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FOREWORD: The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to give researchers, whether military professionals or civilian scholars, a ready reference of those issues of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. The focus of the KSIL is strategic, rather than operational or tactical. Every year, the KSIL helps guide research efforts to the mutual benefit of the defense community and individual researchers. This year, our nation faces several major challenges, ranging in type from the conflict in Iraq to changes in force size and structure. These challenges are perhaps more significant than any the United States has faced in more than a decade. With the publication of the 2007 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute their efforts to resolving these challenges. Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the Strategic Studies Institute points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend experts or additional sponsors.
The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to provide military and civilian researchers a ready reference for issues of special interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD). Unlike other lists that generally reflect issues which are operational or tactical in nature, the focus of the KSIL is strategic. It highlights topics that senior Army and DoD leaders should consider in providing military advice and formulating military strategy. At present, the U.S. military is engaged in a changing situation in Iraq and an increasing presence in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to restore balance in force sizing and structure. With the publication of the 2009 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute to informing America's leaders of current and emerging challenges.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interests is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. "Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions." They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important.4 National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy. The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. Despite what many academics have maintained, national interests are not only a factor for nation-states. All actors in the international system possess interests. Using Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde's units of analysis, the need to have interests is equally applicable to international subsystems (groups or units that can be distinguished from the overall system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or independence on each other) like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, individual units (actors consisting of various subgroups, orga¬nizations, and communities) such as nations of people that transcend state boundaries and multi¬national corporations, subunits (organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect the behavior of the unit as a whole) like bureaucracies and lobbies, and finally, individuals that all possess separate personal interests as they participate in the overall system.5 Some academ¬ics choose to distinguish between national interests (interests involved in the external relations of the actor) and public interests (interests related within the boundaries of the actor).6 For purposes of this essay, given the closing gap between the influence of external and internal issues in the 21st century international system brought about by the associated components of a rapidly globalized world, there will be no distinction made between external and internal interests. In effect, they all fall under the concept of the national interest. There is a generally accepted consensus among academics that interests are designed to be of value to the entity or actor responsible for determining the interest for itself. This could include 4 those interests that are intended to be "a standard of conduct or a state of affairs worthy of achieve¬ment by virtue of its universal moral value."7 However, there is less agreement over the question of whether all nation-state interests are enduring, politically bi-partisan, permanent conditions that represent core interests that transcend changes in government,8 in contrast to those interests that may be altered over time and or respond to change in the international system.
The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."