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This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view. The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief change. Many results and constructions in the book are completely new and have not appeared earlier in the literature.
This work develops logical theories necessary to understand adaptable human reasoning & the design ofintelligent systems. It unifies lively & significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics & artificial intelligence.
Belief change is an emerging field of artificial intelligence and information science dedicated to the dynamics of information and the present book provides a state-of-the-art picture of its formal foundations. It deals with the addition, deletion and combination of pieces of information and, more generally, with the revision, updating and fusion of knowledge bases. The book offers an extensive coverage of, and seeks to reconcile, two traditions in the kinematics of belief that often ignore each other - the symbolic and the numerical (often probabilistic) approaches. Moreover, the work encompasses both revision and fusion problems, even though these two are also commonly investigated by different communities. Finally, the book presents the numerical view of belief change, beyond the probabilistic framework, covering such approaches as possibility theory, belief functions and convex gambles. The work thus presents a unified view of belief change operators, drawing from a widely scattered literature embracing philosophical logic, artificial intelligence, uncertainty modelling and database systems. The material is a clearly organised guide to the literature on the dynamics of epistemic states, knowledge bases and uncertain information, suitable for scholars and graduate students familiar with applied logic, knowledge representation and uncertain reasoning.
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.
The first edition of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic (four volumes) was published in the period 1983-1989 and has proven to be an invaluable reference work to both students and researchers in formal philosophy, language and logic. The second edition of the Handbook is intended to comprise some 18 volumes and will provide a very up-to-date authoritative, in-depth coverage of all major topics in philosophical logic and its applications in many cutting-edge fields relating to computer science, language, argumentation, etc. The volumes will no longer be as topic-oriented as with the first edition because of the way the subject has evolved over the last 15 years or so. However the volumes will follow some natural groupings of chapters. Audience: Students and researchers whose work or interests involve philosophical logic and its applications
In contrast to the prevailing tradition in epistemology, the focus in this book is on low-level inferences, i.e., those inferences that we are usually not consciously aware of and that we share with the cat nearby which infers that the bird which she sees picking grains from the dirt, is able to fly. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such inferences. Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed. Part 3 recalls and extends various systems of deductive and nonmonotonic logic and thereby explains the semantics of absolute and high reliability. In Part 4 it is proven that qualitative neural networks are able to draw justified deductive and nonmonotonic inferences on the basis of distributed representations. This is derived from a soundness/completeness theorem with regard to cognitive semantics of nonmonotonic reasoning. The appendix extends the theory both logically and ontologically, and relates it to A. Goldman's reliability account of justified belief.
Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information, this book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2009, held in Chongqing, China, in October 2009. The 24 revised full papers presented together with 8 posters were carefully reviewed and selected from a flood of submissions. The workshops topics include but are not limited to semantic models for knowledge, for belief, and for uncertainty, dynamic logics of knowledge, information flow, and action, logical analysis of the structure of games, belief revision, belief merging, logics for preferences and utilities, logics of intentions, plans, and goals, logics of probability and uncertainty, argument systems and their role in interaction, as well as norms, normative interaction, and normative multiagent systems.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management, SUM 2012, held in Marburg, Germany, in September 2012. The 41 revised full papers and 13 revised short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 75 submissions. The papers cover topics in all areas of managing and reasoning with substantial and complex kinds of uncertain, incomplete or inconsistent information including applications in decision support systems, machine learning, negotiation technologies, semantic web applications, search engines, ontology systems, information retrieval, natural language processing, information extraction, image recognition, vision systems, data and text mining, and the consideration of issues such as provenance, trust, heterogeneity, and complexity of data and knowledge.
The present volume of the Handbook of the History of Logic brings together two of the most important developments in 20th century non-classical logic. These are many-valuedness and non-monotonicity. On the one approach, in deference to vagueness, temporal or quantum indeterminacy or reference-failure, sentences that are classically non-bivalent are allowed as inputs and outputs to consequence relations. Many-valued, dialetheic, fuzzy and quantum logics are, among other things, principled attempts to regulate the flow-through of sentences that are neither true nor false. On the second, or non-monotonic, approach, constraints are placed on inputs (and sometimes on outputs) of a classical consequence relation, with a view to producing a notion of consequence that serves in a more realistic way the requirements of real-life inference. Many-valued logics produce an interesting problem. Non-bivalent inputs produce classically valid consequence statements, for any choice of outputs. A major task of many-valued logics of all stripes is to fashion an appropriately non-classical relation of consequence.The chief preoccupation of non-monotonic (and default) logicians is how to constrain inputs and outputs of the consequence relation. In what is called "left non-monotonicity, it is forbidden to add new sentences to the inputs of true consequence-statements. The restriction takes notice of the fact that new information will sometimes override an antecedently (and reasonably) derived consequence. In what is called "right non-monotonicity, limitations are imposed on outputs of the consequence relation. Most notably, perhaps, is the requirement that the rule of or-introduction not be given free sway on outputs. Also prominent is the effort of paraconsistent logicians, both preservationist and dialetheic, to limit the outputs of inconsistent inputs, which in classical contexts are wholly unconstrained.In some instances, our two themes coincide. Dialetheic logics are a case in point. Dialetheic logics allow certain selected sentences to have, as a third truth value, the classical values of truth and falsity together. So such logics also admit classically inconsistent inputs. A central task is to construct a right non-monotonic consequence relation that allows for these many-valued, and inconsistent, inputs.The Many Valued and Non-Monotonic Turn in Logic is an indispensable research tool for anyone interested in the development of logic, including researchers, graduate and senior undergraduate students in logic, history of logic, mathematics, history of mathematics, computer science, AI, linguistics, cognitive science, argumentation theory, and the history of ideas. - Detailed and comprehensive chapters covering the entire range of modal logic. - Contains the latest scholarly discoveries and interprative insights that answers many questions in the field of logic.
This book is an extensive, self-contained, up-to-date study of Lehrer's epistemological work. Covering all major aspects, it contains original contributions by some of the most distinguished specialists in the field, outgoing from the latest, significantly revised version of Lehrer's theory. All basic ideas are explained in an introductory chapter. Lehrer's extensive replies in a final chapter give unique access to his current epistemological thinking.