Download Free Us Policy And Nato Military Operations In Kosovo Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Us Policy And Nato Military Operations In Kosovo and write the review.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last The sudden disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 led to a series of violent armed ethnic conflicts that resulted in the deaths of more than a quarter-million civilians and almost 1.5 million refugees. Although NATO forces were able to end these conflicts and bring stability to most of the region, a brief flare-up occurred in 1998-99 in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which was part of Serbia. After a sustained bombing campaign against the Serbian aggressors, the United States Army entered the troubled province and eventually enforced a tenuous peace between the Kosovars and Serbs. This brief study chronicles the origins of U.S. involvement and the peace enforcement operation that followed through 2005. Military leaders, peace negotiators, military science, AP high school global studies students, and international relations students may find this resource helpful for research papers. Historians, especially military historians and political scientists may also be interested in this work. Related products: Yugoslavia From "National Communism" to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990 (Book and CD-ROM) is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00252-0 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Center of Military History can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1061 "
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.
An examination of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, with afocus on joint military operations.The 1999 military operation against the Yugoslav Army in Kosovosuggests several areas in which Joint military operations weredeficient. This study examined all aspects of the Kosovo conflict,including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt tounderstand these deficiencies and to recommend improvements. Thisdocument--provided in both a classified and unclassified version--isbased on extensive original source documents and interviews with mostof the principal participants, and serves as the definitive Armyrecord on Kosovo. While the primary focus of the research was on U.S.Army involvement, it covered many other aspects of Operation AlliedForce. Topics included NATO objectives in Operation Allied Force, airand ground planning, evolution of the air operation and its effects onfielded Yugoslav forces, Task Force Hawk, and peace operations. The 1999 military operation in Kosovo suggests severalareas in which Joint military operations were deficient. This studyexamines all aspects of the Kosovo conflict, with a focus on U.S. Armyinvolvement, including its political and historical underpinnings, inan attempt to understand these deficiencies and to recommendimprovements.
In response to Serbian aggression in Kosovo, NATO began air operations against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. This report reviews international reactions to that operation. Responses in eight NATO countries France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom--which are key to the operation for either military and/or geopolitical reasons are discussed. The potential for the conflict in Kosovo to spill across international borders is considered to be high. Thus, this report considers the reaction to the NATO air strikes of the following non-NATO regional actors: Albania, Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Slovenia. The strongest international opposition to the NATO operation has come from Russia and China. For this reason, U.N. Security Council approval has not been sought because both countries have veto power on the Council. Their reactions are discussed, together with a review of action in the United Nations on the crisis in Kosovo. Related CRS products include Kosovo and U.S. Policy by Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, CRS Issue Brief 98041; Kosovo-U.S. and allied Military Operations, by Steven Bowman, CRS Issue Brief 10027: Kosovo: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy, by Steve Woehrel, CRS Short Report RS20125; Kosovo Conflict: Russian Responses and Implications for the United States, by James Nichol, CRS Long Report 30130; and Kosovo: Greek and Turkish Perspectives, by Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Short Report 20149. The report will be updated as events warrant.
U.S. strategy in the Balkans and the Army s role there is examined. The author recommends continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long-term American military presence in the region, and some significant changes in role of the U.S. Army. The goals that led the United States into the Balkans have not yet been fully met. To do so requires both sustained involvement in that region and a continued refinement at the Army s peace operations capabilities. From a broader perspective, he argues that, if U.S. political leaders decide that involvement in protracted peace operations will be an enduring part of American strategy, the Department of Defense should help form specialized joint and interagency peacekeeping organizations as an augmentation to the existing military. The Army should clearly play a leading role in this.