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Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.
Erfaringer i bekæmpelse af oprør og guerillabevægelser i Malaysia og Vietnam.
Local Defenses are viewed by many counterinsurgency strategists as an essential element in defeating an insurgency. Providing a population with a local defense organization will strongly support the government's strategy of extending its security and control over the rural areas affected by insurgent organizations. However every insurgency is unique and demands a unique counterinsurgency strategy to be defeated. There always will be an important commonality: insurgent organizations need popular support to subsist. The final success of the government or the insurgents will be determined by the capacity of either both to win and retain the support among the rural population. The analysis of the four cases presented in this study clearly demonstrates each government's approach to the insurgent problem, including the use of local defenses to protect rural populations from insurgent attacks and influence. The organization of local defenses during the Malayan Emergency, the El Salvador's Civil War, as well as the Vietnam War and the Terrorist Epoch in Peru proved to be a force multiplier for the government s effort, at least during the time period in which they were effectively implemented. The contribution of this analysis is not that of providing a framework or recipe for strategists to implement this kind of organizations. Rather, the contribution of this study is on a set of variables to be considered when planning the implementation of local defenses as part of a counterinsurgency effort.
What is Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history. However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Guerrilla warfare Chapter 3: Asymmetric warfare Chapter 4: Malayan Emergency Chapter 5: Low-intensity conflict Chapter 6: Insurgency Chapter 7: Robert Grainger Ker Thompson Chapter 8: Phoenix Program Chapter 9: Jungle warfare Chapter 10: Modern warfare (II) Answering the public top questions about counterinsurgency. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Counterinsurgency.
The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency: Find, Fix, Fight focuses on how to understand the relationship between the use of force and the outcomes of such use. Specifically, there is debate as to how to evaluate counterinsurgency conflicts, and what prescriptions flow from that evaluation. The Neo-Classicist school emphasises prescriptions which are either directly from, or inspired by, Cold War counterinsurgency efforts undertaken by anti-communist states. The Revisionist school focuses on how best to evaluate the political dimensions of such conflicts. This book finds that a third approach, Reflective-Action, is best as it combines Neo-Classicism’s strength of issuing practical prescriptions with Revisionism’s strength for conceptually evaluating counterinsurgency conflicts. This conceptual debate is exposited in three cases. They are the British counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, American counterinsurgency in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Coalition counterinsurgency in Iraq during the 2000s.
The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by American military forces to set conditions for conducting effective Military Information Support Operations (MISO) campaigns in counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. To find these actions, hypotheses built upon tenets found in American military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine were compared to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three COIN case studies from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions, such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp’s, that “effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns” are inherent in successful COIN operations, it is ironic that few works discuss specific recommendations regarding the design and conduct of such campaigns. This study begins filling this literature gap by showing that MISO relationship to other operations holds greater significance in effective MISO campaign design than internal details such as the level of centralization. This finding supports contemporary calls for a more unified group of inform and influence practitioners within the United States military, as well as calls for the United States government to draft a National Information Strategy to better leverage this important element of national power.
This study of the Malayan Emergency examines not only the military but also the administrative, economic, political, and social aspects of the guerrilla war. Taking a cue from the hearts and minds approach to counter-guerrilla warfare, which was popularized by its success in the Emergency but which has not been well understood, the study details the evolution of the policies of the Malayan Government and the Malayan Communist Party and plots the fluctuating fortunes of each side as the sympathies, allegiances, and actions of the people were influenced by the changing circumstances.
A senior expert in national security matters provides the first comparative analysis of unconventional conflicts, using Malaya and Vietnam as lessons for devising new U.S. strategie to counter Third World strife and "drug wars" in the future. This is a provocative text for classes in U.S. foreign policy and military studies.