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¿A stimulating read.... Ambitious in scope and with much original insight, this work is an important contribution to an important debate.¿ ¿Carrie Manning, Georgia State University ¿Westendorf offers an important framework for analyzing prospects for state building by the international community.¿ ¿Desha M. Girod, Georgetown University Why do so many post¿civil war societies continue to be characterized by widespread violence and political instability? Or, more succinctly, why do peace processes so often fail to consolidate peace? Addressing this question, Jasmine-Kim Westendorf explores how the international community engages in resolving civil wars¿and clarifies why, despite the best of intentions and the investment of significant resources, external actors fail in their reconstruction efforts and even contribute to perpetuating the very conditions of insecurity and conflict that they are trying to alleviate. Jasmine-Kim Westendorf is lecturer in international relations at La Trobe University.
Why does peace fail? More precisely, why do some countries that show every sign of having successfully emerged from civil war fall once again into armed conflict? What explains why peace "sticks" after some wars but not others? In this illuminating study, Charles T. Call examines the factors behind fifteen cases of civil war recurrence in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, and Latin America. He argues that widely touted explanations of civil war—such as poverty, conflict over natural resources, and weak states—are far less important than political exclusion. Call’s study shows that inclusion of former opponents in postwar governance plays a decisive role in sustained peace. Why Peace Fails ultimately suggests that the international community should resist the temptation to prematurely withdraw resources and peacekeepers after a transition from war. Instead, international actors must remain fully engaged with postwar elected governments, ensuring that they make room for former enemies.
Although the book explores the roles that other factors - such as regional and systemic power relationships, the terms of the settlement itself, and the role of "ripeness" - play in the success or failure of these peace settlements, it concludes that success hinges more on what third parties do and do not do.
"A project of the International Peace Academy and CISAC, The Center for International Security and Cooperation"--P. ii.
The end of the Cold War has changed the shape of organized violence in the world and the ways in which governments and others try to set its limits. Even the concept of international conflict is broadening to include ethnic conflicts and other kinds of violence within national borders that may affect international peace and security. What is not yet clear is whether or how these changes alter the way actors on the world scene should deal with conflict: Do the old methods still work? Are there new tools that could work better? How do old and new methods relate to each other? International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War critically examines evidence on the effectiveness of a dozen approaches to managing or resolving conflict in the world to develop insights for conflict resolution practitioners. It considers recent applications of familiar conflict management strategies, such as the use of threats of force, economic sanctions, and negotiation. It presents the first systematic assessments of the usefulness of some less familiar approaches to conflict resolution, including truth commissions, "engineered" electoral systems, autonomy arrangements, and regional organizations. It also opens up analysis of emerging issues, such as the dilemmas facing humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies. This book offers numerous practical insights and raises key questions for research on conflict resolution in a transforming world system.
This volume examines the gap between agreements and actual peace. It offers different explanations for the successes and failures of the three processes - in South Africa, Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine - and provides historical and comparative perspectives on the failure of the Middle East peace process.
Why do warring parties turn to United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking even when they think it will fail? Dayal asks why UN peacekeeping survived its early catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, and how this survival should make us reconsider how peacekeeping works. She makes two key arguments: first, she argues the UN's central role in peacemaking and peacekeeping worldwide means UN interventions have structural consequences – what the UN does in one conflict can shift the strategies, outcomes, and options available to negotiating parties in other conflicts. Second, drawing on interviews, archival research, and process-traced peace negotiations in Rwanda and Guatemala, Dayal argues warring parties turn to the UN even when they have little faith in peacekeepers' ability to uphold peace agreements – and even little actual interest in peace – because its involvement in negotiation processes provides vital, unique tactical, symbolic, and post-conflict reconstruction benefits only the UN can offer.
Exclusive interview with Ariel Sharon! A probing look at the war on terrorism. Conflict in the Middle East has simmered and boiled for decades. Now, war and terrorism are global in scope. The Last War contains supremely relevant information for all concerned: Why do Islamic radicals hate the West? What is the radical Moslem’s world view? Who are Osama bin Laden’s allies? Who are the “Little Satan” and the “Great Satan”? Are we being told the whole truth about our enemies? Tragically, a decade of intense diplomacy and negotiation has given way to widespread violence: some analysts, aware of the real potential for catastrophic war in the region, openly wonder if this will all lead to a “last war” of sorts. After seven years of "confidence-building" measures that are the framework of the Oslo Accords - an ambitious attempt to bring Israelis and Palestinians to a final peace agreement - the whole affair is unraveling. Violence in the West Bank has accelerated dramatically since Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Afarat signed the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn in 1993. In this indepth study of the peace process, the reader will learn little-reported facts about the peace process and the people involved, and will be able to see clearly that the latest confrontations are a prelude to a devastating conclusion.
Most studies of international negotiations take successful talks as their subject. With a few notable exceptions, analysts have paid little attention to negotiations ending in failure. The essays in Unfinished Business show that as much, if not more, can be learned from failed negotiations as from successful negotiations with mediocre outcomes. Failure in this study pertains to a set of negotiating sessions that were convened for the purpose of achieving an agreement but instead broke up in continued disagreement. Seven case studies compose the first part of this volume: the United Nations negotiations on Iraq, the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in 2000, Iran-European Union negotiations, the Cyprus conflict, the Biological Weapons Convention, the London Conference of 1830–33 on the status of Belgium, and two hostage negotiations (Waco and the Munich Olympics). These case studies provide examples of different types of failed negotiations: bilateral, multilateral, and mediated (or trilateral). The second part of the book analyzes empirical findings from the case studies as causes of failure falling in four categories: actors, structure, strategy, and process. This is an analytical framework recommended by the Processes of International Negotiation, arguably the leading society dedicated to research in this area. The last section of Unfinished Business contains two summarizing chapters that provide broader conclusions—lessons for theory and lessons for practice.