Download Free Who Will Fight The Next War Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Who Will Fight The Next War and write the review.

The Persian Gulf conflict was the first major combat test for U.S. military forces since the nation ended conscription two decades ago. As hundreds of thousands of American troops were dispatched to the Middle East, the nation realized, seemingly for the first time, that the composition of its armed forces was far removed from any that the nation had previously sent to war. The deployment of unprecedented proportions of minorities and women and the prominent role of reserves and national guard troops aroused considerable interest, widespread debate, and some worry. The prospect that African Americans could bear a disproportionate share of military casualties generated a socially diverse debate that threatened to reopen old racial scars; the reality that American women were exposed to perils from which, by long and deep tradition, they had previously been shielded inspired calls for them to be admitted to combat specialties; and controversy surrounding the readiness of the Army's combat reserves led to an internecine struggle over the future shape of the U.S. Army. In this book, Martin Binkin addresses each of these issues in order to provide a better understanding of the composition of America's fighting forces, to prompt an assessment of attitudes toward who should fight in future wars, and to delineate the choices for influencing the social distribution of peril. Binkin argues that the time for public involvement is now, while the memories of the Persian Gulf conflict are still reasonably fresh and while a fundamental rethinking of the post-cold war military is under way.
The Persian Gulf conflict was the first major combat test for U.S. military forces since the nation ended conscription two decades ago. As hundreds of thousands of American troops were dispatched to the Middle East, the nation realized, seemingly for the first time, that the composition of its armed forces was far removed from any that the nation had previously sent to war. The deployment of unprecedented proportions of minorities and women and the prominent role of reserves and national guard troops aroused considerable interest, widespread debate, and some worry. The prospect that African Americans could bear a disproportionate share of military casualties generated a socially diverse debate that threatened to reopen old racial scars; the reality that American women were exposed to perils from which, by long and deep tradition, they had previously been shielded inspired calls for them to be admitted to combat specialties; and controversy surrounding the readiness of the Army's combat reserves led to an internecine struggle over the future shape of the U.S. Army. In this book, Martin Binkin addresses each of these issues in order to provide a better understanding of the composition of America's fighting forces, to prompt an assessment of attitudes toward who should fight in future wars, and to delineate the choices for influencing the social distribution of peril. Binkin argues that the time for public involvement is now, while the memories of the Persian Gulf conflict are still reasonably fresh and while a fundamental rethinking of the post-cold war military is under way.
This report defines and describes will to fight and provides a model of unit will to fight that can be applied to ground combat units of any scale. It also provides a theoretical basis for adding will to fight to military war gaming.
"...a useful addition to the literature of the changing character of war. Its scoping and focus, and its application of the identified disruptors to current challenges offer immediate insights for today’s commanders and defence policymakers." — The Wavell Room The nature of war is constant change. We live in an era of exponential technological acceleration which is transforming how wars are waged. Today, the battlespace is transparent; multi-domain sensors can see anything, and long-range precision fire can target everything that is observed. Autonomous weapons can be unleashed into the battlespace and attack any target from above, hitting the weakest point of tanks and armored vehicles. The velocity of war is hyper-fast. Battle shock is the operational, informational, and organizational paralysis induced by the rapid convergence of key disrupters in the battlespace. It occurs when the tempo of operations is so fast, and the means so overwhelming, that the enemy cannot think, decide, or act in time. Hit with too many attacks in multiple domains, all occurring simultaneously, the enemy is paralyzed. In short, the keys to decisive victory in war is to generate battle shock. Imagine a peer fight against Communist China, a new war in Europe against a resurgent Russia, or a conflict against Iran in the Middle East. How can our forces survive an enemy-first strike in these circumstances? Can we adapt to the ever-accelerating tempo of war? Will our forces be able to mask from enemy sensors? How will leaders execute command and control in a degraded communications environment? Will our command posts survive? Will our commanders see and understand what is happening in order to plan, decide, and act in real time? This book addresses these tough questions and more.
Americans love war. We’ve never run from a fight. Our triumphs from the American Revolution to World War II define who we are as a nation and a people. Americans hate war. Our leaders rush us into conflicts without knowing the facts or understanding the consequences. Korea, Vietnam, and now Iraq and Afghanistan define who we are as a nation and a people. How We Fight explores the extraordinary double-mindedness with which Americans approach war and articulates the opposing perspectives that have governed our responses throughout history: the “crusade” tradition, or our love of grand quests to defend democratic values and overthrow tyrants; and the “quagmire” tradition, or our resistance to the work of nation-building and its inevitable cost in dollars and American lives. How can one nation be so split? Studying conflicts from the Civil War to the present, Dominic Tierney uncovers the secret history of American foreign policy and provides a frank and insightful look at how Americans respond to the ultimate challenge. And he shows how U.S. military ventures can succeed. His innovative model for tackling the challenges of modern war suggests the possibility of enduring victory in Afghanistan and elsewhere by rediscovering a lost American warrior tradition.
The first comprehensive treatment of how the United States has handled the final stages of its conflicts-from World War I to Iraq-spoiled repeatedly by leaders' failures to plan clearly for what to do when the guns fall silent. Concerned with not repeating past errors, our leaders miscalculate and prolong the conflict or invite unwelcome results. In his penetrating analysis of past, present, and future wars, Rose suggests how to break this cycle.
How three key figures in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran built ruthless irregular warfare campaigns that are eroding American power. In Three Dangerous Men, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America’s rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about—and engages in—competition before it is too late.
How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.