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Actor Joseph Gordon-Levitt makes his feature directorial debut with this funny yet earnest psychological comedy-drama about a womanizer named Jon Martello (Gordon-Levitt) who earns the nickname "Don Jon" for his ability to charm beautiful women, but remains unable to forge a meaningful connection with the opposite sex due to his all-consuming Internet porn addiction. Meanwhile, as Jon struggles to free himself from the realm of virtual debauchery, he connects with two disparate women (Scarlett Johansson and Julianne Moore), who separately try to teach him the true value of intimacy. ~ Jason Buchanan, Rovi
'Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918' refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War. Cassar's careful analysis shows that while his work on the home front was on the whole good, he was an abysmal failure as a strategist and nearly cost Britain the war.
Who were the senior generals who took France through the First World War, and why do we know so little about them? They commanded the largest force on the Western Front through both humiliating defeats and forgotten victories; they won international respect and adoration, but also led their army to infamous mutiny. Nevertheless, the French and their allies, under a French General in Chief, would eventually achieve final victory over Imperial Germany. It is extraordinary that this remarkable group of men has been so neglected in histories on the war. Previous studies are outdated and haven't tapped the wealth of primary source material in France's military archives. It is this gap in the literature and in the understanding of the conflict that this thought-provoking and original volume is designed to address. It takes a collective biographical approach to the leading French soldiers who ran the war on the Western Front.
Traditionally, in general studies of the First World War, the Middle East is an arena of combat that has been portrayed in romanticised terms, in stark contrast to the mud, blood, and presumed futility of the Western Front. Battles fought in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia offered a different narrative on the Great War, one in which the agency of individual figures was less neutered by heavy artillery. As with the historiography of the Western Front, which has been the focus of sustained inquiry since the mid-1960s, such assumptions about the Middle East have come under revision in the last two decades – a reflection of an emerging ‘global turn’ in the history of the First World War. The ‘sideshow’ theatres of the Great War – Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific – have come under much greater scrutiny from historians. The fifteen chapters in this volume cover a broad range of perspectives on the First World War in the Middle East, from strategic planning issues wrestled with by statesmen through to the experience of religious communities trying to survive in war zones. The chapter authors look at their specific topics through a global lens, relating their areas of research to wider arguments on the history of the First World War.
After an introductory chapter dealing with the conduct of external relations before 1909, the book examines three distinct phases of the department's development. Although the department had modest beginnings under the first under-secretary, Sir Joseph Pope (1909-1925), it was seen by his successor, O.D. Skelton, as an important instrument for the assertion of Canadian autonomy. Skelton presided over the establishment of the first Canadian diplomatic missions abroad, and was responsible for the creation of a foreign service to staff them. With the outbreak of the war in 1939, both the responsibilities and the size of the department underwent substantial organizational change under Norman Robertson, who became under-secretary after Skelton's death in 1941. Taken together, the criteria for recruitment introduced by Skelton and the reorganization which took place under Robertson gave the department many of the features which have characterized it as a branch of the Canadian government. The further development of the institution will be examined in a second volume covering the years 1946-1968. Since the prime minister was secretary of state for External Affairs during much of the period covered by volume I, the book contributes to an understanding of the operation of the Canadian government as a whole as well as of a single department. It also examines the policy making process and therefore will be of interest to students of international relations as well as of public administration.
When war broke out in Europe in 1914, nearly every combatant foresaw a short decisive conflict. Experience would soon prove, however, that this belief was sorely misplaced. Eventually, excessive economic dislocations would topple every authoritarian regime. Only the intervention of the United States would save the British and the French from collapse. This book traces the trilateral struggle between the Entente, the Central Powers, and the United States to determine the outcome of the war. Stubbs focuses on a few essential factors vital to understanding this three-way race: the acquisition of war materiel, food, human resources, and the movement of each. In an analysis of coalition strategies, it is not enough to study the memoirs and memoranda of General Staffs or political figures engaged in war. One must also examine the roles played by each population, their industries, economy, means of transportation, and the financial decisions that make such strategies possible. In short, the material foundations of war set the boundaries within which strategic maneuvers occur. Ultimately, the United States determined the outcome of the First World War, not simply because it provided the last untapped reservoir of manpower, but due to its overall economic contributions to the allied effort.
A landmark work of narrative history, Paris 1919 is the first full-scale treatment of the Peace Conference in more than twenty-five years. It offers a scintillating view of those dramatic and fateful days when much of the modern world was sketched out, when countries were created—Iraq, Yugoslavia, Israel—whose troubles haunt us still. Winner of the Samuel Johnson Prize • Winner of the PEN Hessell Tiltman Prize • Winner of the Duff Cooper Prize Between January and July 1919, after “the war to end all wars,” men and women from around the world converged on Paris to shape the peace. Center stage, for the first time in history, was an American president, Woodrow Wilson, who with his Fourteen Points seemed to promise to so many people the fulfillment of their dreams. Stern, intransigent, impatient when it came to security concerns and wildly idealistic in his dream of a League of Nations that would resolve all future conflict peacefully, Wilson is only one of the larger-than-life characters who fill the pages of this extraordinary book. David Lloyd George, the gregarious and wily British prime minister, brought Winston Churchill and John Maynard Keynes. Lawrence of Arabia joined the Arab delegation. Ho Chi Minh, a kitchen assistant at the Ritz, submitted a petition for an independent Vietnam. For six months, Paris was effectively the center of the world as the peacemakers carved up bankrupt empires and created new countries. This book brings to life the personalities, ideals, and prejudices of the men who shaped the settlement. They pushed Russia to the sidelines, alienated China, and dismissed the Arabs. They struggled with the problems of Kosovo, of the Kurds, and of a homeland for the Jews. The peacemakers, so it has been said, failed dismally; above all they failed to prevent another war. Margaret MacMillan argues that they have unfairly been made the scapegoats for the mistakes of those who came later. She refutes received ideas about the path from Versailles to World War II and debunks the widely accepted notion that reparations imposed on the Germans were in large part responsible for the Second World War. Praise for Paris 1919 “It’s easy to get into a war, but ending it is a more arduous matter. It was never more so than in 1919, at the Paris Conference. . . . This is an enthralling book: detailed, fair, unfailingly lively. Professor MacMillan has that essential quality of the historian, a narrative gift.” —Allan Massie, The Daily Telegraph (London)