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At the end of the twentieth century, academics and policymakers welcomed a trend toward fiscal and political decentralization as part of a potential solution for slow economic growth and poor performance by insulated, unaccountable governments. For the last two decades, researchers have been trying to answer a series of vexing questions about the political economy of multi-layered governance. Much of the best recent research on decentralization has come from close collaborations between university researchers and international aid institutions. As the volume and quality of this collaborative research have increased in recent decades, the time has come to review the lessons from this literature and apply them to debates about future programming. In this volume, the contributors place this research in the broader history of engagement between aid institutions and academics, particularly in the area of decentralized governance, and outline the challenges and opportunities to link evidence and policy action.
'Decentralization in Client Countries' assesses the effectiveness of Bank support for decentralization between fiscal years 1990 and 2007 in 20 countries, seeking to inform the design and implementation of future support. Given the difficulties of measuring the results of decentralization, the evaluation uses intermediate outcome indicators- such as strengthened legal and regulatory frameworks for intergovernmental relations, improved administrative capacity, and increased accountability of subnational governments and functionaries to higher levels of government and to local citizens- to assess the results of Bank support in these 20 cases. To examine potential lessons at a sectoral level, the evaluation also assesses whether Bank support for decentralization improved intermediate outcomes for service delivery in the education sector in 6 of the 20 countries.
"Past approaches to correcting for unit nonresponse in sample surveys by re-weighting the data assume that the problem is ignorable within arbitrary subgroups of the population. Theory and evidence suggest that this assumption is unlikely to hold, and that household characteristics such as income systematically affect survey compliance. The authors show that this leaves a bias in the re-weighted data and they propose a method of correcting for this bias. The geographic structure of nonresponse rates allows them to identify a micro compliance function, which they then use to re-weight the unit-record data. An example is given for the U.S. Current Population Surveys, 1998-2004. The authors find, and correct for, a strong household income effect on response probabilities"--Cover verso.
The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.
The authors analyze general equilibrium relationships between trade policy and the household distribution of income, decomposing social welfare into real income level and variance components and emphasizing Gini and Atkinson indexes. They embed these inequality-adjusted social welfare functions in a general equilibrium structure mapping from tariff protection to household inequality. This yields predictions regarding the linkages between trade protection, country characteristics, and inequality within a broad general equilibrium framework. In addition, the authors can separate the efficiency and equity effects of tariffs on welfare. They then examine endogenous tariff formation when policymakers care about both equity and special interests.
Trade preferences are a central issue in ongoing efforts to negotiate further multilateral trade liberalization. "Less preferred" countries are increasingly concerned about the discrimination they confront, while "more preferred" developing countries worry that WTO-based liberalization of trade will erode the value of current preferential access regimes. This tension suggests there is a political economy case for preference-granting countries to explicitly address erosion fears. The authors argue that the appropriate instrument for this is development assistance. The alternative of addressing erosion concerns through the trading system will generate additional discrimination and trade distortions, rather than moving the WTO toward a more liberal, non-discriminatory regime. They further argue that prospective losses generated by most-favored-nation liberalization should be quantified on a bilateral basis, using methods that estimate what the associated transfer should have been and ignoring the various factors that reduce their value in practice (such as compliance costs or the fact that part of the rents created by preference programs accrue to importers in OECD countries). Given that many poor countries have not been able to benefit much from preference programs, a case is also made that preference erosion should be considered as part of a broader response by OECD countries to calls to make the trading system more supportive of economic development. The focus should be on identifying actions and policy measures that will improve the ability of developing countries to use trade for development.
"The benefits of services trade reform are huge but services negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) are making little progress. A proximate cause is the current negotiating process, based on an inertial request-and-offer approach rather than a set of goals that would give direction and momentum to the negotiations. The paper suggests that WTO members should consider: (1) locking in the current openness of cross-border trade for a wide range of services; (2) eliminating barriers to foreign investment either immediately or in a phased manner where regulatory inadequacies need to be remedied; and (3) allowing greater freedom of international movement at least for intra-corporate transferees and for service providers to fulfill specific services contracts ... " -- Cover verso.
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. It provides insights into current policy debates from Latin America to the European Union, and a new perspective on a tension between the promise and peril of federalism that has characterized the literature since The Federalist Papers.