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In the fall of 1956, the world was on the brink of war. Egyptian President Gamel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and Britain, France, and Israel attacked him. Russia supported Nasser, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened nuclear holocaust if the United States became militarily involved. Soon, the matter became a major problem for the United Nations. Fortunately, because of the efforts of Lester Pearson, then Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, the crisis was defused. Pearson proposed a U.N. peacekeeping force be sent to Egypt to separate the warring factions there and keep the peace. Because his idea was adopted, Pearson helped save the world from war. For his outstanding statesmanship, Pearson won the Nobel Prize for Peace, the only Canadian ever to do so. This book, written to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the event, is about the Suez and about Pearson’s work during a tension-filled time in the twentieth century.
Between 1957-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan restored the 'Special Relationship' between the United States and Great Britain after the Suez Crisis of 1956 threatened to divide these longtime allies. Their diplomatic partnership, designed to keep the peace during one of the most difficult periods of the Cold War, was based on their personal friendship, the system of bilateral consultations which they established, and the program of defence co-operation which they instituted. In this fascinating study, Geelhoed and Edmonds explore the most important diplomatic partnership of the 1950s.
From the 9/11 attacks to waterboarding to drone strikes, relations between the United States and the Middle East seem caught in a downward spiral. And all too often, the Central Intelligence Agency has made the situation worse. But this crisis was not a historical inevitability -- far from it. Indeed, the earliest generation of CIA operatives was actually the region's staunchest western ally. In America's Great Game, celebrated intelligence historian Hugh Wilford reveals the surprising history of the CIA's pro-Arab operations in the 1940s and 50s by tracing the work of the agency's three most influential -- and colorful -- officers in the Middle East. Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt was the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and the first head of CIA covert action in the region; his cousin, Archie Roosevelt, was a Middle East scholar and chief of the Beirut station. The two Roosevelts joined combined forces with Miles Copeland, a maverick covert operations specialist who had joined the American intelligence establishment during World War II. With their deep knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs, the three men were heirs to an American missionary tradition that engaged Arabs and Muslims with respect and empathy. Yet they were also fascinated by imperial intrigue, and were eager to play a modern rematch of the "Great Game," the nineteenth-century struggle between Britain and Russia for control over central Asia. Despite their good intentions, these "Arabists" propped up authoritarian regimes, attempted secretly to sway public opinion in America against support for the new state of Israel, and staged coups that irrevocably destabilized the nations with which they empathized. Their efforts, and ultimate failure, would shape the course of U.S. -- Middle Eastern relations for decades to come. Based on a vast array of declassified government records, private papers, and personal interviews, America's Great Game tells the riveting story of the merry band of CIA officers whose spy games forever changed U.S. foreign policy.
This book advances a critical analysis of U. S. Middle East policy and offers alternative perspectives. It highlights areas of policy shortcomings in the wake of ongoing global and domestic changes and draws attention to the need for a new and more plausible U. S. policy. The United States and the Middle East evaluates the roots and consequences of post-World War II diplomatic and military initiatives, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian question, United States relations with Iran following the Iranian revolution, Irangate, the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, and the war led by the United States against Iraq. The important roles of U. S. media and Middle East studies and education in influencing U. S. foreign policy are also emphasized. A concluding chapter focuses on the ongoing global restructuring and the U. S. quest for world leadership in the wake of the Persian Gulf War.
How are alliances made? In this book, Stephen M. Walt makes a significant contribution to this topic, surveying theories of the origins of international alliances and identifying the most important causes of security cooperation between states. In addition, he proposes a fundamental change in the present conceptions of alliance systems. Contrary to traditional balance-of-power theories, Walt shows that states form alliances not simply to balance power but in order to balance threats. Walt begins by outlining five general hypotheses about the causes of alliances. Drawing upon diplomatic history and a detailed study of alliance formation in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, he demonstrates that states are more likely to join together against threats than they are to ally themselves with threatening powers. Walt also examines the impact of ideology on alliance preferences and the role of foreign aid and transnational penetration. His analysis show, however, that these motives for alignment are relatively less important. In his conclusion, he examines the implications of "balance of threat" for U.S. foreign policy.
This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Prize recounts the panoramic history of oil -- and the struggle for wealth power that has always surrounded oil. This struggle has shaken the world economy, dictated the outcome of wars, and transformed the destiny of men and nations. The Prize is as much a history of the twentieth century as of the oil industry itself. The canvas of this history is enormous -- from the drilling of the first well in Pennsylvania through two great world wars to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm. The cast extends from wildcatters and rogues to oil tycoons, and from Winston Churchill and Ibn Saud to George Bush and Saddam Hussein. The definitive work on the subject of oil and a major contribution to understanding our century, The Prize is a book of extraordinary breadth, riveting excitement -- and great importance.
Why NATO Endures examines military alliances and their role in international relations, developing two themes. The first is that the Atlantic Alliance, also known as NATO, has become something very different from virtually all pre-1939 alliances and many contemporary alliances. The members of early alliances frequently feared their allies as much if not more than their enemies, viewing them as temporary accomplices and future rivals. In contrast, NATO members were almost all democracies that encouraged each other to grow stronger. The book's second theme is that NATO, as an alliance of democracies, has developed hidden strengths that have allowed it to endure for roughly 60 years, unlike most other alliances, which often broke apart within a few years. Democracies can and do disagree with one another, but they do not fear each other. They also need the approval of other democracies as they conduct their foreign policies. These traits constitute built-in, self-healing tendencies, which is why NATO endures.