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The United States in the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 is an invaluable reference guide to the costly and controversial war the U.S. waged in Vietnam, over the course of five presidential administrations. Focusing not only on the conflict in Southeast Asia, but also on the tumult the war inspired on the domestic front, Louis Peake provides an authoritative guide to the wide range of media available on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. From collections of art work and poetry about the soldiering experience, to journalistic accounts of battles, and military training films, the entries consistently provide clear and concise descriptions, allowing the reader to easily identify the value of any particular resource. With revised and updated annotations, and over 150 new entries, this second edition of The United States in the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 is an invaluable reference tool for researchers and students of the Vietnam War. Routledge Research Guides to American Military Studies provide concise, annotated bibliographies to the major areas and events in American military history. With the inclusion of brief critical annotations after each entry, the student and researcher can easily assess the utility of each bibliographic source and evaluate the abundance of resources available with ease and efficiency. Comprehensive, concise, and current—Routledge Research Guides to American Military Studies are an essential research tool for any historian.
South Vietnam fell because of events occurring thousands of miles away from the battlefields--in China, the Soviet Union, Latin America, the Middle East, and Washington's corridors of power, along protest lines, and around America's dinner tables. These other wars being fought by American presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford profoundly impacted what happened in Vietnam. This work examines those other conflicts and the political, social, and economic factors involved with them that distracted and crippled the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and led to the eventual abandonment of the U.S.-supported South Vietnamese regime. Nixon entered office with the goal of bringing the world together, but saw that goal ruined by the 1973 war in the Middle East, preoccupations with China and the Soviet Union, a weak economy, Watergate, and his disgraceful exit from the White House. Ford's presidency was tainted almost from the beginning because of the pardon he granted to Nixon, but the American public, tired of war and concerned about the economy, was ready to hear that the war had come to an end. An argument is presented that the war could have been won if the "other wars" had been fought by presidents willing to honor the American commitment to its allies in South Vietnam.
This book explores the ramifications of the peacekeeping mission by three countries in light of their various foreign policies, set in the wider scene of international politics. The Commission did more worthwhile work than is commonly appreciated.
Demonstrating the centrality of diplomacy in the Vietnam War, Pierre Asselin traces the secret negotiations that led up to the Paris Agreement of 1973, which ended America's involvement but failed to bring peace in Vietnam. Because the two sides signed the agreement under duress, he argues, the peace it promised was doomed to unravel. By January of 1973, the continuing military stalemate and mounting difficulties on the domestic front forced both Washington and Hanoi to conclude that signing a vague and largely unworkable peace agreement was the most expedient way to achieve their most pressing objectives. For Washington, those objectives included the release of American prisoners, military withdrawal without formal capitulation, and preservation of American credibility in the Cold War. Hanoi, on the other hand, sought to secure the removal of American forces, protect the socialist revolution in the North, and improve the prospects for reunification with the South. Using newly available archival sources from Vietnam, the United States, and Canada, Asselin reconstructs the secret negotiations, highlighting the creative roles of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and Saigon in constructing the final settlement.
Long considered a classic for its enlightening analysis of what went wrong in Vietnam, this frank assessment of the American involvement in the war comes straight from the U.S. Army generals responsible for its conduct in the field. First published in 1977 to great acclaim, the painful indictment of both the military and civilian policy makers serves as a useful guide on how to avoid similar disasters in today's conflicts. The author, an American general who was chief of staff of the most important field command in Vietnam before his retirement in 1970, sent an extensive questionnaire to 173 other generals in 1974, seeking their views on the war and guaranteeing anonymity. Nearly 70% responded, with many adding pages of comments about such sensitive subjects as leadership and integrity. General Kinnard then interviewed twenty of the respondents and supplemented their input with research of Army documents. What emerges from his analysis of the generals' responses is a uniquely fascinating and penetrating look at the war, focusing on such central issues as the competence of American and Vietnamese troops, the clarity of U.S. objectives, the influence of body counts, and much more.
Winner of the Overseas Press Club's Cornelius J. Ryan Award for Best Nonfiction Book, the Commonwealth Club of California's Gold Medal for Nonfiction, and the PEN Center West Award for Best Research Nonfiction Twenty-five years after the end of the Vietnam War, historian and journalist A. J. Langguth delivers an authoritative account of the war based on official documents not available earlier and on new reporting from both the American and Vietnamese perspectives. In Our Vietnam, Langguth takes us inside the waffling and deceitful White Houses of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon; documents the ineptness and corruption of our South Vietnamese allies; and recounts the bravery of soldiers on both sides of the war. With its broad sweep and keen insights, Our Vietnam brings together the kaleidoscopic events and personalities of the war into one engrossing and unforgettable narrative.
In this shocking exposé on the betrayal of South Vietnam, premier historian Larry Berman uses never-before-seen North Vietnamese documents to create a sweeping indictment against President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. On April 30, 1975, when U.S. helicopters pulled the last soldiers out of Saigon, the question lingered: Had American and Vietnamese lives been lost in vain? When the city fell shortly thereafter, the answer was clearly yes. The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam—signed by Henry Kissinger in 1973, and hailed as "peace with honor" by President Nixon—was a travesty. In No Peace, No Honor, Larry Berman reveals the long-hidden truth in secret documents concerning U.S. negotiations that Kissinger had sealed—negotiations that led to his sharing the Nobel Peace Prize. Based on newly declassified information and a complete North Vietnamese transcription of the talks, Berman offers the real story for the first time, proving that there is only one word for Nixon and Kissinger's actions toward the United States' former ally, and the tens of thousands of soldiers who fought and died: betrayal.