined Palestinian nationalism. In the second part, he proposes a new strategy based on solutions to the two core issues of 1948: the preservation of a Jewish state, and the rights and circumstances of Palestinian refugees. With The Olive Branch from Palestine, Jerome Segal offers a new narrative of the peace process and details a Palestinian-led strategy that could end the conflict.
In a myth-busting analysis of the world's most intractable conflict, a star of Middle East reporting, "one of the most important writers" in the field (The New York Times), argues that only one weapon has yielded progress: force. Scattered over the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea lie the remnants of failed peace proposals, international summits, secret negotiations, UN resolutions, and state-building efforts. The conventional story is that these well-meaning attempts at peacemaking were repeatedly, perhaps terminally, thwarted by violence. Through a rich interweaving of reportage, historical narrative, and powerful analysis, Nathan Thrall presents a startling counter-history. He shows that force—including but not limited to violence—has impelled each side to make its largest concessions, from Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution to Israeli territorial withdrawals. This simple fact has been neglected by the world powers, which have expended countless resources on initiatives meant to diminish friction between the parties. By quashing any hint of confrontation, promising an imminent negotiated solution, facilitating security cooperation, developing the institutions of a still unborn Palestinian state, and providing bounteous economic and military assistance, the United States and Europe have merely entrenched the conflict by lessening the incentives to end it. Thrall’s important book upends the beliefs steering these failed policies, revealing how the aversion of pain, not the promise of peace, has driven compromise for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Published as Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza reaches its fiftieth anniversary, which is also the centenary of the Balfour Declaration that first promised a Jewish national home in Palestine, The Only Language They Understand advances a bold thesis that shatters ingrained positions of both left and right and provides a new and eye-opening understanding of this most vexed of lands.
In recent years geographic mental maps have made a comeback into the spotlight of scholarly inquiry in the area of International Relations (IR), particularly Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The book is framed within the mental map research agenda. It seeks to contribute and expand the theoretical and empirical development and application of geographic mental maps as an analytical concept for international politics. More precisely, it presents a theoretical framework for understanding how mental maps are employed in foreign policy decision-making and highlights the mechanisms involved in their transformation. The theoretical framework presented in this book employs the latest conceptual and theoretical insight from numerous other scientific fields such as social psychology and organizational theory. In order to test the theoretical propositions outlined in the initial chapters, the book assesses how the Carter Administration’s changing mental maps impacted its Middle East policy. In other words, the book applies geographic mental maps as an analytical tool to explain the development of the Carter Doctrine. The book is particularly targeted at academics, students, and professionals involved in the fields of Human Geography, IR, Political Geography, and FPA. The book will also be of interest to individuals interested in Political Science more generally. While the book has is academic in nature, its qualitative and holistic approach is accessible to all readers interested in geography and international politics. Luis da Vinha, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Geography & Political Science at Valley City State University.
The history of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is marked by numerous stark failures and a few ephemeral successes. Jimmy Carter's short-lived Middle East diplomatic strategy constitutes an exception in vision and approach. In this extensive and long-overdue analysis of Carter's Middle East policy, Jorgen Jensehaugen sheds light on this important and unprecedented chapter in U.S. regional diplomacy. Against all odds, including the rise of Menachem Begin's right-wing government in Israel, Carter broke new ground by demanding the involvement of the Palestinians in Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations. This book assesses the president's `comprehensive peace' doctrine, which aimed to encompass all parties of the conflict, and reveals the reasons why his vision ultimately failed. Largely based on analysis of newly-declassified diplomatic files and American, British, Palestinian and Israeli archival sources, this book is the first comprehensive examination of Jimmy Carter's engagement with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At a time when U.S. involvement in the region threatens to exacerbate tensions further, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter provides important new insights into the historical roots of the ongoing unrest. The book will be of value to Middle East and International Relations scholars, and those researching U.S diplomacy and the Carter Administration.
"In eleven dramatic years, Anwar Sadat changed history--not just that of Egypt, or of the Middle East, but of the entire world. As the architect of the 1973 war against Israel, he gained the support of other Arab nations and inspired the oil embargo that transformed the global economy. Following the war, however, he forever ended Arab aspirations of unity by making peace with Israel. Early in his presidency, Sadat jettisoned Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union and turned to the United States, thereby giving the West a crucial Cold War victory. Sadat's historic tenure still resonates in the twenty-first century as the Islamic activists--whom he originally encouraged but who opposed his conciliatory policy toward Israel and ultimately played a role in his assassination--continue to foster activism, including the Muslim Brotherhood, today.Thomas W. Lippman was stationed in the Middle East as a journalist during Sadat's presidency and lived in Egypt in the aftermath of the October War. He knew Sadat personally, but only now, after the passage of time and the long-delayed release of the U.S. State Department's diplomatic files, can Lippman assess the full consequences of Sadat's presidency. Hero of the Crossing provides an eye-opening account of the profound reverberations of one leader's political, cultural, and economic maneuverings and legacy"--
The US commitment to stability—both domestically and abroad—has been a consistent feature in the way Washington, DC carries out international relations. This commitment is complimented by the increased overlap between the economic and political spheres in international affairs. Consequently, this US approach to foreign interaction is informed by an assumption that foreign policy tools can influence global stability for the better. In order to investigate this assumption, this book details the foundations of what Amir Magdy Kamel refers to as the US Stability Policy—how it evolved over time and how it was implemented in Egypt. He finds that domestic and global forces were left unaccounted for by the Stability Policy, ultimately leading to a failure to achieve the self-stated stability goals. Kamel’s analysis is informed through a unique mixed-method approach that sheds light on how and why this policy fared so poorly under Mubarak’s Egypt. He develops and tests a unique and particular way of examining the Stability Policy and presents a framework for future work to replicate and build on in the quest to understand other state-on-state relationships and the effectiveness of other foreign economic policies in achieving stability goals. Floundering Stability reflects on what Kamel’s findings mean for the relationship between the US and Egypt, as well as specific US foreign policy suggestions on how the same mistakes can be avoided in the future.