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A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.
For 2,000 years, the standard philosophical model of knowledge was that it could be defined as a justified true belief. According to this way of thinking, we can know, for example, that we are human because [1] we believe ourselves to be human; [2] that belief is justified (others treat us as humans, not as dogs); and [3] the belief is true. This definition, which dates to Plato, was challenged by Edmund Gettier in one of the most influential works of philosophy published in the last century – a three page paper that produced two clear examples of justified true beliefs that could not, in fact, be considered knowledge. Gettier's achievement rests on solid foundations provided by his mastery of the critical thinking skill of analysis. By understanding the way in which Plato – and every other epistemologist – had built their arguments, he was able to identify the relationships between the parts, and the assumptions that underpinned then. That precise understanding was what Gettier required to mount a convincing challenge to the theory – one that was bolstered by a reasoning skill that put his counter case pithily, and in a form his colleagues found all but unchallengeable.
This book enriches our understanding of knowledge and Gettier's challenge, stimulating debate on a central epistemological issue.
A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology - belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such beliefs as representations of reality. Within this framework Professor Armstrong offers a distinctive account of many of the main questions in general epistemology - the relations between beliefs and language, the notions of proposition, concept and idea, the analysis of truth, the varieties of knowledge, and the way in which beleifs and knowledge are supported by reasons. The book as a whole if offered as a contribution to a naturalistic account of man.
Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.
What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, by identifying and arguing against two fundamental epistemological presumptions. Can there be both better and worse knowledge of some fact? Can you improve your knowledge of a particular fact? Can there be especially bad knowledge of a specific fact? Epistemologists routinely answer these questions with a resounding 'No'. But Stephen Hetherington argues that those standard answers are mistaken. The result is a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way. The theory offers new solutions to many traditional epistemological puzzles, including various kinds of scepticism, the Gettier challenge, and the problem of the criterion. It also offers a fresh way of using G. E. Moore's anti-sceptical gambit, along with reinterpretations of the epistemic roles of fallibility, luck, relevance, and dogmatism. And what can we know about knowledge? The role of intuition in shaping epistemological thought about knowledge is critically examined. Anyone working on epistemology will enjoy this original and challenging work.
Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa — belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists.
Offering a philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge, this text demonstrates how a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and luck can enable us to see past some of the most intractable disputes in the contemporary theory of knowledge.
Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place. Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.
Reflective Knowledge draws together ground-breaking work in epistemology by Ernest Sosa. He argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on virtuous circularity, shows how this idea may be found explicitly or just below the surface in such illustrious predecessors as Descartes and Moore, and defends the view against its rivals.