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Over the past several decades, increases in acquisition costs for U.S. Navy combatants have outpaced the rate of inflation. To understand why, the authors of this book examined two principal source categories of ship cost escalation (economy-driven factors and customer-driven factors) and interviewed various shipbuilders. Based on their analysis, the authors propose some ways the Navy might reduce ship costs in the future.
Over the past four decades, the growth of U.S. Navy ship costs has exceeded the rate of inflation. This cost escalation concerns many in the Navy and the government. The real growth in Navy ship costs means that ships are becoming more expensive and outstripping the Navy's ability to pay for them. Given current budget constraints, the Navy is unlikely to see an increase in its shipbuilding budget. Therefore, unless some way is found to get more out of a fixed shipbuilding budget, ship cost escalation means that the size of the Navy will inevitably shrink. In fact, by some estimates, even boosting the shipbuilding budget from $10 billion annually to $12 billion would only help the Navy achieve a fleet of 260 ships by the year 2035 rather than the nearly 290 it now has (CBO, 2005). To better understand the magnitude of ship cost escalation and its implications, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations asked the RAND Corporation to explore several questions. These include the magnitude of cost escalation, how ship cost escalation compares with other areas of the economy and other weapon systems, the sources of cost escalation, and what might be done to reduce or minimize ship cost escalation.
Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.
The Navy¿s FY 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY 2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2 billion. The ship received $184 million in FY 2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1.9 billion of the cost in the FY 2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy¿s proposed FY 2011 budget does not request any procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Amphibious Ships in General; LPD-17 Program; (3) Issues for Congress. Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal; Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
Discusses the challenges that the Navy is facing in its plans for building its future fleet. This testimony examined these matters: (1) the Navy¿s draft shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2011; (2) the effect that replacing Ohio class submarines with a new class of submarines will have on the Navy¿s shipbuilding program; and (3) the number of ships that may be needed to support ballistic missile defense from the sea. Before discussing those issues, the author briefly recaps an analysis of the 2009 shipbuilding plan as a point of departure for examining the draft 2011 plan. Charts and tables.
The U.S. academic research fleet is an essential national resource, and it is likely that scientific demands on the fleet will increase. Oceanographers are embracing a host of remote technologies that can facilitate the collection of data, but will continue to require capable, adaptable research vessels for access to the sea for the foreseeable future. Maintaining U.S. leadership in ocean research will require investing in larger and more capable general purpose Global and Regional class ships; involving the scientific community in all phases of ship design and acquisition; and improving coordination between agencies that operate research fleets.
This book analyzes the rise of China’s naval power and its possible strategic consequences from a wide variety of perspectives – technological, economic, and geostrategic – while employing a historical-comparative approach throughout. Since naval development requires huge financial resources and mostly takes place within the context of transnational industrial partnerships, this study also consciously adopts an industry perspective. The systemic problems involved in warship production and the associated material, financial, technological, and political requirements currently remain overlooked aspects in the case of China. Drawing on first-hand working experience in the naval shipbuilding industry, the author provides transparent criteria for the evaluation of different naval technologies’ strategic value, which other researchers can draw upon as a basis for further research in such diverse fields as International Security Studies, Naval Warfare Studies, Chinese Studies, and International Relations.
CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers and takes a deep look at each of the military services, the new Space Force, special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2021 budget. This report further includes a foreword regarding how the Biden administration might approach decisions facing the military forces, drawing on insights from the individual chapters.
The U.S. shipbuilding industry now confronts grave challenges in providing essential support of national objectives. With recent emphasis on renewal of the U.S. naval fleet, followed by the defense builddown, U.S. shipbuilders have fallen far behind in commercial ship construction, and face powerful new competition from abroad. This book examines ways to reestablish the U.S. industry, to provide a technology base and R&D infrastructure sustaining both commercial and military goals. Comparing U.S. and foreign shipbuilders in four technological areas, the authors find that U.S. builders lag most severely in business process technologies, and in technologies of new products and materials. New advances in system technologies, such as simulation, are also needed, as are continuing developments in shipyard production technologies. The report identifies roles that various government agencies, academia, and, especially, industry itself must play for the U.S. shipbuilding industry to attempt a turnaround.
Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.