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The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) advises the Secretary of Defense on the acquisition of major defense systems, reviews the status of individual programs, and formulates recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. It has conducted over 178 reviews since it began in 1969, and some programs have required successive reviews. Major changes in the management of weapon systems were recently introduced following criticism by the services of excessive program direction and micromanagement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). These changes mean that future reviews of program progress for many weapon systems will be conducted by the military services and that OSD staffs will have a more limited role. Many claims of interference in program management stem from efforts of OSD to obtain the needed information for making meaningful reviews and recommendations. Program managers are responsible for expenditures involving billions of dollars, and a review of their actions is essential. Overall needs of DOD require coordination and control. There have been some problems in implementing the DSARC process, some aggrevated by rapid turnover of key personnel. Delegation of reviews to the services could be effective if the OSD maintained its capability of acquiring data, continued its participation in programs, and had final authority for major decisions.
This paper presents the salient points from a 650-page report, and some of my comments regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the defense systems acquisition review process. At the outset, the origin and evolution of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) will be reviewed. Then observations and perceptions of the review process will be made based upon an analysis of several defense system programs. The fundamental question to be answered by the evaluation of the review process was whether experience has shown that DSARC reviews are still the most effective way to ensure a smooth transition of a defense system program from one program phase to the next phase. The experience data based used in answering this question was the result of (1) fact-finding investigations of 16 programs, and (2) interviews with current and prior DOD officials having defense system management knowledge and experience. Conclusions and recommendations are offered based upon the results of the evaluation. (Author).
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion each year to develop, produce, field and sustain weapons systems (the U.S. Air Force over $100 billion per year). DOD and Air Force acquisitions programs often experience large cost overruns and schedule delays leading to a loss in confidence in the defense acquisition system and the people who work in it. Part of the DOD and Air Force response to these problems has been to increase the number of program and technical reviews that acquisition programs must undergo. This book looks specifically at the reviews that U.S. Air Force acquisition programs are required to undergo and poses a key question: Can changes in the number, content, or sequence of reviews help Air Force program managers more successfully execute their programs? This book concludes that, unless they do it better than they are now, Air Force and DOD attempts to address poor acquisition program performance with additional reviews will fail. This book makes five recommendations that together form a gold standard for conduct of reviews and if implemented and rigorously managed by Air Force and DOD acquisition executives can increase review effectiveness and efficiency. The bottom line is to help program managers successfully execute their programs.
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion each year to develop, produce, field and sustain weapons systems (the U.S. Air Force over $100 billion per year). DOD and Air Force acquisitions programs often experience large cost overruns and schedule delays leading to a loss in confidence in the defense acquisition system and the people who work in it. Part of the DOD and Air Force response to these problems has been to increase the number of program and technical reviews that acquisition programs must undergo. This book looks specifically at the reviews that U.S. Air Force acquisition programs are required to undergo and poses a key question: Can changes in the number, content, or sequence of reviews help Air Force program managers more successfully execute their programs? This book concludes that, unless they do it better than they are now, Air Force and DOD attempts to address poor acquisition program performance with additional reviews will fail. This book makes five recommendations that together form a gold standard for conduct of reviews and if implemented and rigorously managed by Air Force and DOD acquisition executives can increase review effectiveness and efficiency. The bottom line is to help program managers successfully execute their programs.
The objective of this study was to evaluate the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) process since its inception and to assess, in a qualitative sense, the degree to which the process has proved to be effective and efficient. The study focused on both the process and the supporting procedures from the standpoint of specific programs. Study Reports contained in this volume include: ROLAND Program Study Report; Copperhead Program Study Report; SOTAS Program Study Report; AV-8B Program Study Report; LAMPS Program Study Report; TRIDENT Program Study Report; FFG Program Study Report; HARPOON Program Study Report; and TACTAS Program Study Report.
The ability of U.S. military forces to field new weapons systems quickly and to contain their cost growth has declined significantly over the past few decades. There are many causes including increased complexity, funding instability, bureaucracy, and more diverse user demands, but a view that is gaining more acceptance is that better systems engineering (SE) could help shorten development time. To investigate this assertion in more detail, the US Air Force asked the NRC to examine the role that SE can play during the acquisition life cycle to address root causes of program failure especially during pre-milestone A and early program phases. This book presents an assessment of the relationship between SE and program outcome; an examination of the SE workforce; and an analysis of SE functions and guidelines. The latter includes a definition of the minimum set of SE processes that need to be accounted for during project development.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) process since its inception and to assess, in a qualitative sense, the degree to which the process has proved to be effective and efficient. In contrast to earlier studies, this study focuses on both the process and the supporting procedures from the standpoint of the program by examining impacts on programs reviewed. The study focuses on two specific areas, the actual process; and the procedures. The process in defined as the basic concept of decentralized management with centralized control of key decisions. The procedures are defined as those activities required to support the process.