Download Free Appointment Of Dr Mark Carney As Governor Of The Bank Of England Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Appointment Of Dr Mark Carney As Governor Of The Bank Of England and write the review.

The Treasury Committee has today published a report following the pre-commencement hearing it held with the next Governor of the Bank of England, Dr Mark Carney, on 7 February 2013. During the hearing, Dr Carney offered his views on the UK's future monetary policy framework. The Treasury Committee will report its conclusions, based in part on Dr Carney's evidence, in its forthcoming Report on the Budget. The Bank of England has taken on a wide range of new powers. Significant structural and cultural change is underway. Dr Carney will be responsible for overseeing it. In evidence to the Committee, Dr Carney set out his preference for a consensus-based approach to leadership; this will be significant if it leads to a meaningful change of culture within the Bank. The Committee wishes Dr Carney every success for his term as Governor. He will bring a wide range of skills and a great deal of experience to the role. Dr Carney's appearance before the Treasury Select Committee has set an important precedent. No previous Governor of the Bank of England has been subject to such a rigorous pre-commencement hearing. In future, they will be.

Budget 2013

Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Treasury Committee

Published: 2013-04-22

Total Pages: 200


Get eBook

The Treasury Committee's report on Budget 2013 focuses on: macroeconomy; the public finances; monetary policy; taxation; departmental spending; housing; energy policy; premature disclosure of budget information; Parliamentary timing. The report contains 46 conclusions and recommendations. Particular attention is paid to the Help to Buy housing policy, which is considered a work in progress which may have unintended consequences and may not help first-time buyers. The Committee poses a number of questions for the Chancellor on the policy. Overall, if the Government's priority was housing supply, its housing measures should have concentrated there. On energy it is unclear which Government Department is in the lead for energy policy and this lack of clarity must be addressed. The changes to the monetary policy remit announced by the Chancellor at the time of Budget 2013 create uncertainty. Tax complexity and instability remain of considerable concern. The Committee will monitor whether the Government anti-avoidance measures succeed in generating the revenue predicted of them. In addition, the Committee invited comments from three accounting bodies on how Budget 2013 meets the Committee's tax policy principles: basic fairness; supporting growth and encouraging competition; certainty, including simplicity; stability; practicality; and coherence.
On 17 October 2014, the European Commission informed HM Treasury that the UK would have to make an additional contribution to the EU budget of approximately 2.1 billion euro. This additional contribution had been prompted by revisions to EU Member States' historic Gross National Income (GNI) data, dating back to 1995. Member States make several annual contributions to the EU budget, by far the most significant being a levy on GNI. This levy is charged as a percentage rate on Member States' annual GNI, with the rate set at a level designed to cover exactly the portion of the EU Budget which remains unfunded once the other sources of income - namely Traditional Own Resources' and VAT-based resources - have been taken into account. The result is that an individual Member State contributes to this portion of the budget in proportion to its share of total GNI across all Member States. In 2013, GNI-based contributions amounted to 74 per cent of the EU's total budget. Emerging from the ECOFIN summit of 7 November 2014, the Chancellor claimed to have "halved the bill" of £1.7 billion demanded by the EU. He later described this as the result of "hard-fought negotiation" with the Commission to ensure that the consequential change to the UK's rebate would apply. The calculation of the rebate, and the circumstances in which it applies, are embedded in EU law. This is set out in detail in Council Decision 2007/436/EC and the supporting Council document on the UK correction. These documents establish the precise method for calculating the rebate. On the basis of the evidence the Committee has seen, it should have been unambiguously clear to the Treasury, well in advance of ECOFIN on 7 November 2014, that the UK was entitled to a rebate on any additional budget contributions that could arise from the GNI revisions.
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form a large part of the UK economy. According to official statistics, there were 5.243 million private sector businesses at the start of 2014. 5.236 million had 0-250 employees and are classed as SMEs, of which 5.204 million had fewer than 50 employees and are classed as small businesses. SMEs account for 60 per cent of all private sector employment, and registered an annual turnover of £1.6 trillion at the start of 2014-47 per cent of the private sector total. A large majority of SMEs are sole traders-76% of all businesses are non-employers. The Government believes that access to finance for SMEs is 'key to the recovery and long term growth of the economy'. Research by National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) in 2009 found that the '6 per cent of UK businesses generated half of the new jobs created by existing businesses between 2002 and 2008. This report offers a number conclusions and recommendations covering: the state of the SME lending market; RBS Global Restructuring Group (GRG); mis-sale of Hedging Products; and alternative finance
On the evening of 27 March 2014, the Daily Telegraph published an article on its website describing a forthcoming thematic review by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) into the life insurance market. The same story appeared in the print edition of the Telegraph the following day. The story, based on an advance briefing given by the FCA to the Telegraph earlier that week, gave a misleading impression of the scope of the life insurance review, and was published before the FCA had made any official announcement of its own. When the markets opened on 28 March, the share prices of several leading life insurers began to fall heavily. Only when the FCA published a clarifying statement about the scope of the review - several hours later that day - did share prices begin to recover. On the day following the publication of the Telegraph article, the Chairman of this Committee called for a "full and transparent explanation about how such an apparently serious mistake came to be made by our financial services watchdog--the body appointed by Parliament to enforce high standards of conduct". Simon Davis, Partner at Clifford Chance LLP, was subsequently appointed to conduct an investigation, and reported his findings in December 2014. The Committee records its thanks to Mr Davis for undertaking this work and for the evidence he gave to it.
The Treasury has again been unable to provide all the information needed by deadlines agreed with the OBR. The Government may, as the Chairman of the Office for Budget Responsibility suggested, have decided that for political reasons this was a "price worth paying." This would set an undesirable precedent. The work of the Office for Budget Responsibility depends on the Treasury meeting the agreed deadlines. The Committee welcomes the OBR's innovation of providing uncertainty ratings for policy costings. The Committee recommends in future that the OBR publish a breakdown of the uncertainty rating assessment against the three criteria for all announced measures at Autumn Statements and Budgets. The Committee also welcomes the Government's continued publication of the distributional analysis of the Government's policy changes and recommends that the next Government continue with this important aid to transparency. The current inflation target set by the Government is symmetrical, and is 2 per cent at all times. Several witnesses alluded to the risks of very low inflation and subsequent deflation, including the Chancellor. The Chancellor has publicly welcomed the current level of inflation. This is not likely to help anchor inflationary expectations. The Governor of the Bank of England is required to write to explain to the Chancellor why inflation has fallen below 1 per cent. It is important to avoid mixed messages on inflation targeting. The Bank of England should undertake research on the effect of net migration, and the potential for future net migration, on the supply of labour and wage growth as part of the work on meeting the MPC's remit. The Treasury should ensure that discussions within Government on immigration policy fully consider the requirements of the economy.
One of the most significant consequences of Co-op Bank's near-collapse, from a public policy perspective, was the collapse of Lloyds Banking Group's planned divestment under Project Verde. Co-op Bank's withdrawal forced Lloyds to resort to its fallback option of an Initial Public Offering. The result is a new bank, TSB, which, not having an existing banking presence of its own, consists solely of the business divested by Lloyds. Accordingly, it has a personal current account market share not of 7 per cent, but of 4.2 per cent. There is a risk that a bank of this size might struggle to grow significantly and to act as a true challenger in the market. Had Co-op Bank's resulting capital shortfall been uncovered earlier, it is likely that the bank would not have progressed so far with Verde. As it was, the rapid and late emergence of the capital problem led to Co-op's withdrawal from the Verde process at a relatively late stage. The Committee recommends that the FRC investigation and the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank consider the role of KPMG and the FSA in relation to the late emergence of loan impairment and IT losses. On the basis of these findings, the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank should also form a view on whether Co-op's Verde bid could or should have been halted sooner. While it may not have been fully transparent from the start that Co-op Bank's bid was doomed to failure, it was beset by problems from an early stage. But it was not these problems that killed the deal-it was the capital shortfall that emerged only late in the day. It is important, from every angle to determine why the capital shortfall was not uncovered earlier.