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Spending on U.S. foreign affairs, which constitutes only about one percent of the federal budget, is being sharply reduced. Under the President's 1996 budget plan, it will decline by just as great a percentage as defense between 1990 and 2002—and by substantially more than defense over the 1980-2002 period. No other major category of federal spending will undergo a real cut over either time period. The shrinking budget, totaling about $19 billion in 1997, will still have to fund the State Department, international broadcasting and educational exchanges, trade subsidies and investment guarantees for U.S. business overseas; United Nations operations including peacekeeping, and all types of foreign assistance. In this book, O'Hanlon and Graham focus primarily on this last component of international spending. Specifically, they analyze U.S. official development assistance (ODA) to poor countries. The authors place U.S. ODA in a broad historical, international, and economic perspective. They then recommend an alternative approach to ODA for the United States as well as other donors. They favor continuing to provide humanitarian and grass-roots aid to most poor countries, but providing ODA to promote macroeconomic growth only to those countries that maintain coherent, market-oriented economic policy frameworks. The authors argue that to provide effective aid, as well as to maintain U.S. leadership in world affairs, net resources for ODA and the international account need to increase only modestly.
The phenomenon of foreign aid began at the end of World War II and has survived the Cold War. How should the United States now spend its foreign aid to support its interests and values in the new century? In this study, Carol Lancaster takes a fresh look at all US foreign aid programs and asks whether their purposes, organization and management are appropriate to US interests and values in the world of the 21st century. Lancaster finds that US aid in the new century, if it is to be an effective tool of US foreign policy, needs to be transformed. Its purposes need to be refocused and its organization and management brought into line with those purposes. Those purposes include support for peace-making, addressing transnational issues, providing for humane concerns and responding to humanitarian emergencies. Traditional programs aimed at promoting development, democracy and economic and political transitions in former socialist countries will not disappear but they will have less priority than inthe past. These new sets of purposes, promoting both US interests and values abroad, also offer a policy paradigm around which a new political consensus can be created that will support US aid in the 21st century.Transforming Foreign Aid should be of particular interest to professors, students, and researchers of international affairs, foreign policy, political science, and political economy.
The United States has never felt at home abroad. The reason for this unease, even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is not frequent threats to American security. It is America's identity. The United States, its citizens believe, is a different country, a New World of divided institutions and individualistic markets surviving in an Old World of nationalistic governments and statist economies. In this Old World, the United States finds no comfort and alternately tries to withdraw from it and reform it. America cycles between ambitious internationalist efforts to impose democracy and world order, and more nationalist appeals to trim multilateral commitments and demand that the European and Japanese allies do more. In At Home Abroad, Henry R. Nau explains that America is still unique but no longer so very different. All the industrial great powers in western Europe (and, arguably, also Japan) are now strong liberal democracies. A powerful and peaceful new world exists beyond America's borders and anchors America's identity, easing its discomfort and ending the cycle of withdrawal and reform. Nau draws on constructivist and realist perspectives to show how relative national identities interact with relative national power to define U.S. national interests. He provides fresh insights for U.S. grand strategy toward various countries. In Europe, the identity and power perspective advocates U.S. support for both NATO expansion to consolidate democratic identities in eastern Europe and concurrent, but separate, great-power cooperation with Russia in the United Nations. In Asia, this perspective recommends a shift of U.S. strategy from bilateralism to concentric multilateralism, starting with an emerging democratic security community among the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Taiwan, and progressively widening this community to include reforming ASEAN states and, if it democratizes, China. In the developing world, Nau's approach calls for balancing U.S. moral (identity) and material (power) commitments, avoiding military intervention for purely moral reasons, as in Somalia, but undertaking such intervention when material threats are immediate, as in Afghanistan, or material and moral stakes coincide, as in Kosovo.
In this dramatic new perspective on international affairs, Richard N. Haass, one of the country's most brilliant analysts and able foreign policy practitioners, argues that it is hard to overstate the significance of there being no major power conflict in the world. America's great military, economic, and political power discourages traditional challenges; no ideological fault line divides the world into warring blocs. India, China, Japan, Russia, and Europe all seek a prolonged period of stability that would support economic growth. The opportunity thus exists for unprecedented cooperation among the major powers. This is good, because they share vulnerabilities. Globalization, which promotes trade and investment and eases travel and communication, also facilitates the spread of viruses (human and computer alike), weapons, terrorists, greenhouse gases, and drugs. And the United States, for all its strength, cannot defeat these threats alone. But opportunity is not inevitability. The question is whether the United States will be able to integrate other countries into global efforts against terrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons, genocide, and protectionist policies that jeopardize global economic prosperity. This compelling book explains why it must and how it can.
The first comprehensive account of U.S. development aid policies and implementation operations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, this work is a unique contribution to world history and to the extensive literature on Third World development. Butterfield begins with the remarkable story of why, in 1949, President Truman surprised Americans with his unprecedented development aid policy. He then describes the major alterations in U.S. development aid strategy and operations from 1950 to 2000. Drawing upon his long experience both in Washington and in country aid missions, Butterfield puts a human face on the story by weaving real world vignettes into his narrative. The survey addresses the role of Congress, important program foundations established in the 1950s, creative initiatives of the 1960s, frustrated promises in Vietnam. It explores the Third World's unexpected population explosion; America's evolving technical assistance work in the core sectors such as agriculture, education, health, and administration; and initiatives to reach the rural poor and promote the development role of women. It also comments upon linkages between policy dialogue and financial aid to promote market-oriented policy reforms, Africa's lagging development, and the decline of U.S. development aid in the 1990s.