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Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Contents: Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine The Al-Qaeda Organization Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism" The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa'idat Al-Jihad Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad "What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn III. Islamic State Organization "Zarqawism" vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999 Al-Zarqawi's Private Jihasist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's "Caliphate": From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: The Caliphate Now! The "Final Solution" to the "Shia Problem" Terrorist Modus Operandi Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis The Al-Qaeda Organization The "Classical" Base First Bin Ladenist Lone Mujahid" "Far Enemy" Strategy Islamic State Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Key Findings Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQ and its Affiliates Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the IS
The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni "jihadism"? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators?
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism in Africa, edited by George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Kelechi A. Kalu, addresses the need for a systematic understanding and examination of insurgent movements and terrorist organizations, as well as state policies that instigate intrastate conflicts in African states. It examines and documents the tactics that are used by anti-government forces, states’ counterterrorism responses, and the human security impacts of insecurity on citizens across various communities in Africa. The contributors’ extensive research methods include case studies that explore activities of terrorist organizations like Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State. It presents new and productive insights about counterterrorism strategies deployed by selected African states, the African Union, and the U.S. A historically rich and politically focused analysis of states as co-conspirators in terrorism-induced insecurity in Africa, this book challenges existing literature on terrorism that largely focuses on the actions of non-state entities. It provides practical insights to policymakers that desire to end insecurity and promote inclusive governance in Africa.
This book assesses the effectiveness of Nigeria’s counterterrorist policies against Boko Haram. It takes a critical review of the interventionist strategies adopted by the Nigerian government, highlights the motivations behind the choice of strategies, and proffers a deeper understanding of the factors responsible for the state’s inability, thus far, to rid the country of terrorism. Specifically, it evaluates the NACTEST policy framework that guides the Nigerian state’s counterterrorist strategies, which contains both hard and soft power approaches. Adopting historical and case study approaches which put the Nigerian state and occurrences of violent conflict in context, it takes cognizance of the politics of ethno-religious diversity which reinforce violent conflicts among groups and against the state, and reviews the socio-economic and political realities that led to the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram. The volume concludes by suggesting practical policy options for combating Boko Haram and other similar armed insurrection. This book is appropriate for researchers and students interested in African politics, conflict, security, peace studies, terrorism, and counterterrorism, as well as policy makers and government departments dealing with terrorism and counterterrorism.
Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and potential answers for such key questions as: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni "jihadism"? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S. Government strategists and professional military educators? Dr. Kamolnick's book substantially advances the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combating these terrorist entities more effectively.
First published in English in 2007 under title: The history of terrorism: from antiquity to al Qaeda.
The effects of the information revolution are particularly profound in the realm of national security strategy. They are creating new opportunities for those who master them. The U.S. military, for instance, is exploring ways to seize information superiority during conflicts and thus gain decisive advantages over its opponents. But the information revolution also creates new security threats and vulnerabilities. No nation has made more effective use of the information revolution than the United States, but none is more dependent on information technology. To protect American security, then, military leaders and defense policymakers must understand the information revolution. The essays in this volume are intended to contribute to such an understanding. They grew from a December 1999 conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Pittsburgh Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. The conference brought together some of the foremost members of the academic strategic studies community with representatives of the U.S. Government and U.S. military. As could be expected when examining a topic as complex as the relationship between the information revolution and national security, the presentations and discussions were far-ranging, covering such issues as the global implications of the information revolution, the need for a national information security strategy, and the role of information in U.S. military operations. While many more questions emerged than answers, the conference did suggest some vital tasks that military leaders and defense policymakers must undertake.
Though U.S. leaders try to convince the world of their success in fighting al Qaeda, one anonymous member of the U.S. intelligence community would like to inform the public that we are, in fact, losing the war on terror. Further, until U.S. leaders recognize the errant path they have irresponsibly chosen, he says, our enemies will only grow stronger. According to the author, the greatest danger for Americans confronting the Islamist threat is to believe-at the urging of U.S. leaders-that Muslims attack us for what we are and what we think rather than for what we do. Blustering political rhetor.
The internet offers tremendous opportunities for violent extremists across the ideological spectrum and at a global level. In addition to propaganda, digital technologies have transformed the dynamics of radical mobilisation, recruitment and participation. Even though the jihadist threat has seemingly declined in the West, the danger exists of the internet being an environment where radical messages can survive and even prosper. Against this background, this ISPI report investigates the current landscape of jihadist online communication, including original empirical analysis. Specific attention is also placed on potential measures and initiatives to address the threat of online violent extremism. The volume aims to present important points for reflection on the phenomenon in the West (including Italy) and beyond.