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A history of World War I and an analysis of its causes & effects, plus how the conflict was fought. The Great War of 1914–1918 was the first mass conflict to fully mobilize the resources of industrial powers against one another, resulting in a brutal, bloody, protracted war of attrition between the world’s great economies. Now, one hundred years after the first guns of August rang out on the Western front, historian William Philpott reexamines the causes and lingering effects of the first truly modern war. Drawing on the experience of front line soldiers, munitions workers, politicians, and diplomats, War of Attrition explains for the first time why and how this new type of conflict was fought as it was fought; and how the attitudes and actions of political and military leaders, and the willing responses of their peoples, stamped the twentieth century with unprecedented carnage on—and behind—the battlefield. War of Attrition also establishes link between the bloody ground war in Europe and political situation in the wider world, particularly the United States. America did not enter the war until 1917, but, as Philpott demonstrates, the war came to America as early as 1914. By 1916, long before the Woodrow Wilson’s impassioned speech to Congress advocating for war, the United States was firmly aligned with the Allies, lending dollars, selling guns, and opposing German attempts to spread submarine warfare. War of Attrition skillfully argues that the emergence of the United States on the world stage is directly related to her support for the conflagration that consumed so many European lives and livelihoods. In short, the war that ruined Europe enabled the rise of America. Praise for War of Attrition A Wall Street Journal Best Non-Fiction Book of 2014 “An incisive, colorful book. . . . War of Attrition succeeds both as an argument and a gripping narrative.” —Geoffrey Wawro, author of A Mad Catastrophe “Philpott argues persuasively that the stunning victories of the last hundred days of the war were the result of a steep learning curve necessitated by earlier bloodbaths.” —The Wall Street Journal “An astute examination by an expert war historian that sifts through the collective theatres of attrition in this unprecedented slaughter.” —Kirkus Reviews
Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.
Jonathan Fennell captures for the first time the true wartime experience of the ordinary soldiers from across the empire who made up the British and Commonwealth armies. He analyses why the great battles were won and lost and how the men that fought went on to change the world.
History has tended to measure war's winners and losers in terms of its major engagements, battles in which the result was so clear-cut that they could be considered "decisive." Cannae, Konigsberg, Austerlitz, Midway, Agincourt-all resonate in the literature of war and in our imaginations as tide-turning. But these legendary battles may or may not have determined the final outcome of the wars in which they were fought. Nor has the "genius" of the so-called Great Captains - from Alexander the Great to Frederick the Great and Napoleon - play a major role. Wars are decided in other ways. Cathal J. Nolan's The Allure of Battle systematically and engrossingly examines the great battles, tracing what he calls "short-war thinking," the hope that victory might be swift and wars brief. As he proves persuasively, however, such has almost never been the case. Even the major engagements have mainly contributed to victory or defeat by accelerating the erosion of the other side's defences. Massive conflicts, the so-called "people's wars," beginning with Napoleon and continuing until 1945, have consisted of and been determined by prolonged stalemate and attrition, industrial wars in which the determining factor has been not military but matériel. Nolan's masterful book places battles squarely and mercilessly within the context of the wider conflict in which they took place. In the process it help corrects a distorted view of battle's role in war, replacing popular images of the "battles of annihilation" with somber appreciation of the commitments and human sacrifices made throughout centuries of war particularly among the Great Powers. Accessible, provocative, exhaustive, and illuminating, The Allure of Battle will spark fresh debate about the history and conduct of warfare.
For three years following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, Egypt, with a massive infusion of weaponry from the Soviet Union, continued to do battle with Israel in what became known as the War of Attrition. The history of these years holds the key to understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict today. In this book, David A. Korn offers a detailed insider’s account of the first—and, until recently, the only—U.S.-Soviet cooperative effort to bring peace to the Middle East and an explanation of the origin of the “land for peace” formula. He relates a fascinating story of political intrigue in Washington and Jerusalem that stymied the efforts of peacemakers; of Egypt’s massing a huge army along the west bank of the Suez Canal; and of Israel’s desperate search for a strategy to hold the east bank with a token force and minimal losses. He also describes the incredible miscalculation that nearly plunged Israel into war with the Soviet Union and the great heroism on both sides of the Suez line. This book fills a large gap in the history of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors and is the first to analyze war and diplomacy in the Middle East during the critical years of 1967–1970 from the Egyptian as well as the Israeli point of view. To both, Korn brings penetrating insights based on a wealth of materials never before published. It is a gripping story by a writer who had a grandstand seat on the line.
The First World War left a legacy of chaos that is still with us a century later. Why did European leaders resort to war and why did they not end it sooner? Roger L. Ransom sheds new light on this enduring puzzle by employing insights from prospect theory and notions of risk and uncertainty. He reveals how the interplay of confidence, fear, and a propensity to gamble encouraged aggressive behavior by leaders who pursued risky military strategies in hopes of winning the war. The result was a series of military disasters and a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, he shows that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight as it did on success on the battlefield.
The Marine Corps Way of War examines the evolving doctrine, weapons, and capability of the United States Marine Corps during the four decades since our last great conflict in Asia. As author Anthony Piscitelli demonstrates, the USMC has maintained its position as the nation's foremost striking force while shifting its thrust from a reliance upon attrition to a return to maneuver warfare.In Indochina, for example, the Marines not only held territory but engaged in now-legendary confrontational battles at Hue, Khe Sanh. As a percentage of those engaged, the Marines suffered higher casualties than any other branch of the service. In the post-Vietnam assessment, however, the USMC ingrained aspects of Asian warfare as offered by Sun Tzu, and returned to its historical DNA in fighting "small wars" to evolve a superior alternative to the battlefield.The institutionalization of maneuver philosophy began with the Marine Corps' educational system, analyzing the actual battle-space of warfare--be it humanitarian assistance, regular set-piece battles, or irregular guerrilla war--and the role that the leadership cadre of the Marine Corps played in this evolutionary transition from attrition to maneuver. Author Piscatelli explains the evolution by using traditional and first-person accounts by the prime movers of this paradigm shift. This change has sometimes been misportrayed, including by the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, as a disruptive or forced evolution. This is simply not the case, as the analyses by individuals from high-level commanders to junior officers on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, demonstrate. The ability of the Marines to impact the battlefield--and help achieve our strategic goals--has only increased during the post-Cold War era.Throughout The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, one thing remains clear: the voices of the Marines themselves, in action or through analysis, describing how "the few, the proud" will continue to be America's cutting-edge in the future as we move through the 21st Century. This new work is must-reading for not only every Marine, but for everyone interested in the evolution of the world's finest military force.
This book proposes that the United States Armed Forces consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of battalion sized combat troops in 1965, through the Westmoreland-Abrams transition, and ultimately encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this strategy during the period of Vietnamization. General Abrams promoted a "one-war" strategy which had the desired end state of population security for the people of South Vietnam. In reality the "one-war" was a multi-tiered strategy of attrition. The training of South Vietnamese forces was predicated on their capability to conduct attrition warfare upon the departure of American forces. This book emphasizes the continuity of American strategy in the Republic of South Vietnam. Despite claims of a radical shift to counter-insurgency and pacification operations, General Abrams continued a consistent strategy he inherited from his predecessor; in turn he passed it on to the South Vietnamese. Any limited success achieved by the United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam was a result of attrition not counter-insurgency and that the ultimate failure was the inability to transition from attrition to maneuver.
In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block-combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent's freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.