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This book assesses the respective prospects of two competing methodological approaches to the study of meaning and communication, as well truth and inference, each figuring prominently within the analytic tradition of philosophy of language. The first, ‘logistical’ approach is characterized by the employment of de-compositional logical analysis designed to resolve various theoretically problematic semantic and logical puzzles.The representative proponents of this approach are the three great early analytic philosophers (Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein). The second, ‘phenomenological’ approach, by contrast, instead advocates careful inspection and detailed description of our actual linguistic practices, along with general features of the ordinary circumstances, and lived experiences, in which they are situated. The aim of such description is then to dissolve the aforementioned puzzles by showing them to derive from key misunderstandings of these practices and circumstances. The principle proponent here is the later Wittgenstein. Expanding upon the work of the later Wittgenstein, this book argues that considerations regarding the nature of following a rule, and deriving from the impossibility of private languages, decisively recommend the phenomenological over the logistical methodology, in particular because these considerations demand that we identify linguistic meanings with the disciplined uses of words within public, and proto-typically social, linguistic practices.
Analytic philosophy--arguably one of the most important philosophical movements in the twentieth century--has gained a new historical self-consciousness, particularly about its own origins. Between 1880 and 1930, the most important work of its founding figures (Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein) not only gained attention but flourished. In this collection, fifteen previously unpublished essays explore different facets of this period, with an emphasis on the vital intellectual relationship between Frege and the early Wittgenstein.
Diversity of perspective, whether it be social, cultural, or historical in nature, poses serious challenges to any philosophy of language which hopes to accommodate the notion that linguistic meanings can both be objective (and so sustain important distinctions between correctness and incorrectness, truth and falsity), while nevertheless accounting for successful communication across contexts of utterance. In this dissertation, the goal will be to assess the respective prospects of two distinct methodological approaches to the study of semantic content (each figuring prominently within the history of analytic philosophy) as approaches to these aforementioned challenges. The first of these, which I refer to as the 'logistical' approach, is characterized by the employment of technical, function-theoretic, logical analysis designed to resolve semantic puzzles which emerge characteristically in connection with a set of broadly 'classical realist' metaphysical and semantic assumptions. Such assumptions would include, for instance, that the meanings of words are to be identified with cognitive, external, or abstract Platonic objects. The principle though not exclusive proponents of this approach are the three great early analytic philosophers (that is Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein). The second of the two approaches, which I term the 'phenomenological,' advocates, by contrast, careful inspection and detailed description of our actual linguistic practices, along with general features of the circumstances in which they are situated, the aim of such description being to dissolve the aforementioned puzzles by showing them to derive from key misunderstandings of these practices and circumstances (including those emblematic of 'classical realism' and alluded to above). The principle proponent here is the later Wittgenstein. Expanding upon the work of Wittgenstein, I argue that considerations related to the nature of rule-following and private language decisively recommend the latter methodology over the former, in particular because these considerations demand that we identify linguistic meanings with the disciplined uses of words within proto-typically social linguistic practices. I then in turn attempt to apply the recommended methodology to an interrelated set of problems prominent within the analytic tradition of philosophical semantics, pertaining in particular to singular terms, concepts, propositions, content ascriptions, semantic normativity, and truth.
Between Saying and Doing aims to reconcile pragmatism with analytic philosophy. Robert Brandom investigates the relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions (logical, indexical, modal, normative, and intentional, among others) and their use. He offers new ways of thinking about empiricism, naturalism, and functionalism.
Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies consists of thirteen thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein's writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein's response to Frazer's Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap's conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson's rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond-Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein's explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein's intentions), and Malcolm's defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them previously unpublished or difficult to find, shed much light upon different aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, and upon the controversies which it has stimulated.
This volume initiates an inquiry into the relationship between Ludwig Wittgensteinâ (TM)s â oeanalytic stanceâ towards philosophy and the inherently apophatic nature of his epistemology, a subject that has been repeatedly hinted at, but hitherto never thoroughly researched through this particular hermeneutical lens. In using the term â oeapophaticism, â the book is not merely referring to the theological â oevia negativaâ or to tendencies towards mysticism, but rather to a comprehensive epistemological stance that â oerefuses to identify truth with its formulation and to identify the understanding of the signifier with the knowledge of its signified reality, â to use Christos Yannarasâ (TM) definition. The question of whether Ludwig Wittgensteinâ (TM)s work can be approached as a particularly efflorescent case of the implementation of an implicitly (and at times explicitly) apophatic epistemology is herewith addressed. As such, this volume contends that such an approach would not merely provide elucidations on apophatic epistemologies, but rather shed potentially valuable hermeneutical light on Wittgensteinâ (TM)s work, functioning as an epistemological thread running through it. Consequently, the focal points here consist of questions concerning knowledge and its disclosure, ineffability, non-discursivity, the function of language, the limits of oneâ (TM)s language as the limits of oneâ (TM)s world, and the language of religion, among others. In addition, the volumeâ (TM)s contribution to shedding more light on the apophatic aspects of Ludwig Wittgensteinâ (TM)s philosophy is enhanced by its inclusion of a broad spectrum of different approaches, with contributors ranging from Wittgenstein scholars to Patristics scholarsâ "and beyond.
In this book Michael Potter offers a fresh and compelling portrait of the birth of modern analytic philosophy, viewed through the lens of a detailed study of the work of the four philosophers who contributed most to shaping it: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Frank Ramsey. It covers the remarkable period of discovery that began with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift in 1879 and ended with Ramsey's death in 1930. Potter—one of the most influential scholars of this period in philosophy—presents a deep but accessible account of the break with absolute idealism and neo-Kantianism, and the emergence of approaches that exploited the newly discovered methods in logic. Like his subjects, Potter focusses principally on philosophical logic, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics, but he also discusses epistemology, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of language. The book is an essential starting point for any student attempting to understand the work of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, as well as their interactions and their larger intellectual milieux. It will also be of interest to anyone who wants to cast light on current philosophical problems through a better understanding of their origins.
A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts Includes listings of suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy
A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and necessity and possibility - the concepts of modality - was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that these concepts are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible, and the actual. In this book, the first of two volumes, Sanford Shieh investigates the grounds of this position and its consequences for Frege's and Russell's conceptions of logic. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The upshot of this opposition to modality is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would have to be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance, though the coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays because it is generally assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions.