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The United States is engaged in a protracted struggle against violent extremists that will persist for the foreseeable future. Our Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) are at the forefront of this struggle. In recent years, we have called upon AFSOF to deliver unique capabilities and skill sets to combatant commanders across the range of military operations from the major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to the humanitarian relief operations in Haiti. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-7, Special Operations, guides the preparation and employment of Air Force special operations forces. It builds upon our capstone doctrine, and presents the fundamentals of what Airmen have learned as the best way to organize and employ AFSOF at the operational level of war. AFDD 2-7, Special Operations, describes the support AFSOF provides to the joint force commander (JFC) and reiterates the command relationships that allow the JFC to leverage AFSOF capabilities as part of a greater campaign plan. As we read AFDD 2-7, it is essential we keep the basic SOF truths in mind. AFSOF cannot be mass produced. AFSOF is centered on people and not platforms and therefore quality is always better than quantity. It takes years to produce a strategic SOF Airman. History has demonstrated that we cannot produce competent AFSOF after an emergency arises. Our AFSOF must remain strong and ready to serve. Finally, as we employ AFSOF, All Air Force Airmen must be prepared to enable the AFSOF mission with agile combat support capabilities. Although proud of our Air Force's successes during our most recent operations, history tells us that we cannot afford complacency. With this in mind, AFDD 2-7 captures lessons learned from latest experiences, adjusts AFSOF's doctrinal sightline, and shapes the foundational concepts to meet current and future challenges. Contents: Chapter One - Overview of Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) * Chapter Two - Core Activities And Missions * Chapter Three - Command, Control, and Organization * Chapter Four - AFSOF Planning and Support Considerations
Colonel Slife chronicles the influence of the late Gen Wilbur L. "Bill" Creech7a leader, visionary, warrior, and mentor7in the areas of equipment and tactics, training, organization, and leader development. His study serves both to explain the context of a turbulent time in our Air Force's history and to reveal where tomorrow's airmen may find answers to some of the difficult challenges facing them today. Colonel Slife, who addresses such controversial topics as the development of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and what it meant to airmen, is among the first to describe what historians will surely see in years to come as the revolutionary developments of the late 1970s/early 1980s and General Creech's central role. Creech Blue enlightens the Air Force on its strongly held convictions during that period and challenges the idea that by 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Air Force had forgotten how to wage a "strategic" air campaign and was dangerously close to plunging into a costly and lengthy war of attrition had it not been for the vision of a small cadre of thinkers on the Air Staff. In exploring the doctrine and language of the decade leading up to Operation Desert Storm, Colonel Slife reveals that the Air Force was not as shortsighted as many people have argued.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
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After Southeast Asia, analysts and force planners came to the realization that there was a fundamental difference between search and rescue (SAR) in a permissive area and in an area that was not permissive (i.e., under enemy control). This second condition is now called combat search and rescue or CSAR. At the time of Desert Storm, the two forms of rescue were defined thusly: Search and Rescue (SAR): Use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, personnel, and equipment to locate and recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): A specialized SAR task performed by rescue-capable forces to effect recovery of distressed personnel from hostile territory during contingency operations or wartime.2 The development of this rescue capability has been well established. Dr. Robert Futrell documented our efforts in Korea in The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. His work was followed by Dr. Earl Tilford's Search and Rescue in South east Asia, which eloquently chronicled the heroic efforts of the rescue crews in that conflict who brought back literally thousands of airmen. It extensively documented what is now considered the "golden age" of rescue. This work is meant to follow in those traditions and will focus on our CSAR efforts in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, or more specifically, the period of Operation Desert Storm, 17 January to 28 February 1991. Overall, CSAR in Desert Storm appears to have been a mixed bag. Because of advances in precision weaponry, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, countermeasures, and training, relatively few coalition aircraft were shot down. Forty-three coalition aircraft were lost in combat, most over high-threat areas. Eighty-seven coalition airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines were isolated in enemy or neutral territory. Of that total, 48 were killed, one is still listed as missing, 24 were immediately captured, and 14 were exposed in enemy territory. Of those who survived, most landed in areas controlled by enemy troops. Of the few actually rescueable, six were not rescued for a variety of reasons, but primarily because of limitations in CENTAF's ability to locate them accurately and in a timely manner.
In war, defeating an enemy's force is often a necessary step on the path to victory. Defeating enemy armies is a difficult task that often comes with a high price tag in terms of blood and treasure. With its inherent speed, range, and flexibility, air and space power offers a way to lower that risk by providing commanders a synergistic tool that can provide a degree of control over the surface environment and render enemy forces ineffective before they meet friendly land forces. Modern air and space power directly affects an adversary's ability to initiate, conduct, and sustain ground combat.
En historisk gennemgang af luftopklaringens betydning for landkrigen - fra ballonerne til de hurtige fly.
The use of airpower in wartime calls to mind the massive bombings of World War II, but airplanes have long been instrumental in small wars as well. Ever since its use by the French to put down rebellious Moroccan tribes in 1913, airpower has been employed to fight in limited but often lengthy small conflicts around the globe. This is the first comprehensive history of airpower in small wars-conflicts pitting states against non-state groups such as insurgents, bandits, factions, and terrorists-tracing it from the early years of the twentieth century to the present day. It examines dozens of conflicts with strikingly different scenarios: the Greek Civil War, the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South Vietnam before the American escalation, counterinsurgency in southern Africa, Latin American counterguerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns in the Middle East over the last four decades. For each war, the authors describe the strategies employed on both sides of the conflict, the air forces engaged, and the specific airpower tactics employed. They discuss the ground campaigns and provide the political background necessary to understand the air campaigns, and in each case they judge the utility of airpower in its broadest sense. In their historic sweep, they show how forms of airpower evolved from planes to police helicopters, aircraft of the civilian air reserve, and today's unmanned aircraft. They also disclose how small wars after World War II required new strategies, operational solutions, and tactics. By taking this broad view of small-war airpower, the authors are able to make assessments about the most effective and least effective means of employing airpower. They offer specific conclusions ranging from the importance of comprehensive strategy to the need for the United States and its allies to expand small-wars training programs. Airpower in Small Wars will be invaluable for educating military professionals and policy makers in the subject as well as for providing a useful framework for developing more effective doctrine for employing airpower in the conflicts we are most likely to see in the twenty-first century.