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More than a decade after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, most studies of the Iraq conflict focus on the twin questions of whether the United States should have entered Iraq in 2003 and whether it should have exited in 2011, but few have examined the new Iraqi state and society on its own merits. Iraq after America examines the government and the sectarian and secular factions that have emerged in Iraq since the U.S. invasion of 2003, presenting the interrelations among the various elements in the Iraqi political scene. The book traces the origins of key trends in recent Iraqi history to explain the political and social forces that produced them, particularly during the intense period of civil war between 2003 and 2009. Along the way, the author looks at some of the most significant players in the new Iraq, explaining how they have risen to prominence and what their aims are. The author identifies the three trends that dominate Iraq's post-U.S. political order: authoritarianism, sectarianism, and Islamist resistance, tracing their origins and showing how they have created a toxic political and social brew, preventing Iraq's political elite from resolving the fundamental roots of conflict that have wracked that country since 2003 and before. He concludes by examining some aspects of the U.S. legacy in Iraq, analyzing what it means for the United States and others that, after more than a decade of conflict, Iraq's communities—and its political class in particular—have not yet found a way to live together in peace.
In the tradition of In Cold Blood and The Executioner’s Song, this haunting, insightful, and surprisingly intimate portrait of Saddam Hussein provides “a brief, but powerful, meditation on the meaning of evil and power” (USA TODAY). The “captivating” (Military Times) The Prisoner in His Palace invites us to take a journey with twelve young American soldiers in the summer of 2006. Shortly after being deployed to Iraq, they learn their assignment: guarding Saddam Hussein in the months before his execution. Living alongside, and caring for, their “high value detainee and regularly transporting him to his raucous trial, many of the men begin questioning some of their most basic assumptions—about the judicial process, Saddam’s character, and the morality of modern war. Although the young soldiers’ increasingly intimate conversations with the once-feared dictator never lead them to doubt his responsibility for unspeakable crimes, the men do discover surprising new layers to his psyche that run counter to the media’s portrayal of him. Woven from firsthand accounts provided by many of the American guards, government officials, interrogators, scholars, spies, lawyers, family members, and victims, The Prisoner in His Palace shows two Saddams coexisting in one person: the defiant tyrant who uses torture and murder as tools, and a shrewd but contemplative prisoner who exhibits surprising affection, dignity, and courage in the face of looming death. In this thought-provoking narrative, Saddam, known as the “man without a conscience,” gets many of those around him to examine theirs. “A singular study exhibiting both military duty and human compassion” (Kirkus Reviews), The Prisoner in His Palace grants us “a behind-the-scenes look at history that’s nearly impossible to put down…a mesmerizing glimpse into the final moments of a brutal tyrant’s life” (BookPage).
The first man to conduct a prolonged interrogation of Saddam Hussein after his capture explains why preconceived ideas about the dictator led Washington policymakers and the Bush White House astray.
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
A new account of modern Iraqi politics that overturns the conventional wisdom about its sectarian divisions How did Iraq become one of the most repressive dictatorships of the late twentieth century? The conventional wisdom about Iraq's modern political history is that the country was doomed by its diverse social fabric. But in State of Repression, Lisa Blaydes challenges this belief by showing that the country's breakdown was far from inevitable. At the same time, she offers a new way of understanding the behavior of other authoritarian regimes and their populations. Drawing on archival material captured from the headquarters of Saddam Hussein's ruling Ba'th Party in the wake of the 2003 US invasion, Blaydes illuminates the complexities of political life in Iraq, including why certain Iraqis chose to collaborate with the regime while others worked to undermine it. She demonstrates that, despite the Ba'thist regime's pretensions to political hegemony, its frequent reliance on collective punishment of various groups reinforced and cemented identity divisions. At the same time, a series of costly external shocks to the economy—resulting from fluctuations in oil prices and Iraq's war with Iran—weakened the capacity of the regime to monitor, co-opt, coerce, and control factions of Iraqi society. In addition to calling into question the common story of modern Iraqi politics, State of Repression offers a new explanation of why and how dictators repress their people in ways that can inadvertently strengthen regime opponents.
After Saddam: American Foreign Policy and the Destruction of Secularism in the Middle East investigates the manner in which American foreign policy in Iraq artificially shifted the balance of power in the region and brought religious identities to the foreground. Deposing Saddam Hussein resulted in a new regional order that diminished the strength of secular nationalism, elevated Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional rivals, and by implication, established a new ideological paradigm that privileged competing religious factions over secular ideals. The trend first manifested itself in Iraq during the American occupation with Iranian-backed Shiites fighting Saudi-supported Sunnis. A similar dynamic is evident in current regional wars in Syria and Yemen. By elevating particular groups through rhetorical, financial, and military support, civil conflicts in the Middle East reflect the ideologies behind the Saudi–Iranian rivalry. This book therefore looks beyond popular narratives of intractable, long-standing Sunni–Shia conflict to explain the source of current sectarian tension as a product of balance of power dynamics. It also helps to explain the fracturing of the region that created a ripe environment for groups like the Islamic State to capitalize on sectarian grievances. This book relies and builds on balance of power theorizing by looking at the way that traditional competition for power between states and nonstate actors shapes ideological competition. For example, during the Cold War, the two major world powers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—helped to shape international conflicts so that the narrative of “capitalism vs. communism” played a prominent role in civil and international conflicts—such as in Korea, Nicaragua, or Angola. By meddling in the internal affairs of states, arming rebel groups, and lending support to competing factions, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shaped not only outcomes, but also the ideas underpinning conflicts. Today, a similar dynamic can be discerned in the Middle East.
This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.
This book draws on newly available archives from the Iraqi state and Ba'th Party to present a revisionist history of Saddam Hussein's religious policies. The point of doing this, other than to correct the current understanding of Saddam's political use of religion through his presidency, is to argue that the policies promoted then directly contributed to the rise of religious insurgencies in post-2003 Iraq as well as the current and probably future crises in the country. In looking at Saddam's policies in the 1990s, many have interpreted his support for state religion as evidence of a dramatic shift away from Arab nationalism, toward political Islam. But this book shows that the 'Faith Campaign' he launched during this time was the culmination of a plan to use religion for political ends, begun upon his assumption of the Iraqi presidency in 1979. At this time, Saddam began constructing the institutional capacity to control and monitor Iraqi religious institutions. The resulting authoritarian structures allowed him to employ Islamic symbols and rhetoric in public policy, but in a controlled manner. By the 1990s, these policies became fully realized. Following the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, religion remained prominent in Iraqi public life, but the system that Saddam had put in place to contain it was destroyed. Sunni and Shi'i extremists who had been suppressed and silenced were now free. They thrived in an atmosphere where religion had been actively promoted, and formed militant organizations which have torn the country apart since.
Whether changing the regime in Iraq is a worthwhile U.S. policy objective depends in no small part on what occurs in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's departure. This timely volume explores the most urgent challenges for policymakers in a near-term scenario. In addressing the problem of how to overcome the twenty-year legacy of brutality under Saddam's rule, the authors present ideas for limiting the chaos and revenge-taking that are likely to follow Saddam's overthrow, while examining the challenges that will arise for a new leadership attempting to ensure Iraqi social stability. This unique collection of analyses will be an important resource for anyone interested in building a more hopeful future for the people of Iraq. Contributors include Ellen Laipson (president and CEO, Henry L. Stimson Center), Rend Rahim Francke (executive director, Iraq Foundation), Kamran Karadaghi (deputy director and chief editor, Radio Free Iraq), Michael Rubin (visiting scholar, American Enterprise Institute), Safwat Rashid Sidqi (cofounding member, Kurdistan Human Rights Organization), and Amatzia Baram (director, Jewish Arab Center and Gustav Heinemann Institute for Middle East Studies, University of Haifa).
Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three weeks, but stabilization efforts in that country are, as of this writing, ongoing. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the continuing insurgency, with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor the plans in place to handle the situation that arose after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Looters took to the streets, damaging much of Iraq's infrastructure that had remained intact throughout major combat. Iraqi police and military units were nowhere to be found, having largely dispersed during combat. U.S. military forces in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country were not prepared to respond rapidly to the initial looting and subsequent large-scale public unrest. These conditions enabled the insurgency to take root, and the Army and Marine Corps have been battling the insurgents ever since. Why was the United States so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq? As part of a larger study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), RAND Arroyo Center examined prewar planning for postwar Iraq and the subsequent occupation to seek an answer to this question and to draw lessons and recommendations from the Iraq experience.