Download Free An Analysis Of The Efficacy Of Counter Insurgency In The Philippines Against The Communist Forces With Special Reference To Counter Insurgency In Malaysia Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online An Analysis Of The Efficacy Of Counter Insurgency In The Philippines Against The Communist Forces With Special Reference To Counter Insurgency In Malaysia and write the review.

Erfaringer i bekæmpelse af oprør og guerillabevægelser i Malaysia og Vietnam.
The Maoist-inspired Communist Party of the Philippines celebrated its 37th anniversary on December 2005. It marks a long history of violence, terror, and instability in the archipelagic country of 87 million people, causing thousands of casualties among government troops, insurgents, and including civilians. This study seeks to find a lasting solution that will finally bring to a close the final chapter to insurgency in the country. It was approached from a historical point of view by studying the events that lead to the birth of the movement in 1932 until its defeat in 1954. A new chapter of the Maoist insurgency started in 1969 and this movement emerged into a formidable guerrilla force that became the primary threat to the nation’s security. This paper tries to analyze how that insurgency persisted to challenge the government this far and what went wrong with the government’s response. It will attempt to answer the primary question: How to defeat the communist insurgency?
The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency: Find, Fix, Fight focuses on how to understand the relationship between the use of force and the outcomes of such use. Specifically, there is debate as to how to evaluate counterinsurgency conflicts, and what prescriptions flow from that evaluation. The Neo-Classicist school emphasises prescriptions which are either directly from, or inspired by, Cold War counterinsurgency efforts undertaken by anti-communist states. The Revisionist school focuses on how best to evaluate the political dimensions of such conflicts. This book finds that a third approach, Reflective-Action, is best as it combines Neo-Classicism’s strength of issuing practical prescriptions with Revisionism’s strength for conceptually evaluating counterinsurgency conflicts. This conceptual debate is exposited in three cases. They are the British counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, American counterinsurgency in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Coalition counterinsurgency in Iraq during the 2000s.
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
This thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency operations being launched by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA). The Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) is an essential component of the AFP's Operational clear-hold-support methodology. Many scholars have argued that separating the Communist guerrillas from the populace is an important element in winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolating the Communist insurgents is done through the creation of local militia. However, some authors contend it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces because, in the long term, the governments are unsure of the future loyalties of these paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the government, but as they work and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills against the government in the future. Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. The Philippine paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used effectively for counterinsurgency. Their primary task of protecting the communities and the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the Communist insurgents are achieved. They are an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as well as command and control. This thesis concludes that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in the right operational direction for utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense and as the protectors of the people. The paramilitary forces in the Philippines need the proper training as well as command and control in order to make these paramilitary forces effective counterinsurgency forces.
In the post Cold War and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the communist insurgents in the Philippines are still a potent force and the main threat to the county's national security. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues that brought about the resurgence of the communist insurgency and the counterinsurgency measures undertaken by the government. Economic disparity and injustice are major reasons for people to take up arms against the government. Unless these are resolved, the insurgency problem will continue to persist. A purely military solution to the problem will not solve the communist insurgency in the Philippines. While the CPP is the most potent threat to the security of the Republic of the Philippines, it is not yet in a position to win militarily against the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the same manner, the Armed Forces of the Philippines could not totally defeat the insurgents for as long as the basic issues that attract or draw the people to the communist movement are not addressed by the government.