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The electric power delivery system that carries electricity from large central generators to customers could be severely damaged by a small number of well-informed attackers. The system is inherently vulnerable because transmission lines may span hundreds of miles, and many key facilities are unguarded. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that the power grid, most of which was originally designed to meet the needs of individual vertically integrated utilities, is being used to move power between regions to support the needs of competitive markets for power generation. Primarily because of ambiguities introduced as a result of recent restricting the of the industry and cost pressures from consumers and regulators, investment to strengthen and upgrade the grid has lagged, with the result that many parts of the bulk high-voltage system are heavily stressed. Electric systems are not designed to withstand or quickly recover from damage inflicted simultaneously on multiple components. Such an attack could be carried out by knowledgeable attackers with little risk of detection or interdiction. Further well-planned and coordinated attacks by terrorists could leave the electric power system in a large region of the country at least partially disabled for a very long time. Although there are many examples of terrorist and military attacks on power systems elsewhere in the world, at the time of this study international terrorists have shown limited interest in attacking the U.S. power grid. However, that should not be a basis for complacency. Because all parts of the economy, as well as human health and welfare, depend on electricity, the results could be devastating. Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System focuses on measures that could make the power delivery system less vulnerable to attacks, restore power faster after an attack, and make critical services less vulnerable while the delivery of conventional electric power has been disrupted.
Since 9/11, the dominant view is that we have entered an era of 'new conflict' in which technology has empowered non-state actors who now pose unprecedented and unmanageable threats to U.S. national security. This unique work studies a range of threats, from homegrown and foreign terrorism to the possibility of cyber- or Chinese sabotage and fears of religious subversion to challenge every aspects of this 'new conflict' argument and expose its underlying exaggerations and misunderstandings. Examining such issues as political violence, the role of religion in terrorism, the impact of technology, and the political aspects of homeland security, this unique survey demonstrates how such activities as terrorism are limited by their clandestine nature. It also addresses why we need to switch our strategic focus and increase the role citizens have in dealing with such threats. This historically informed and critical analysis fills a void in the debates on the threats and conflicts that the U.S. confronts at home and abroad and will appeal to anyone interested in national security and terrorism.
This edited book investigates the interrelations of disaster impacts, resilience and security in an urban context. Urban as a term captures megacities, cities, and generally, human settlements, that are characterised by concentration of quantifiable and non-quantifiable subjects, objects and value attributions to them. The scope is to narrow down resilience from an all-encompassing concept to applied ways of scientifically attempting to ‚measure’ this type of disaster related resilience. 28 chapters in this book reflect opportunities and doubts of the disaster risk science community regarding this ‚measurability’. Therefore, examples utilising both quantitative and qualitative approaches are juxtaposed. This book concentrates on features that are distinct characteristics of resilience, how they can be measured and in what sense they are different to vulnerability and risk parameters. Case studies in 11 countries either use a hypothetical pre-event estimation of resilience or are addressing a ‘revealed resilience’ evident and documented after an event. Such information can be helpful to identify benchmarks or margins of impact magnitudes and related recovery times, volumes and qualities of affected populations and infrastructure.
This volume presents the papers and summarizes the discussions of a workshop held in Goa, India, in January 2004, organized by the Indian National Institute of Advanced Science (NIAS) and the U.S. Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). During the workshop, Indian and U.S. experts examined the terrorist threat faced in both countries and elsewhere in the world, and explored opportunities for the U.S. and India to work together. Bringing together scientists and experts with common scientific and technical backgrounds from different cultures provided a unique opportunity to explore possible means of preventing or mitigating future terrorist attacks.